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Advantages, Disadvantages of Warsaw Pact Viewed

PM2706183090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 25, 19-25 Jun 90 pp 9-10

[Article by Vladimir Savelyev: "When the Threat Disappears. The Warsaw Treaty Organization: Advantages and Disadvantages of Maintaining the Alliance"]

[Text] The recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO] showed a high degree of mutual trust, though it was not marked by unanimity, as was the case in the past. Diametrically opposite prospects regarding the WTO's future were expressed before its Moscow meeting. For instance, Hungarian Premier Jozsef Antall proposed abolishing the alliance as an out-of-date organization by the end of 1991. Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski declared, however, that all members of the alliance should be interested in its existence, though it is necessary to strenghten its politicl character. By all indications, this view prevailed at the meeting. But the matter has not been settled finally.

Today, when the East European governments are radically changing, and it becomes increasingly evident that the great powers are giving up attempts to influence the course of events in the continent by flexing their muscles, we can take a different look at the traditional confrontation of military blocs. Is not the military alliance becoming an anachronism? Its most important manoeuvres are now reduced to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, and to cuts in the armed forces of nearly all its member states.

Let us consider the pros and cons and begin with arguments in favor of preservation of the WTO.

First, the WTO ensures stability in the region and the inviolability of postwar frontiers in Europe.

Second, by protecting the common socio-economic and political interests of East European countries, the alliance helps to combine their military efforts and increases in this way the economic effectiveness of mutual defence. Third, the WTO serves as a guarantor against aggression, interference or pressure on the part of the West in circumstances in which, as Soviet generals say, the United States and NATO are not reducing their armed forces, are pursuing a position of strength policy towards the Soviet Union and its allies and calling more often than before for a revision of the present system of treaties in Europe.

This view is held not only by Soviet generals, but also by many Soviets, especially older members of society, who consider the WTO a vitally important instrument for averting a new war originating on German soil.

It is important to note that the idea of maintaining the WTO is advocated both by political and military leaders of the East European countries and by many Western leaders, mainly conservatives. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski once wrote that Poland should remain in the WTO for the sake of stability in the spirit of the past. In the given case, his national roots are evidently stronger than ideological ones, for it is not accidental that the hatred of Russians in military uniform is disappearing in Poland, and the population is taking an almost friendly attitude to them, seeing in the presence of Soviet troops in Polish soil a reliable guarantee against possible territorial claims on the part of a united German superpower.

Paradoxically enough, many Western leaders are now interested in the continued existence of the WTO. They refer to the need of "solidarity with perestroyka," the continuity of policy, stability and even "help for Gorbachev." All this, however, is prompted by the desire to keep the main argument in favour of NATO. If the "threat" disappears and its embodiment in the WTO ceases to exist, the need to preserve the Western defensive alliance will disappear too.

While praising the sincerity of the advocates of preservation of the WTO, let us consider arguments against keeping its former status.

The military expediency of the WTO from the standpoint of the Soviet Union's national security already seems doubtful today. It sufficies to recall the generally recognized view that conflicts in Europe can no longer be settled by military means.

In view of the current processes in East European countries, the self-dissolution of the WTO will probably be a reasonable step, for it would remove some tension in the Soviet Union's relations with its allies. The time factor is acquiring ever greater importance. The "old guard" suffered a defeat in the elections held in Hungary, Romania and the German Democratic Republic in the spring of this year.

It is time to admit that the WTO's experience has been negative in many respects. Military blocs inevitably stimulate attempts to solve the complicated problems by force. For instance, the existence of the WTO determined to a certain extent Moscow's approach to the events in Hungary of 1956 and the interventionist reaction to the Czechoslovakan reforms in 1968.

Bitter experience determined Moscow's highly cautious stand during the revolt against the Ceausescu regime in Romania. The WTO leadership did not take risky measures and only humanitarian aid was given to that country. The Soviet Union avoided the temptation to repeat the actions of the United States, which was then carrying out a military-police operation in Panama.

Newspapers carried alarming reports in connection with the constitutional and political crisis in the Baltic republics, first of all in Lithuania. However, no emphasis is being placed on the settlement of the conflict by military force. We have indeed drawn lessons from the past, though, unfortunately, we prefer to learn from our own mistakes, not from the mistakes made by others. It is indicative that even some top officials, who are regarded as conservatives or hardliners in the West, such as Politbureau member Yegor Ligachev or former commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Col-Gen Boris Gromov, are vigorously against the use of regular troops in national conflicts.

It will be recalled that the possibility of the Soviet Union's existence without the WTO was already proved in the worst times, at the height of the Cold War in 1949-55, when the military and strategic positions of our country were much weaker than today.

Lastly, we should not forget about the burden of military expenditure and the public attitude to bloc policy. Fifty to sixty per cent of the United States' military budget, which has exceeded 300 billion dollars, goes to "the defence of Europe," that is, mainly through NATO channels. The Soviet Union's expenditure in the WTO has not been made public yet. By all indications, it is much higher than the United States' relevant contribution to NATO. Incidentally, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have begun to reduce their armies. Why should the Soviet Union pay the joint defence bills?

As perestroika develops further, the WTO' disadvantages will only increase, in my opinion. Nothing else can be expected in the given circumstances. It is not accidental that the public is worried over the continued existence of such a "closed" zone. Warnings are being made that it may undermine the economy or that the military-industrial complex may get out of government and public control and even help establish a military dictatorship. Such is the common tendency of structures based on military confrontation.

It is doubtful that the economic and bureaucratic interests established in an atmosphere of confrontation will readily concede their positions. However, changes are hindered not only by selfish interests. Old fears remain for a long time after the circumstances which engendered them have disappeared.

The concept of national security which justified the existence of the WTO is growing hopelessly obsolete at a time when the Soviet Union is consolidating its security by renouncing its old military great-power commitments and advancing towards demonstration of its own political system.

Shevardnadze's PRAVDA Article Analyzed

LD2606145390 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Commentary by station commentator Yuriy Soltan]

[Excerpts] What lessons should be drawn from the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe? Is there a future for the Warsaw Treaty Organization? Won't the unification of Germany undermine the Helsinki process? These and other questions that were received at the office of the newspaper PRAVDA are answered in its Tuesday [26 June] issue by the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Some of these answers are analyzed by our commentator Yuriy Solton.

The time is gone when everything the Soviet leadership has been doing in foreign policy was unconditionally trusted. The questions that PRAVDA forwarded to Eduard Shevardnadze to answer are of serious concern to Soviet people. That covers, for example, statements made over the past few days by some high-ranking military men and politicians. One gets the impression that some quarters would like to make a thorough investigation of who and how has lost Eastern Europe. The question is why tanks were not used to put things in order. [passage omitted]

The Soviet foreign minister admits that problems have also arisen, but tragedy could have erupted if the changes had been slow in coming. It is notable what Eduard Shevardnadze has to say on the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its future. This organization, which appeared and functioned for long years in the atmosphere of the cold war, has proved little receptive to changes and it did not always keep abreast of the times. All this could not fail to be felt now, when the situation is different in principle. Nevertheless the Soviet foreign minister believes that the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been existing and will continue to exist so far as it matches the real needs of the member nations. [passage omitted]

Many Soviet people have been disturbed with the prospect for unification of Germany, but why is there more risk in keeping a great nation disunited, which strives inevitably for unification, or in its unity within the context of an all European settlement? In the opinion of the Soviet foreign minister only the latter path leads to peace and stability. We are certain, concludes Eduard Shevardnadze, that close political and economic relations will be established between a united Germany and the Soviet Union and that we will be able to cooperate and inter-react in the interests of the future of Europe and the rest of the world.

[This was] an analysis from commentator Yuriy Solton of the answers by the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, to questions from PRAVDA readers.

Shevardnadze's PRAVDA Article Criticized

LD2706144790 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Commentary by Mikhail Mayorov]

[Text] The Soviet foreign policy has ceased being an untouchable issue. During the polemic about it, here now different sides give different views. The discussion at times stops being diplomatic at all. Things have gone so far that on Tuesday [26 June] in the newspaper PRAVDA the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to apologize to the people of the East European countries for insulting attacks by some of his compatriots. Here's a comment from Mikhail Mayorov and this is what he writes:

A couple of years ago criticism could be heard of any cabinet minister but Eduard Shevardnadze. The practically unanimous approval of his activity in Parliament was confirmation of that. What has changed since then? Has Shevardnadze himself changed in any way? No. Shevardnadze gives the impression of being stable and consistent. He puts such requirements not only to himself but to foreign policy in general.

And so here is an objective, not subjective, factor. Those people in this country who are referred to as conservatives could apparently accept more or less calmly theoretical talk about allegiance of Soviet diplomacy to general human values, to the principles of no interference and free choice of paths of development. But then practical results have followed. Today a Leningrad college instructor, Nina Andreyeva, known for her anti-perestroyka views, openly names Eduard Shevardnadze among the three Soviet leaders whose resignation must be pressed for first of all. There were statements also on a higher level. The head of a Soviet Army region, General Makashov, has publicly criticized the Soviet leadership for the policy in East Europe.

With all the nuances that at times differentiate the views of the critics, there are common points—how could Moscow permit to let go East Europe; why are Soviet troops withdrawing from there instead of putting things into order the way it was done in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

Parrying these attacks by lovers of tank diplomacy, Eduard Shevardnadze has wittily compared them with McCarthyites. He meant those episodes in the history of the United States when viciously minded politicians harassed those officials at the State Department who were allegedly to blame for the weakening of the struggle against world communism.

So is there McCarthyism in the USSR? Well, one must take into account this possible reality that has not quite fully shaped yet, as it most vividly confirms the acuteness of the period the Soviet Union is going through. Well, the old thinking does not depart. The empire is counterattacking, so to say.

For some people here the European countries liberated by the Soviet troops during the years of the Second World War are trophies to which Moscow can claim the right of ownership. Elementary morals and the logic of new political thinking reject such an approach. This is probably the main thing that critics of the Soviet foreign policies refuse to understand and accept.

Future of NATO, Warsaw Pact Examined

PM2706154690 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 90 p 11

[Dispatch by Bjarne Stenquist: "Military Pact in Dissolution"]

[Text] Moscow—The reports of the death of the Warsaw Pact are exaggerated. That is the picture people in Moscow want to give after the military pact's summit in early June. The Pact's survival strategy involves political cooperation with NATO as an important ingredient.

The Warsaw Pact has deep wounds left by the political and military thaw in East Europe. The Soviet Union's most important ally, the GDR, is on its way into NATO. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have decided without many formalities to send home the Soviet troops stationed on their territory. Hungary and Romania are openly talking about leaving the Soviet-dominated military alliance. The same mood prevails in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but here withdrawal is being delayed in order not to create further concern in Europe. Inside NATO people no longer view the Warsaw Pact as a working military organization.

The mood in East Europe is strongly opposed to the Warsaw Pact. The organization was created by Soviet diktat. Unlike NATO, it has no independent military structure. The forces of the six smaller members (Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and East Germany) have been completely under the command of Soviet generals in the event of war or other joint operations, such as the 1956 invasion of Hungary and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Now that the Soviet grip is loosening, massive criticism is coming to the surface.

It was possible to see that the Warsaw Pact is no longer what it was at the foreign ministers' meeting in Prague in March when Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia strongly opposed the Soviet Union's demand that a united Germany should be neutral. They advocated German membership of NATO as a good way of keeping an eye on Germany's combat forces. The Polish and Hungarian foreign ministers also spoke about cooperation with NATO as an element of their countries' foreign policy.

When the Pact's heads of government and heads of state—together with foreign and defense ministers—gathered in Moscow 7 June, many people thought that it was the beginning of the end. During the meeting the disagreements over the Pact's future were sharp, but the threat of dissolution was averted by the appointment of a special committee to examine the future of the Pact. In October the committee will put forward proposals on the Warsaw Pact's "transformation into a treaty between sovereign and equal states based on democratic principles." In November there will be a further summit to decide on the Pact's future activities.

It remains to be seen whether the decision in Moscow simply means that the Pact is being kept alive on a respirator or whether the member states really have a genuine interest in continued political cooperation. In Moscow, however, people are anxious to make a firm impression:

"The West should not be hypnotized by wishful thinking about the death of the Warsaw Pact," said Andrey Grachev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department.

"The conclusion of the Moscow meeting was not that the Pact should be liquidated, but rather that it should take a different, political form," said Leonid Sharin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security.

Andrey Grachev takes the view that at present a change is taking place in the East European countries' attitude to both economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union.

"At the beginning of the year everyone was going to make a swift transition to a market economy, establish cooperation with the EC, and so on. Now people realize that this is not so easy. They have also realized that the Soviet Union and East Europe are also very important, both as markets and as suppliers of raw materials and energy. This amounts to a natural base for continued cooperation.

"The same is true in the field of security policy. In the rapid transformation of Europe that is now taking place—what with disarmament talks, discussions regarding a future security order, and so on—it is as well not to act on one's own. Especially since NATO is continuing its cooperation."

Grachev represents the nucleus of old power, the Central Committee. Sharin has in the past been party secretary in Vladivostok and has worked for most of his life in the management of various defense industries. His committee is largely manned by officers, KGB chiefs, and people from the defense industry. Independent observers in Moscow see the committee as an offshoot of the military-industrial complex. That it should speak out in favor of the Warsaw Pact is hardly surprising.

But even some of the more independent observers are surprised that the Warsaw Pact survived the Moscow meeting.

"When people are demonstrating in the streets and demanding withdrawal it requires a certain courage to stay and examine the Pact's future," said Viktor Konovalov of the United States and Canada Institute.

An important element in Soviet policy today is the proposal for a "bridge" or some kind of formalized cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. When you ask what this means you receive answers that vary greatly:

"I see it as an integration process between the leaderships of the blocs, perhaps not so much to create joint armed forces as to form some sort of mixed groups between the leaderships. The final objective will be to create an order whereby no one could seize power over the blocs," said Leonid Sharin who clearly thinks most in terms of the merger of the two military alliances.

"Our foreign minister, Shevardnadze, recently visited NATO. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has written a major article in PRAVDA. At the beginning of the year all of Europe's military commanders met to discuss military doctrines. We can build further on this," said Vladimir Shustov, who is head of the Foreign Ministry Research Center and who clearly advocates a step-by-small-step rapprochement.

"I hope that the Warsaw Pact will survive for a couple of years at least and that in this time it will succeed in establishing a bridge with NATO. When the Warsaw Pact then finally disappears—which I think is only a question of time—individual countries in East Europe could use this bridge independently to seek cooperation with NATO," said Sergey Blagovolin of the World Economics and International Relations Institute who sees NATO with a pan-European role in the future.

Both Andrey Grachev and Leonid Sharin stressed that a rapprochement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is a precondition for the acceptance of Germany's membership of NATO.

"German unification must be used to overcome the bloc divisions in Europe, not to alter the balance of strength between the blocs," Grachev said.

The proposal for a "bridge" has had a cool reception in the West. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has gone so far as to propose a nonaggression pact between the blocs.

Ambassador Jack Maresca, head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on security-building measures in Vienna, is very critical of the proposals for cooperation between the blocs.

"The Warsaw Pact is an undemocratic organization which no one other than the Soviet Union wants. That is why it is dissolving. The proposals for political cooperation with NATO are simply a final attempt to legitimize the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact. Why should we help?" asked Maresca when he met with a group of Swedish journalists during his visit to Stockholm last week.

Canada's Foreign Minister Views Changing NATO

LD2206062590 Moscow TASS in English 0602 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Kuznetsov]

[Text] Ottawa June 22 TASS—Canadian Foreign Minister Joseph Clark has called for enhancing NATO's political role.

Canada fully supports the reorientation, which meets Canadian interests, he emphasised in a speech to the International Relations Council in Montreal.

The need for changes in NATO's activity is prompted by changes that have taken place in East European countries, he said.

At the NATO summit in July this year, Canada will seek a decision on reductions in tactical nuclear arms and NATO's armed forces in Central Europe. This will inevitably lead to a cut in the Canadian military presence on the European continent, Clark said.

"We shall not regret such a cut, since it would be the result of the long-desired relaxation of tension in East-West relations," he said.

The Canadian foreign minister said that he would suggest that NATO partners hold regular high-level meetings with representatives of the governments in countries in Eastern and central Europe.

Ottawa also intends to raise the question of inviting those countries to work in NATO committees that consider economic and social matters.

At the same time Clark favoured NATO retaining a certain military role and some of its nuclear arms. He maintained that this is necessary in case of instability and as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union's still remaining nuclear arsenal.

Correction, Comparison of Shevardnadze Article

PM2706163190

The following correction and comparison pertain to the item headlined "Shevardnadze Defends Arms, Alliance Policies" published in the 26 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pp 1-6:

Page one, column two, sourceline should read: PM2506213190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 90 First Edition p 3 (correcting edition number to "First")

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 June 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 3 an article by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Comparison of the PRAVDA Second Edition item, entitled "On Foreign Policy," with the First Edition item are identical except for the following:

Page two, column two, last full paragraph, only sentence reads: Policy founded on ideolgy and imbued with ideology can only be meaningful if that ideolgy is based on the principles of goodness, fairness, humanity, and spirituality. Advocacy of ideological sectarianism and intolerance has never done any good. Society will not follow an ascetic hermit or a holy fool, even if they tell the truth about the state of this society. When we talk about the deideologization of relations between states, we have in mind the need to rid them of deformed ideology and ideological extremism.

I needed this digression to state how the framework of a feasible, realistic, and sensible approach in foreign policy is envisioned in the context of the new political thinking. (picking up next paragraph, adding passage)

Page three, column one, first partial paragraph, last sentence reads: I just want to say that assessments of the past must show no less responsibility than the choice of a path for the future.

"Does the Warsaw Pact have a future?" people ask. (picking up second full paragraph, deleting first full paragraph)

United States & Canada

Continuing U.S., USSR Nuclear Tests Debated

90UF0265A Moscow RABOCHAYA RIBUNA in Russian 23 Jun 90 p 3

[Statements on nuclear test in Nevada reported by S. Doronin: "When Will the Explosions Fall Silent?"; first paragraph is set off in a box.]

[Text] Field testing of nuclear weapons is a necessity, assert the military. Taking exception are public spokesmen who think that the ruinous doctrine of nuclear parity causes irreparable damage to the interests of the people of the USSR and the United States.

On 13 June a regular underground nuclear explosion was conducted in the United States on the Nevada test range. It is the second in succession and, apparently, not the last in a program of nuclear tests planned in accordance with the program for this year. Its echo resounded throughout the world, and the echoes also had a direct effect on our state in which the public, significantly ahead of the politicians, is more and more insistently demanding the initiation of a unilateral cessation of nuclear tests.

What course should be taken? What considerations must apply when making a decision on the fate of Semipalatinsk and other test ranges?

Here are opinions of the sides—spokesmen for the public and for the armed forces:

USSR People's Deputy O. Suleymenov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

The military-industrial complexes of the United States and the USSR are mutually interested in stimulating each other's might. For if one becomes weaker, then inevitably the other will slacken.

The "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement is unconditionally supported by miners located in that same region of the Karaganda coal basin, by the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, and by the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. A separate resolution on halting tests was also adopted at the congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party. There are 840,000 communists of the republic who are for it. The scientific potential of the test range, according to general conviction, must be redirected to the resolution of peaceful tasks.

Consider that these are not requests. This is the uncompromising demand of hundreds of thousands of Soviet people.

And what is more. I was informed of the following from Chelyabinsk the other day: The sensitivity of all of the monitoring and measuring equipment set up on the range was understated by several times. Naturally, it is not possible to establish the true values of the radiation background with its help. I suppose that these same kinds of instruments were also provided a group of people's deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet who visited the Semipalatinsk range on 9-10 June. So, is the information that they received reliable?

General of the Army M. Moiseyev, chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR people's deputy:

The Soviet Union is doing a lot: Where necessary, it is taking unilateral steps and, at times, it is even making concessions. The recent year and a half moratorium on underground nuclear tests is evidence of this. But remember one other thing—the actions of the opposing side. It did not want to join in this.

Of course, regular field testing in the state of Nevada is an internal matter of the United States, which is systematically working out a planned program for the creation of new weapon systems and the perfection of existing ones. Especially as it is being conducted in strict compliance with treaty principles. However, there is reason to examine this fact on a somewhat different plane: It is very unfortunate that the antinuclear and antimilitary forces in the United States do not yet determine the strategy of state policy.

Apparently, it makes sense to the native movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" and other similar movements that have not abandoned a priority objective—to achieve complete cessation of production testing, the spread and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and the elimination of existing arsenals—to reexamine tactical objectives and to bring them into closer conformity with the political steps of the states. Gradualness and consideration of all applicable factors are necessary. To give the leadership of the state an ultimatum is, to say the least, irresponsible.

Field testing is not an end in itself, and it is not homage to the native military-industrial complex or a gratification of the excessive ambitions of nuclear physicists. It is, first and foremost, a necessity. Weapons are periodically improved, and they must be kept combat ready, in a repaired condition, and in safe storage, and it is necessary to know their operational characteristics perfectly. I say this as a military man and as a specialist. Well, as a human being, I believe: The time will come when the world will breathe peacefully.

Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Zelentsov, deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

The people's concern is understandable. It arises to a significant degree from a lack of information about what is really happening there and from a misunderstanding of the true causes of the worsening condition of the environment.

Problems have piled up for decades in the Semipalatinsk and nearby oblasts that are in no way associated with the existing range. The region was deprived of attention in all respects. Housing, medical services, food supplies, and industrial commodities did not meet real needs year in and year out. Add to this the intensive construction of enterprises, the majority of which to this day are not equipped with waste disposal means.

We are rebuked: Field testing provokes an increase in cancer illnesses. But let us turn to the statistics. Based on the number of illnesses in a 100,000 population, the index for the United States is 350, the USSR—225, Moscow—290, the Baltics—280, and the Ukraine—270 persons. In Semipalatinsk, the figure holds at a level of 208.

Yes, cases of illnesses of children were more frequent in the oblasts and rayons. But what causes this? What is the explanation for the fact that in all 100 samples of women's breast milk an amount of pesticides and other harmful substances was discovered? Is it not because of the storage and use of chemical weed and pest killers in sovkhozes and kolkhozes [state and collective farms] that things are as bad as they can be? Is it not because the nourishment of women and children in the range area is in the true sense of the word defective? How can a child grow up healthy here?

There is also a lot of other evidence here. Serious and convincing evidence that was prepared by responsible people—specialists in the field of nuclear power, physicians, and ecologists. But even if their authority is not enough, we are prepared to invite an independent international commission of experts to the range. We are for the truth about the state of affairs in our country.

Abalkin Invites NYSE Chairman for Seminar

LD2706061990 Moscow TASS in English 0601 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Special to TASS by Sean Wood]

[Text] New York, June 27—The New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], the Soviet Ministry of Finance, and Gosbank [USSR State Bank] have taken one more step in the transition to a market economy in the USSR.

Soviet Deputy Prime Minister and State Economic Reform Commission Chairman Leonid Abalkin invited NYSE Chairman and Chief Executive Officer John J. Phelan Jr to lead a delegation of U.S. financial experts to organize a seminar on the development of securities exchanges and capital markets. The seminar will be held in Moscow in October.

The idea for the seminar was first proposed by President Gorbachev during his 1989 Malta meeting with President George Bush. The recent Soviet decision to sanction creation of public companies with the right to sell shares and issue bonds has given the go ahead for the seminar.

"A the package of measures for radical economic reform and the transition to a regulated market economy...proposes the creation in our country of a market in securities, this joint Soviet-American seminar will, in our view, constitute an important and concrete step in that direction," said Abalkin on issuing the invitation.

If the creation of a securities market sees the light in Moscow, the Soviets will be on their way to entering the world financial market. If the October seminar develops into a more elaborate cooperation, the Soviets could participate in trading securities of the NYSE's more than 1,850 companies from around the world.

Phelan believes that at the very least, the seminar will provide "insight into the Soviet Union's needs and goals as it embarks on this historic economic reform."

Further, Phelan is sure that "the develoment of a new economic structure at home, and the Soviet Union's expansion into world financial markets, will provide increasing opportunities for cooperation between our two nations."

U.S.-Soviet Seminar of Historians on 'Cold War'

LD2706134290 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—The origins of the "cold war" are now being debated by Soviet and U.S. historians and political scientists who have gathered on the outskirts of Moscow for a seminar on the issue. Today, on the final day of the seminar, its participants will examine the main factors which brought about the "cold war" in 1945-50, as well as the political lessons from the process.

Practially all participants, including Arthur Schlesinger (New York University), Robert Conquest (Hoover Institution), and Sergey Plekhanov (USSR Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies), stressed the importance of studying the experience of past years for those who want to prevent Soviet-U.S. confrontation from continuing. Summing up the results of the seminar, the experts of the two countries agreed that it marked a successful beginning of the process of establishing the historical truth. But the process has to be developed further, they agreed.

Apart from meeting Soviet colleagues within the framework of the seminar, the U.S. guests also familiarised themselves with the changes under way in the USSR.

A frank discussion of the internal situation and difficulties encountered by the country, was held on Tuesday with member of the Presidential Council Yevgeniy Primakov. During a two-hour conversation the Americans voiced support for the Soviet reforms. They were also interested in how real was the threat to perestroika from conservatively-minded strata. Replying, Primakov expressed conviction that the process of democratic change in the Soviet Union is irreversible.

Joint Efforts Highlighted at U.S. Aerospace Show

LD2706135290 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kuzmin]

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—The creation of new super heavy transport aircraft and passenger airliners, using alternative fuels, is planned by Soviet and American aircraft builders. Preliminary understanding to work together in these fields was achieved recently at the fifth international aerospace show in Oklahoma City, in the United States.

"Interaction between Soviet aircraft builders and American specialists will enable us to create a new generation of aircraft," head of the Chief Directorate for Promising Research and Development work under the USSR Aircraft Industry Ministry Aleksandr Batkov, who was a Soviet delegate to the show, told TASS.

"Soviet aircraft building now leads the world in aerodynamics and aircraft materials. The participation of American specialists in joint ventures opens up new opportunities for fitting aircraft with the latest electronic navigation equipment, something that the Americans excel in. This is why Soviet-American cooperation is able to ensure a qualitatively new breakthrough in aircraft engineering."

"As a result of the Soviet Union's participation in the Oklahoma City air show, our list of partners was swelled to include such world leaders as Boeing, Hughes Aircraft Company, Beech Aircraft and Collins," Batkov noted. "We signed a protocol to cooperate with Boeing in developing a super heavy transport aircraft. Hughes Aircraft specialists will interact with us in the development of aircraft sensors. A joint venture will be established between Corken International Corporation and Soviet partners to produce Hydraulic Systems."

According to Batkov, the latest Soviet-built aircraft attract attention not only in the United States.

West German specialists have shown interest in the gas-fuelled Tu-155 aircraft, and French aircraft builders are willing to pool efforts with Soviet designers to develop a supersonic airliner.

Arctic Issues, Cooperation Discussed With Canada

LD2106075190 Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Ottawa June 21 TASS—Soviet and Canadian foreign ministry experts met in Ottawa from June 18 to 20 to discuss cooperation in the Arctic.

The decision to hold regular exchanges on the issue was agreed by President Mikhail Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney during their summit.

Experts discussed a wide range of issues of interaction between the Soviet Union and Canada in the sphere of multilateral cooperation in addition to military-political and international legal problems.

Special attention was paid to discussing measures to protect the fragile arctic environment and forge mutually-beneficial contacts in scientific, technical, economic, social and cultural spheres.

Both sides acknowledged that the consultations were constructive and useful.

The sides agreed to continue exchanges. The next round of consultations will be held in Moscow in 1991.

Northeast Asia

ROK Trade, Economic Cooperation Emphasized

SK2706015790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Gist" of special article carried by Soviet weekly magazine NOVOYE VREMYA: "Let Us Run With a Tiger"]

[Text] The talks between the Soviet president and the ROK president in San Francisco have opened a great deal of discussion over its effects on developing the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Now we are going to read you a gist of an article run by Soviet weekly magazine NOVOYE VREMYA on USSR-ROK economic cooperation headlined "Let Us Run With a Tiger."

The special article noted that Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk provided a fine opportunity to develop exchanges with the ROK. In the speech he outlined the lines for establishing economic relations with the ROK. Couched in the words was a desire to not only accelerate the restructuring process by diversifying trade and economic exchanges, but also to more positively take part in stabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Nevertheless, the process of normalizing relations between the USSR and the ROK has only begun in the fourth year since the restructuring was put into motion. The two countries have begun trade only after the Soviet Chamber of Commerce opened its mission in Seoul and the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation did the same in Moscow. Going one step further, consular departments have been organized by these missions.

Contacts with the renowned South Korean politicians and Mr. Kim Yong-sam, cochairman of that country's ruling party who made two visits to the Soviet Union, have played a significant role in normalizing and developing dialogue between Moscow and Seoul.

Even if the goal of Soviet policy concerning mutual relations with Seoul is acceptable to a certain degree, then what objective does the ROK seek to achieve by its northern diplomacy?

The answer to this question can be seen not only in the intent of Seoul which seeks to gain (?diplomatic success) by establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but also in purely economic factors.

The South Korean economy now sees the first signs of a recession descending upon it. In fact, South Korea's gross national product has shrunk twice as much in comparison with that of 1988. The crisis that has smitten the mining and manufacturing industries is the source of all kinds of economic hardships.

The magazine KOREA ECONOMIC JOURNAL noted that many overseas buyers are reluctant to sign trade contracts with South Korean firms for fear that their delivery would not be on time or that they might turn out to be of low quality. In addition, the magazine also pointed out that the South Korean export goods have lost their competitiveness.

These are the facts that forced South Korean President No Tae-u to state that the weak competitiveness of the mining and manufacturing sectors has created the gravest difficulties for the national economy. South Korean industrialists are trying to find a way out by developing new markets, and they are hanging their highest hopes on the Soviet Union.

Our two countries, which have been bogged down in an (?extreme form) of economic difficulties for various reasons, need each other like the crew aboard a ship that has gone astray.

In view of our two countries' mutual need to supplement the other economically, nothing is more appropriate than bilateral trade with South Korea. Coal, [word indistinct], cotton, and fishery products are the main items of Soviet export goods, while such things as electric home appliances, washing machines, and textile goods will be mainly imported from South Korea. The results, too, are inevitable. The trade volume between the Soviet Union and South Korea went up to $600 million in 1989.

South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun said in an interview that cultural, trade, and economic cooperation will be the most hopeful areas in the mutual relations between our two countries.

He stated: (?The profits our two countries will reap) on this road will also play a part in establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Our businessmen, paying great attention to the Soviet Union, stand more firmly on such a [word indistinct].

Of course, not everything went (?smoothly) in trade between our two countries. For example, payment for goods are made through third countries, not directly. So, the cooperation between the two countries should become better.

Raw materials occupy a large portion of Soviet exports like [words indistinct]. When it comes to joint ventures, even the South Korean firms that [words indistinct] act cautiously.

This notwithstanding, one thing can be said with certainty: Reading articles in South Korean publications shows that the Soviet Union is highly assessed as being one of the leading countries when it comes to basic scientific research. About this, it can be said: Prospects are good if South Korean business firms' potential for production and assimilation can be combined with the Soviet Union's scientific and technological successes. It is of utmost importance not to miss the possibility that is presently before us.

DPRK Railway Ministers To Increase Exchanges

SK2806000090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] What are the problems of concern to the railway functionaries of the Soviet Union and Korea, and what is the status of cooperation between them? The (?ministerial) meeting of the railway cooperative body recently held in the DPRK will help to answer, in part, these questions.

(Konstantin Belov), our Pyongyang-based station correspondent, met with Pak Yong-sok, the DPRK minister of railways, and Nikolay Konarev, minister of railways of the Soviet Union.

The ministers spoke as follows:

We recorded Pak Yong-sok, minister of railways, saying this:

[Begin Pak Yong-sok recording] We are very grateful that the Soviet delegate came to the (?railway ministers' meeting) and (?actively participated in it). We are looking forward to mutual cooperation for the development of the body. The cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK is still developing well, and it will continue to develop with mutual exchanges. It is now up to us to determine how the results of the talks will be implemented. [end recording]

Now let us hear what Railway Minister Nikolay Konarev has to say:

[Begin Nikolay Konarev recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] The results of the Soviet-Korean talks exceeded all of our expectations. We discussed the problem of transporting exports and imports, and we adopted an agreement to double the capacity of the sites (?where goods are reloaded along the border). We (?reduced work on) freight cars, and [word indistinct] the step to more effectively utilize the total number of the Soviet freight cars and the (?volume) of production (?we have) within DPRK territory.

Our DPRK colleagues will see the [words indistinct] freight cars and passenger carriages produced by DPRK plants, and we will supply the [words indistinct] I proposed to repair the railways with the (?help) of the Korean side (?on the Far East Railway) and to sign contracts for the building of housing and industrial facilities. The Korean comrades showed great interest in this proposal. We, as well as Railway Minister Pak Yong-sok, concluded that despite the comparatively rapid increase in the transport of passengers between our two countries, (?the actual number of passengers has not risen to the level of relations between the Soviet Union and the DPRK.)

For instance, although the transport of passengers during the first four months of this year increased by 48 percent, this figure represented no more than 5,000 people. In my opinion, the inertia between the [word indistinct] organizations of the two countries affected this.

Just as the Soviet people have something to see in Korea, so too the DPRK people have something to see in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we decided to increase the number of passengers between the two countries two or three times within the near future. The students in Khabarovskiy Kray and Primorskiy Kray will be visiting the DPRK this year, and Korean children will be coming to the Soviet Union during their vacation time.

More on Celebration of Korean Month of Solidarity

SK2706111490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Asian News" program]

[Text] The month of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle to withdraw foreign forces from South Korea and to achieve the peaceful reunification of the country on a democratic basis is being celebrated in the Soviet Union. The opening of the month of solidarity was declared at a meeting at the Moscow Electric Plant.

Moscow Plant Celebration

SK2806013090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by an unidentified station reporter]

[Text] [First announcer] There was a meeting yesterday in Moscow among officials of the DPRK Embassy to the Soviet Union, representatives of the Moscow electric plant named after Vladimir Ilich, and activists of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society. This meeting was arranged in connection with the start of the month of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle to remove foreign forces from South Korea and to achieve the peaceful reunification of the country based upon democratic principles. Kim Hui-su, DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim to the Soviet Union, and (Victor Buykov), responsible secretary of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, were present at the meeting. The following is an on-the-spot report by our station reporter:

Aleksey Ignachev, secretary of the Moscow electric plant party committee and chairman of the Union of Primary-Level Organizations of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, is with us now.

[Begin Ignachev recording in Russian, fading into Korean translation read by the first announcer] The traditional month of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle has started in our country. During this period, the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society and its chapters in various republics and cities in the Soviet Union will hold meetings [words indistinct] and lectures on the achievements of the DPRK. The Soviet people know about the Korean people's earnest desire to reunify their fatherland as soon as possible and to build a prosperous country.

[Second announcer] On behalf of the workers of the plant, Walentsin Lukanov, vice chairman of the Moscow electric plant veterans committee, spoke next. He said:

[Begin Lukanov recording in Russian, fading into Korean translation—read by the first announcer] Soviet-Korean friendship has a long history. This friendship was consolidated by blood and was honorably brightened during a joint struggle to build a new, free, and prosperous society. In August 1945, Soviet troops defeated the Kanto Army, the Japanese imperialists' joint unit for armed attack, in the Far East. This decisively influenced the successful conclusion of the struggle to liberate Korea from the Japanese imperialists' long colonial rule. Korea now is marking the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war. We express our respect for those who defended the freedom and independence of the DPRK and those who brought peace to Korea. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries gave a great amount of physical and spiritual assistance to the people's Korea. The Korean war taught the lesson that it is (?groundless) to try to reunify Korea by way of armed force and aggression. Jointly seeking solutions to all problems via dialogue and mutual understanding is the one and only way.

[Second announcer] The speaker went on to say that the DPRK leadership's peaceful initiatives provide a good basis for resuming dialogue with South Korea. He also stressed how important Soviet-Korean friendship is in alleviating tension on the Korean peninsula. Kim Hui-su, DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim to the Soviet Union, delivered a reply speech. He praised [the Soviet Union's] solidarity with the Korean people and pointed out the symbolism of the month of solidarity, which was begun at the plant named after Vladimir Ilich. Kim Hui-su also stressed the significance of the Soviet Union's support for the DPRK's [words indistinct]. He also wished the Soviet Union success in restructuring. [words indistinct] there was a friendly conversation between (?Korean enterprises and members of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society) on prospects for developing relations. The two sides expressed hopes to [words indistinct] and further expand these relations. Officials of the DPRK Embassy to the Soviet Union visited the museum and [word indistinct] of the Moscow electric plant.

Rallies Mark Solidarity

SK2706111690 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Asian News" program]

[Text] Rallies are taking place in the DPRK in connection with the day of international solidarity with the Korean people's struggle to make the U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea and to achieve the peaceful, democratic reunification of the country. Two hundred thousand people participated in the Pyongyang meeting. Big rallies also took place in Haeju and Kaesong, cities close to the Demarcation Line, which divides the Korean peninsula. Participants in these meetings pointed out that, even though 37 years have passed since the Korean war ended, no stable peace has been achieved on the Korean peninsula and that the troops of the North and South of Korea are still confronting each other.

The Korean people demand that the Korean peninsula be turned into a peace zone free from nuclear weapons and that the independent, peaceful reunification of the fatherland be achieved.

Soviet Soldier Reminisces on Korea's 'Liberation'

SK2506223090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Jun 90

[Memoirs of (?Vasiliy Gombin) who took part in the Korean Liberation War: "From Unggi to the 38th Parallel"]

[Text] Respected listeners: We continue to introduce you to those who participated in the Korean liberation war in August 1945. Today's episode is about (?Vasiliy Gombin), a retired Army senior colonel.

In the hall of the Friendship With People of the World Society in Moscow, one can often find this old, gray-haired retired Army senior colonel, every inch a soldier. The breast of his jacket is decorated with medals.

Despite his age, over 70, (?Vasiliy Gombin), a retired Army senior colonel and member of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee, positively takes part in many functions of this mass public organization. He often visits the primary organizations of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society.

He often talks with fondness, about the No. 509 regiment under the command of the No. 393 (?main division) in the days of 1945.

With his regiment, he crossed the Soviet-Korean border and went down as far as the 38th parallel.

[Begin (?Gombin) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] (?Vasiliy Gombin) says: There are some kinds of days that are etched vividly in one's memory and remain that way forever. Those days in August 1945 are such days to me.

I often reminisce about my friends, soldiers and officers, with whom I served in the regiment, as well as some roads along which we walked for dozens of kilometers in the land of Korea.

Most of the soldiers in our regiment had been sent to the Soviet Far East shortly after the Great Patriotic War. On more than one occasion, we almost died, but survived. We even believed that it was a miracle that we had survived. So, you can guess how we had felt about the fact that we had been sent to military operations once again.

Engaged in combat, we advanced a few kilometers. On 12 August, three days later, our regiment took part in pitched battles in the port cities of Unggi and Najin. We occupied Unggi without any fighting.

As the Soviet Armed Forces approached the city, the Japanese Army abandoned the city without any resistance.

After a few days of rest in Unggi, we began to attack Najin, a strategically important point in the northern part of Korea. When we arrived at a hill outside Najin, we were greeted by firing from powerful artillery and machine guns.

(?Vasiliy Gombin) continues his story: We returned fire. Under cover of the counterfire, our regiments opened a breakthrough to Najin. A great deal of weapons and ammunition were spent.

A platoon under the command of Sergeant (?Nikolay Osulov) performed a special duty in this battle. The sergeant was fatally wounded. After a few hours of battle in the hill, we occupied the Najin harbor.

Next a difficult battle for the occupation of Chongjin awaited us.

The Japanese Army that was defending this port city, one of the strategically important points of North Korea, now encountered a resolute resistance. A munitions factory and a few military hardware warehouses were within the precinct of this city. From this city, the supply lines ran to every corner of the country. Chongjin port, which was equipped with modern technology, was prepared for any kind of attack.

Looking back on the battle for the occupation of Chongjin, (?Vasiliy Gombin) says:

[Begin (?Gombin) recording fading into Korean translation read by announcer] We were ordered to occupy Chongjin in a day or two. Nevertheless, we were able to advance at a very slow speed.

Even in retreat, the Japanese Army offered a death-defying resistance and counterattacked from time to time. While fleeing, the enemy destroyed all kinds of transportation networks, including bridges and roads.

I still remember the following scenes: In pursuing the enemy, seven of our soldiers occupied a hill. There, they had a good command of the moves by the enemies. The Japanese Army soldiers, after realizing that there were only a few Soviet soldiers, tried to turn the situation in their favor.

They attempted to counterattack, hurling hand grenades at the Soviet soldiers under cover of machine gun fire. The Soviet soldiers finally occupied the height, after repelling five such attacks.

There were many such instances. In the street fighting in Chongjin, there were many pitched battles on every street and every residential area. Despite the enemy's death-defying resistance, we finally occupied Chongjin.

Victories were not won easily. A large number of men and officers of the Soviet Army died in action during the battles for the occupation of this city in the northeastern part of Korea.

(?Vasiliy Gombin) recalls how the people returned home shortly after the liberation of Korea. Those citizens had been forcibly relocated by the Japanese. All over the place we heard: The Russians, and: Korea-Soviet. I remember many emotional scenes, says (?Vasiliy Gombin).

I remember a group of Korean people standing in line in front of a restaurant in one of the streets in Chongjin city. Bean sprout soup had been cooked especially for them. An old Korean man who was supporting himself on a wooden crutch was telling something to people around him. According to an interpreter, the old man was thanking the Soviet soldiers for having liberated the Korean people.

When the Japanese occupied our land, the sun went behind a cloud. Now, the Soviet soldiers have now removed the cloud and brought the sun to us. This was what the old man said, with tears in his eyes. (?Vasiliy Gombin) says that he heard such words often in the August days of 1945, days of a far-away era.

After the battle in Chongjin, (?Vasiliy Gombin), along with his comrades-in-arms, continued to take part in battles in various cities and villages in Korea in order to liberate them from the grip of the Japanese.

Until June 1946, he stayed in military barracks in an area close to the 38th parallel. He was helping his Korean comrades in organizing a new people's government, while keeping those villages in order.

On the eve of his return home, like many of his Soviet soldiers and officers, he was awarded a medal in Pyongyang: for the Liberation of Korea. He keeps such combat medals as precious treasures.

Dear listeners: Retired Sr. Col. (?Vasiliy Gombin) would like to say a few words to you:

[Begin (?Gombin) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] Dear Korean listeners: Marking the anniversary of the Korean liberation, I offer my wholehearted congratulations. My friends who also passed through Korea in August 1945 join me in this.

I wish you happy and peaceful lives. I wish your country and your people success in their lives. Those of us who participated in the war for the liberation of Korea rejoice over the fact that the Soviet-Korean friendship that came into being during that war still continue, even today.

Korean Civil War, External Involvement Assessed

PM2706121990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 First Edition p 5

[V. Kondratyev report: "How the Korean Knot Was Tied—History, Dates, and Reflections"]

[Text] War began in Korea 40 years ago, 25 June 1950. For a number of years, historians and political specialists of different countries have viewed it as the first large-scale local war of the beginning of the nuclear era. A war which took place in the conditions of the new balance of power which developed after 1945. However, today's knowledge of the details of the conflict gives sufficient grounds to characterize this war as a civil war.

Documents and materials received in recent years testify to the fact that after the formation in 1948 of two Korean states, and the retirement from the peninsula of first Soviet and then U.S. troops, the Syngman Rhee regime energetically pursued the unleashing of civil war. Seoul's intentions were known in Pyongyang, and retaliatory measures were adopted. To all intents and purposes an undeclared "small war" was waged from early 1949, characterized by armed incursions into regions north of the 38th parallel. In the first half of 1950, such sorties began to take on increasingly large dimensions. And wide-scale combat operations began 25 June 1950. Seoul set itself the goal of "destroying the army of the aggressor which had intruded into the Republic of Korea, restoring the border along the 38th parallel, and subsequently eliminating the communist regime in the north of the country." The declared aims of the DPRK leadership, on the other hand, consisted in "repelling the attack of Syngman Rhee's troops, routing the aggressor, and liberating the southern part of the country," thereby creating the essential conditions for plugging South Korea into a unified process of socialist construction. As we can see, both Korean Governments pursued determined strategic and political goals, and this substantially predetermined the uncompromising nature of the struggle.

U.S. armed intervention on the side of the Syngman Rhee regime, with the authority of the United Nations as a cover, and then the entry of Chinese people's volunteers into the war on the DPRK side turned it into a large-scale international conflict, which threatened to evolve into a world war. As for the Soviet Union, its government viewed the civil war as the internal affair of the Korean people themselves, and demanded the unconditional cessation of U.S. military intervention. At a difficult time for the DPRK, the Soviet Union offered it not only diplomatic support, but also material and military aid. Deliveries of weapons, ammunition, foodstuffs, and medicine were carried out. Soviet military advisers were dispatched to the combined units and headquarters of the Korean People's Army. Soviet aircraft took part in repulsing the air raids by U.S. planes against North Korean territory.

Three years later, 27 July 1958, the warring parties signed an Armistice Agreement, which stipulated the "complete cessation of military operations and of all hostile acts in Korea pending a definitive peace settlement." This formula is of special significance, since it underlines that the armistice must remain in force irrespective of the how long it might take to achieve a final settlement of the Korean question. The armed conflict ended on the front line that lay south of the 38th parallel in the western sector, and north of it in the eastern sector. Both sides withdrew their troops two kilometers from the 38th parallel, thereby forming a four-kilometer demilitarized zone.

This meant that the prewar border in Korea along the 38th parallel ceased to exist. From a formal point of view, the Korean War ended in a "draw," insofar as not one of its participants had achieved its ultimate political objectives. At the same time the Korean people sustained casualties running into millions, and for a long time economic life in both parts of Korea was paralyzed.

In Seoul they prefer to this day not to advertize the fact that Syngman Rhee opposed in every way the conclusion of the armistice, and after it was nevertheless concluded, refused to observe it. Many very important clauses of this agreement were left unfulfilled thanks to the provocative efforts of the Seoul regime. Thus, in violation of the agreement obligations, Syngman Rhee insisted on signing a South Korean-U.S. treaty on mutual defense, legitimizing the presence of U.S. Armed Forces on South Korean soil for an unlimited term. (In the early postwar years, the United States had significantly decreased the number of its troops stationed in South Korea. Soon after the cessation of hostilities, the insignificant contingents which Britain, France, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa had put at the disposition of the "UN forces command" also left Korea. As for the detachments of Chinese people's volunteers, they left the republic's territory before the end of 1958 under an arrangement between the DPRK and ROK Governments.)

As far back as under Syngman Rhee, the course toward increasing the numbers of the South Korean Armed Forces and stepping up their offensive potential was adopted. From 1976 onward, the South Korean Armed Forces has carried out large-scale maneuvers and exercises annually, including joint maneuvers and exercises with U.S. troops. For example, the joint U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" maneuvers have a global significance.

On Syngman Rhee's initiative, repressive anticommunist legislation was adopted in South Korea that operates to this day, stipulating severe punishment for people advocating the establishment of genuinely broad contacts and cooperation between South and North Korea and the subsequent realization of a peaceful democratic unification of the country.

In these circumstances, the DPRK Government was forced to adopt measures to safeguard the republic's security. Of course, these methods entailed the diversion of significant human and material resources to the sphere of defense. This in turn lays a heavy burden on the DPRK economy and renders its development more difficult.

This series of events naturally led to the situation whereby from the time that the war ended the main groupings of the DPRK and South Korean Armed Forces have confronted each other on either side of the demilitarized zone in a state of mobilizational readiness. The total numerical strength of these groupingss, according to assessments by military experts, at the present time exceeds one million servicemen. In both parts of the country paramilitary reserve formations, many millions strong, have been set up, and carry out regular training. Moreover, if one takes into account that a 42,000-strong grouping of U.S. troops is stationed on South Korean territory, furnished with modern types of weaponry, including tactical nuclear weapons, then it becomes obvious that the Korean peninsula remains as before a region with an exceptionally high level of concentration of armed forces and arms, a region that has been affected to the minimum degree by the trend toward the relaxation of tension.

Aware of its responsibility before the Korean people, the DPRK Government considers the only correct and realistic path toward the unification of the country to be a political settlement in Korea on the basis of the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, and the development of ties between North and South with a view to restoring the country's national unity in accordance with the interest and wishes of all Koreans. A political dialogue has been conducted through various channels between the DPRK and South Korea since 1972. However, up to now it has been progressing only slowly and with difficulty. In recent years the process of the discussion between the DPRK and the United States of questions of mutual interest have also been stepped up, though here, too, no notable progress has hitherto been observed.

Historical experience meanwhile shows that a diminution in the tension on the Korean peninsula and the achievement of a peaceful reunification of Korea is not an isolated regional problem. This problem is a key problem for the Asian-Pacific region also, which should be examined in a broad international context. This factor makes crucial a balanced reduction of Armed Forces and arms in Korea to a level of reasonable defensive sufficiency, the deliverance of the Korean peninsula from nuclear weapons, and a reduction of the foreign military presence in South Korea. The realization of measures aimed at military detente on the

Korean peninsula, it goes without saying, would normalize the atmosphere in the relations of the DPRK and South Korea, facilitate the establishment of a constructive political dialogue, and might even make a genuine and significant contribution to the solution of security problems in the Far East.

Arrest of Japanese, Korean Fishermen Detailed

PM2206134590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Captain First Rank V. Shirokov: "Poaching Case"]

[Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, the start of the fishing season in Kamchatka was marked by an incident: During a patrol mission, Soviet Coast Guard ships detained 12 vessels sailing under the DPRK flag which were poaching salmon ("Pacific Ocean Incident," 7 June this year). Our correspondent gives the details.

Rear Admiral I. Pridein, deputy commander of the Pacific Border District, told me that the poachers were discovered in a convention area from air intelligence data. Coast Guard ships detained 12 offending fishing boats.

At the port of Nakhodka it was ascertained that around 500 tonnes of fish of the salmon species were in the ships' holds. According to preliminary estimates the loss from the illegal catch is over 8 million foreign currency rubles [R]. Incidentally, coast guard personnel also detained six Japanese ships in convention waters at the beginning of May. A trial was held in the city of Kholmsk in Sakhalin Oblast and the Japanese side was fined 1,810,000 in foreign currency rubles. But who will take responsibility for the illegal catch on this occasion? Neither the Japanese nor the Korean side has yet admitted owning the vessels (there are Japanese and DPRK consulates in Nakhodka). It has been established that the crew members include 76 DPRK citizens and 169 Japanese with Korean passports. The trial, which is being held in Nakhodka, faces the task of establishing what lies behind all this.

Azerbaijan Leader Meets Japanese Business Group

NC2006073390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] President Ayaz Mutalibov today received a delegation representing the Japanese firm (Kavachima) which is headed by the firm's president, (Kavachima Hoshimaru). A number of issues related to Japanese participation in Azerbaijan's social and economic development and the setting up of joint establishments to produce consumer goods were discussed. The Japanese delegation expressed interest in developing holiday resorts on the Caspian coast and stated that it wishes to open a [words indistinct] in Baku, [words indistinct], and participate in joint production work in the large establishments that are being constructed in Azerbaijan.

The representatives of the firm will visit a number of large establishments in the republic to obtain more detailed information about the matters that were discussed.

Fuad Musayev, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, also attended the meeting.

Symposium on Siberian Detention Held in Tokyo

OW2406052590 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Tokyo correspondent Potapov report]

[Text] The Japanese-Soviet symposium on the issue of Siberian detention was held in Tokyo on 20 and 21 June. In this connection, Radio Moscow Tokyo correspondent Pavel Potapov states as follows:

An agreement was reached in Moscow on holding this symposium when a delegation of the Zen-Ryu-Kyo [All-Japan Association of Former Internees] led by its president Rokuro Saito visited the Soviet Union in late 1989. Attending this symposium held in Tokyo was a delegation composed of Vice President Shirinskiy of the Soviet Red Cross Society; Director Kirichenko of the Oriental Studies Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences; Blischenko, noted jurist; and Deputy Director Kristafovich of the Tracing Bureau of the Soviet Red Cross Society.

The hall where the symposium was held was fully crowded with aged people who still remember what happened during the war, former detainees, and many Japanese reporters. All the Soviet delegates, and noted Japanese academicians, historians, jurists, and scholars studying Soviet affairs, including Mr. Haruki Wada and Mr. Nobuo Shiotomai, delivered speeches at the symposium. Mr. Rokuro Saito from the Japanese side and Mr. Kirichenko from the Soviet side made the keynote reports. In his report, Mr. Saito denounced the Soviet Union for detaining Japanese prisoners for a long time in violation of the international agreement.

Almost half a century has elapsed since the end of World War II. New generations have been brought up, and Japan now maintains peaceful relations with almost all former enemies. [Words indistinct], the number of people who participated directly in this drama of bloodshed gradually has decreased. However, there still remain now unshakable facts indicating that from 1941 to 1945, Japan was hostile to the Soviet Union, and that the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the Soviet Union, vigorously engaged in preparations in the Far East for the Pacific war, positively engaged in reconnoitering activities, and sunk Soviet vessels.

Citing all these facts in his keynote report, Mr. Kirichenko proved from the legal point that the Soviet Union should not be denounced for intentionally detaining Japanese prisoners for a long time. On the contrary, he stressed that the Soviet Union formally brought the war against Japan to an end and repatriated prisoners to their home country.

Kirichenko's report has aroused the attention of the Japanese mass media. His article published in the journal NOVOE VREMYA last year, and his pre-symposium interview in which he disclosed new views about the issue of Japanese prisoners have also aroused attention. For example, Mr. Kirichenko made remarks that are different from the original Soviet view that the Soviet Union joined in the war against Japan after making a declaration of war; admitted the fault of the Soviet Union in failing to announce at the proper times the list of Japanese prisoners who died in the Soviet Union; and stated that these acts violated international law concerning prisoners and other war victims.

In disclosing the results of recent Soviet investigations, Mr. Kirichenko stated that 639,635 Japanese officers and men were taken prisoner during the war against Japan, and that among them, 65,245 were either immediately released at the frontline or after the end of combat actions from August to December 1945. He also disclosed detailed maps of the distribution of the detention camps for Japanese prisoners, the number of Japanese prisoner who died in the Soviet Union, and a list of graveyards where Japanese are buried.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Sri Lanka Conflict, Indian Involvement Analyzed

BK2806114590 Moscow International Service in Tamil 1400 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Commentary by station observer Vladimir Ivashin]

[Text] The conflict, which has again erupted in the northeast of Sri Lanka has caused serious concern to the neighboring country, India. Our commentator Vladimir Ivashin writes:

We are of the opinion that events in Sri Lanka will force India to intensify its diplomatic efforts. Speaking at the news conference in Male at the end of his state visit to the Maldives, Prime Minister V.P. Singh said India's sad experience in the past of attempting to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic and political crisis by military intervention has compelled present Indian leaders to resort to a peaceful political solution. Prime Minister V.P. Singh expressed the hope that the current conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] will be solved through peaceful negotiations.

India's concern over the escalation of fighting in Sri Lanka's Northeast can be well understood. There is also the risk of terrorist activities unleashed by LTTE militants reaching the nearby Tamil Nadu State of India. One should take note of the recent killings of 14 members of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front by alleged LTTE terrorists in Madras. Now, the Indian Navy is strictly patrolling the Palk Strait to prevent Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups from infiltrating into India. India, which calls for the resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict by peaceful political means, is ready to help fulfill the democratic aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils. But LTTE militants have spurned this stand. It should be noted that following President Premadasa's announcement of the government's readiness to initiate talks within the purview of the 1987 accord—which provides for the transfer of the Northeastern Province administration to the local administrative council with the aim of improving the government-LTTE relations—LTTE militants launched attacks on government troops.

Everything depends on whether or not there will be an end to the bloody massacre of peaceful civilians or whether LTTE leaders will listen to the call to give up their aggressive methods. As far as the Sri Lankan Government is concerned, Minister of State for Defense Ranjan Wijeratne has reiterated that Colombo is ready to resume talks with the LTTE militants only after they have laid down their arms.

Shevardnadze Meets With Philippine Official

PM2806125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 26 June Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze received M. Yan, Philippine first deputy foreign secretary, who is in Moscow in connection with the holding of routine consultations between the two countries' foreign policy departments.

The participants in the talks exchanged views on a number of topical international problems, as well as on questions of bilateral relations. A high assessment was made of the results of the Washington summit between the Soviet and U.S. presidents, and their importance was stressed both for progress in Soviet-U.S. relations and for improving the international situation as a whole.

Particular attention was devoted to questions of strengthening security and organizing extensive international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It was noted that the USSR and the Philippines advocate that the positive processes that have emerged in the region and are promoting the attainment of the aforesaid goals be reinforced.

Expressing satisfaction with the level of Soviet-Philippine political dialogue achieved, the sides advocated its further enhancement and the galvanization of mutually advantageous cooperation in the trade, economic, scientific, technical, humanitarian, cultural, and other spheres. It was reaffirmed that an important task on the agenda for bilateral relations is to prepare for the visit to the USSR by Philippine President C. Aquino.

Economic, Political Situation in Burma Assessed

BK2706123790 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Article by station commentator: "Can There Be Hopes for Economic Revival in Myanmar?"]

[Text] It has been a month now since democratic elections were held for the first time in 30 years in Myanmar [Burma]. Although opposition parties won those elections by a landslide, the political future still remains uncertain for the country. The situation being as such, problems obstructing the undertaking of economic reforms also remain unchanged in Myanmar.

To give credit where it is due, the military government must be praised for declaring an open-door policy after the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] reviewed the economic strategy of the Burma Socialist Program Party. The move was in response to demands for economic reforms by the Myanmar people.

The SLORC permitted the private sector to engage in almost all businesses and also legislated the Foreign Investment Law, thereby creating conditions for foreign companies to set up businesses that they themselves can manage. In addition, the military government legalized the border trade, particularly the cross-border trade with China and Thailand. Foreign companies were also given concessions to undertake fishery and logging operations. Contracts have also been signed with foreign oil and mineral exploration companies to undertake joint ventures.

Although there are enough reasons for the opposition parties and the foreign environmentalists to criticize these arrangements, it must also be pointed out that the undertakings have borne fruit for the military government. According to the International Monetary Fund, Myanmar now has foreign exchange reserves of $550 million.

People who wish to criticize the military regime, however, have been saying that it is only the Defense Services which reap the fruits of the newly introduced policies. Whatever the situation may be, they cannot deny the fact that, according to the Trade Ministry, there are already 42 foreign companies and 391 joint ventures registered in Myanmar. From this point alone, it can be stated that foreign input can be made available for the development of the Myanmar economy if there is a chance of improving the political situation.

International experts, however, say that government monopoly mechanisms that once controlled the economy remain in place today. Military officers still have the final say regarding the management of the resources in the country. Observers overseas point out that if this situation is to continue, foreign entrepreneurs will not be willing to engage in serious businesses that can help resolve the most pressing problems that Myanmar faces.

One of the immediate problems that Myanmar has today is the foreign debt burden. Myanmar is waiting for word from Japan and the Western nations either to waive the debts or to defer the repayment schedule. Spokesmen in Western nations have said many times that the economic restraints imposed on Myanmar following the coup in 1988 will remain as long as a government elected by the people does not emerge. Their tunes, however, have changed slightly for the better since the election victory by the National League for Democracy [NLD].

The NLD office said Myanmar's prestige has soared internationally since the victory of the democratic forces and that there has been some hope for the partial waiving of foreign debts.

Even if the NLD were able to set up a stable government, it would still have difficulties tackling the problem of economic development. U Kyi Maung, a member of the NLD Central Executive Committee, said that there are no definite plans on how to deal with the economy.

The majority of the people in the country, however, believe that it will be easy to tackle economic problems while resolving general problems associated with the democratization process.

At a meeting with foreign journalists, U Kyi Maung said: The people have given us the mandate to work toward a democracy that respects human rights. We understand very well how great a task this is, but we are all prepared to face the many obstacles and the trials that lie on the way toward our goal.

Near East & South Asia

United Nations To Mediate Iran-Iraq Peace Talks

NC2706192990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Perez de Cuellar, the UN secretary general, intends to resume his mediation mission between Iran and Iraq. UN headquarters announced that he will meet the foreign ministers of these two countries in Geneva. Iran and Iraq are observing the August 1988 cease-fire resolution [as heard]. However, some rounds of talks to reach a peace accord have not yet achieved any results.

The new round of talks as part of the UN mediation mission will be initiated under conditions in which a horrible earthquake has occurred in the areas in northwestern Iran. This earthquake has destroyed the lives of thousands and has brought enormous financial and material losses in its wake. The trail of devastation left behind by this earthquake is, in many ways, reminiscent of the destructive repercussions of the bloody Iran-Iraq war which raged for many years.

The Iranian Armed Forces, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and the Mobilization units are actively involved in the relief operations in the areas of the (?natural) calamity. Many of the people who (?donned) military gear and were (?stationed) in the area near the Iraqi border, who were (? a source of) diplomatic confrontation between Tehran and Baghdad, have been assigned to the affected areas. However, the national catastrophe resulting from the jolts of a subterranean disaster has brought home the folly and futility of continuing confrontation, even in the diplomatic [words indistinct].

The instigatory flights of fancy by the two sides, attempts to jeopardize efforts [words indistinct] by use of force against one another, are merciless and (?ironic) acts, since the reaction (? to this calamity) has been sympathy and a willingness to rally for assistance.

Today, the willingness of numerous countries to assist in eliminating the horrifying effects of the earthquake in Iran has united many countries including those which do not (?have any kind of) relations with Iran. Among these countries, one may mention Iraq. As has been reported, the Iraqi leadership has decided to dispatch to the earthquake zone a group of physicians with necessary equipment and consignments of goods for the victims.

This humanitarian action is of immense significance in light of the present state of relations between the two countries. It testifies to the two sides' ability to (?shelve) reciprocal hostility and to perceive only that which is an important basis for bilateral relations and international [words indistinct] in general. What is important is that human beings and countries need peace and a constructive atmosphere for mutual cooperation. War is an unnatural state of affairs. Hardships and tribulations [words indistinct] with special forces can bring home the truth that military confrontation and lack of tolerance are meaningless (?in the face of) such a situation. Merciless tragedy, immense sorrow, and destitution have befallen hundreds of Iranian families. Tragedy is blind, but in the war between Iran and Iraq, massive losses were inflicted intentionally and deliberately on the two nations, and many years will be needed to compensate for these losses.

The resumption of the UN mediation mission is merely to [words indistinct] for peace between Iran and Iraq. This opportunity should not be lost. Not only the victims of the past war, but the victims of the earthquake in Iran [words indistinct].

Yemeni Ambassador Interviewed on Unity

PM2206084990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Ahmad 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Ilah, ambassador of the Yemen Republic to the Soviet Union, by S. Ivanov in Moscow, no date specified: "Now We Are One"—first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] The ceremonial hoisting of the flag of United Yemen took place at the UN headquarters in New York 22 May 1990. Dr. Ahmad 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Ilah, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Yemen Republic to the Soviet Union, has given his first interview to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's correspondent.

[Ivanov] Esteemed Ambassador, the event which has taken place in the southern Arabian Peninsula is undoubtedly a central one for that region: Two parts of a country divided since the 19th century have now united.

['Abd-al-Ilah] The adoption of the declaration on unity is regarded in Yemen as an historic event and the embodiment of the people's aspirations.

The actual split of Yemen, which led to the formation of two states in the north and the south, happened in 1839 when the British created a colony, the Aden Protectorate, in the south of the country. So a people, mentioned in history as far back as the second millennium BC, was divided. A people who, through their strategic position at the intersection of trade routes, played an important role in the Arab world, maintained ties with a whole series of countries in the east, and actively developed their own culture, science, and agriculture.

Thoughts of the country's unity became more or less realistic after two revolutions: in the north of the country in September 1962 and in the south in October 1963.

[Ivanov] For many long years the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] and the YAR [Yemen Arab Republic] adhered to different ideological concepts. Nevertheless, the Yemen Socialist Party [YSP] was one of the driving forces of the unification process. Does this mean that the YSP has abandoned its old guidelines?

['Abd-al-Ilah] No, the YSP has not renounced socialist ideas. It is a different matter that there has been a considerable broadening of the party's tasks, due to changes in the reality of our life.

The YSP began preparing in good time for work in conditions of the multiparty system. An accord on cooperation was reached between the YSP and the General People's Congress, and it is planned to create a united National Front which will include several Yemeni parties and political organizations.

[Ivanov] Two countries—two economic structures. Will fusion be a simple arithmetical addition: plant plus plant?

['Abd-al-Ilah] The state sector predominated in the economy of the south of the country, which also had cooperative agricultural associations and people's individual activity as well as mixed forms. There are similar economic structures in the north but the private sector predominated there.

We have already created a Ministry of Planning, which will elaborate the state's economic strategy. The country's economic capital will be Aden. A large proportion of the factories, duty-free enterprises, and tourist firms will be located there.

The Presidential Council and the government of the country will have to tackle a host of questions in the transitional period, which will last two-and-a-half years. The priority goals of our economy are to give people an opportunity to lead a normal life, to develop, and to show their abilities.

[Ivanov] The Soviet Union has traditionally had good relations with both parts of Yemen. We gave considerable economic aid and political support to your country. Will the changes that you spoke of not lead to a revision of our relations? AFP recently published a report from one of its correspondents on Soviet-Yemeni relations. The report says, among other things: South Yemen which, with its northern neighbor, forms the united Yemen Republic, has clearly distanced itself from the USSR, which was its ally for almost 25 years... What is your comment on that report?

['Abd-al-Ilah] We know about this AFP report. It is far from the truth. Our cooperation with the Soviet Union will develop.

Some people believe that the establishment of normal relations between Yemen and Western countries will mean a reduction of contacts with the Soviet Union. They do not take into account the fact that the world has changed and that relations today can be built not at someone's expense but together with everyone.

I should like to reemphasize that the Yemen Republic will honor all the commitments assumed by the North and the South and that all the treaties and agreements that have been signed will be honored by the Yemen Republic.

We have made use of the experience of transformations in your country. Now we are ready to share that with other countries. Our president said during a press conference in Baghdad, when a West German correspondent congratulated him on the unification of Yemen: We now have experience of unification and, if the need arises, we are ready to send you our experts.

Afghan Border Minister on Tribal Policies

LD2606151590 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] Kabul June 26 TASS [all quotation marks as received] "Pashtu tribes inhabiting Afghanistan and Pakistan value and appreciate relations that Afghan peoples have with Russia and the Soviet Union," Afghan minister of border affairs Sarjangal Khan Zazai told TASS.

"Traditions of friendship with the Russian and the Soviet people continue. They were established at the turn of the century and were continued by Emir Amanullah and Lenin after the victory of the Great October Revolution. Afghan-Soviet relations have always been honest. We have always conducted a dialogue on a durable friendly basis," he said.

The minister praised the policy of national reconciliation started three years ago. It made it possible to normalise the situation in Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords have played a positive role, too, he emphasised.

"Afghanistan and the Soviet Union contributed to fulfilling them." But the United States and Pakistan do not honour them. This has led to a considerable aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan's southern and south-eastern districts, where U.S. and Pakistani secret services have sent large consignments of weapons for rebel groups, in an effort to prolong the war.

Many in the West underestimate the importance of tribal relations for the military-political situation in Afghanistan, the minister said.

"And these relations, specifically, our traditional institutions, such as tribal jirgas, can preserve the balance of forces, and promote the abandonment of military means in resolving domestic conflicts."

Afghan tribes, first of all Pashtu tribes, play an increasing role in the implementation of national reconciliation policies.

As is known, the Khowst District and its centre have been beseiged over many years. Rebel units attacking them are supplied with large volumes of armaments from Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Khowst is holding out against "the siege. The reason is that the tribes inhabiting the district—Mangal, Jadran, Jaji and others, that in the past declared against the government now cooperate with the Afghan government more actively.

There are no government troops in Jaji-Maidan District, but there are tribal home guards who defend their area.

When rebels try to blockade Khowst, the home guards prevent this.

As a result, the situation around khowst has considerably improved, and the enemy can only shell the city with long-range arms.

The road from Kabul to Mohammad-Agha city, Loghar Province and to Gardez is open to traffic.

The situation is similar in Nangrahar Province. Jalalabad held out against rebel attacks also for the reason that the tribes inhabiting it refused to support the rebels.

Leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan Yunus Khales comes from the Nangarhar tribe Hugiani, but tribesmen view him as a fanatic and oppressor and have not supported his units.

The minister said "that one of the chief factors in Afghanistan's pacification is the increasing activity of tribes, also beyond the Durand line.

At their jirgas, people say ever more often that the war is pointless. Tribal assemblies express the wish to act as mediators to begin talks between the warring sides. They demand that Pakistan stop interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs and stop supplying arms to rebels.

Regarding the attempts of the Pakistani military to suppress the movement of tribes inhabiting Bajawur and Khyber tribal districts, Zazai said that Islamabad's course is nothing new.

Contrary to the existing traditional standards, the Pakistani authorities try to infringe Pashtu rights by stationing troops in tribal districts, by increasing taxation and building military routes.

That is why Pashtu tribes in the tribal districts took up arms and went to the highlands. They intend to resist Islamabad's encroachments.

The minister refuted allegations that the Afghan leaders supply weapons to Pashtu "rebels." He said that they only render Pashtu tribes moral support and material assistance.

Soldier Arrives Home from Afghan Captivity

LD2606180590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 16 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We have just received by satellite from Kabul a report on a subject which concerns every fellow-countryman of ours. Yet another former Soviet servicemen is returning home from Afghaistan.

[Begin recording] [correspondent] He turned out to be (Nurmumad Khodzimuradov). He fell into the hands of a detachment of the armed Afghan opposition exactly one year before the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. Many people have been fighting for his release for nearly a year. They include former internationalist soldiers, who are represented at this ceremony by Valeriy Ochirov and Pavel Shetko, people's deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [video shows Khodzimuradov, in civilian clothes, standing in room among a group of unidentified people, apparently taking part in some ceremony]

This meeting with (Nurmumad Khodzimuradov) took place in our embassy. True, we were obliged to hold our conversation in Uzbek and in Dari, since he has almost forgotten his Russian.

It happened in February, 1988, in the province of Baghlan, says (Nurmumad). I was at a post and decided to try smoking hashish. Then, a short time later, I don't remember how, I found myself in a gang with a machine-gun. When I came to I realized that there was no point in returning to my unit. They would regard me as a deserter.

They did not trust me in the band at first. Then they gave me weapons and later on I began to guard their headquarters. I thought about my home and my relatives every day, (Nurmumad) continued. More than once I heard on the radio the law granting amnesty to people like me. But it was impossible to leave the band. But, on one occasion I received a letter from an Afghan and understood that it was becoming possible for me to return home. I later learned that help had been given by friends from Afghanistan's Ministry of State Security.

[Khodzimuradov, speaking in poor Russian] Thank you very much, Soviet and Afghan (?friends), for the fact that I am going home. [video shows Khodzimuradov, seated on bench in garden, speaking to corresopndent]

[Correspondent] As a father, of course I am very glad that my son is alive and well and that we will be going home together. Today there is happiness in our family and I would like there to be similar celebrations in all families which continue to wait impatiently for the release of their sons. [video shows correspondent speaking to older man in garden] [end recording]

State Committee on Welfare for Afghan Veterans

LD2706010990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] The draft of the state program for organizing aid and support to former servicemen and others who were members of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, in addition to the families of servicemen who died, was discussed today at a meeting of the Collegium of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions. The following figures were given: 675,000 people took part in combat operations, approximately 50,000 of them were wounded and over 11,500 became invalids, 14,500 were killed or perished, 309 were lost without a trace. The program calculated for a five year period. The annual sum to be allocated for its realization is 100 million rubles.

Obminskiy, Indian Trade Minister on Economic Ties

LD2806082390 Moscow TASS in English 0729 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ernest Obminskiy met Indian Trade Ministry Secretary S.P. Shukla on Wednesday to discuss bilateral relations, including trade and economic cooperation and Soviet-Indian inter-action in tackling problems of global economic development.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Repayment for Nigerian Steelworks Problematic

LD2506115790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Many in our country are worried by the question of the USSR's significant expenditure on aid and assistance in the economic development of other states. Now, for instance, our specialists are involved in construction in Nigeria of the biggest steel works in tropical Africa. Vladimir Zhuravlev, our correspondent, reports from Lagos.

[Zhuravlev] The gigantic metallurgical works which is being built in the small township of Ajackuta, overshadows in its dimensions all other aspects of Soviet-Nigerian cooperation, whose volume remains insignificant. Last year goods turnover amounted to approximately $60 million. Ajaokuta has been in the process of construction for many years and, according to the assessments of the Soviet delegation members, is almost 90 percent ready. Approximately 410,000 tonnes of metal construction and plant have been assembled there. All the rolling mills and auxiliary and repair shops have been commissioned. In essence, they are independent plants, foundries, electrical engineering, and machine shops.

In fact, the works could have been yielding output a long time ago. But the Nigerian side has problems with blanks, qualified workers, and installations which are supposed to give the works raw materials and provide transport communications. Recently, the Nigerian side has activated work in these areas.

In essence, it is a situation which, on conclusion of construction, may prove to be absolutely impossible. Over to Oleg Davydov, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic relations.

[Begin recording] [Davydov] We have great difficulty with the fact that normal financing of this installation has not been provided. It must be said that virtually all the plant has been delivered by the Soviet Union, yet payment so far, since 1986, has not been effected.

Of course, we realize the complexities which the Nigerian economy is experiencing, but today the state of construction of the installation is such that it must be financed without fail. These issues were the subject of a discussion to find solutions which would be directed toward ensuring the commissioning of the installation by 1991.

Since 1986 payment of credits has been suspended, and this has continued up to today. I make no secret of the fact that this is 1.2 billion (?Deutschmarks).

[Zhuravlev] At the current rate, the debt thus amounts to approximatley $600 million.

[Davydov] Now the time has come to continue the installments. Otherwise, it is simply impossible to finish construction.

[Zhuravlev] The Soviet side, which for many years has not insisted on installments, is even now not demanding full payment in dollars.

[Davydov] Today there are no proposals from the Nigerian side on clearing this debt.

[Zhuravlev] Today, it seems, there is not even a clear conception of what the Soviet side proposes undertaking. A clear-cut reply to this question has not been forthcoming. However, last year, because of financial problems, it was necessary to seriously reduce the number of Soviet personnel at Ajaokuta. There was nothing with which to pay their wages. But what about abandoning a 90 percent completed works?

[Davydov] We are not putting the issue in such a way that if you won't pay then we will stop construction. We are saying that here we need to find mutually acceptable conditions which would naturally take account of both our demands todav and Nigerian demands. [end recording]

Angolan President Interviewed on Peace Settlement

MB2706204890 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Commentary by Yelena Olgina—read by announcer]

[Text] The ANGOP news agency has reported the country's president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, proposed a new platform on peace settlement in an interview with South African journalists.

This commentary is by Yelena Olgina:

The statement was made half-officially and testifies to the Angolan president's new step to meeting the opposition halfway.

He made an admission of direct general elections, which changes the conditions for a settlement. Up till now, their possibility was ruled out for reasons of the marshal law in the country and the existence of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. That probably implied the military control of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] over a number of areas in Angola. Under such conditions, truly free and democratic elections were hardly imaginable.

However, at present the situation has not changed. It follows from the president's statement that elections can be held only after an end is put to the 15-year-old war, which evidently means not a mere cease-fire agreement but a version of a peace treaty that would stipulate necessary conditions and guarantee the former UNITA members' involvement in peaceful life. In principle, the law on amnesty has already laid the foundation for the guarantees of this kind.

The president does not object to meeting with Jonas Savimbi. A precedent was last year's shaking of hands in Gbadolite, but the issue of Savimbi's role and place remains the stumbling block that, along with other reasons, brought to nought the Gbadolite agreement. Still, Jonas Sawimbi is due to be offered the status of an ordinary Angolan citizen at the hypothetical reading, and that means he is granted legitimate citizenship and denied the status of a leader of a military and political opposition.

A conclusion can be drawn that so far Savimbi may not aspire to some key posts in Angola under peace.

In all evidence, there was no (?incidence) in suggesting these initiatives before the South African mass media. Can it be regarded as a hint to the possible South African participation in the peace settlement? Or is that an approval of the formal dialogue between Nelson Mandela and President Frederik de Klerk?

The Angolan president may see the level of the future MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-UNITA dialogue as [words indistinct] a party that is in full political power treats as its equal another party, which while enjoying no such power, finds support in a considerable part of the population and acts as a legitimate aspirant to the participation in governing the country.

I would not try and overestimate the importance of the interview, meanwhile, writes Yelena Olgina.

In the final account, that was an opinion from the president and not from the Political Bureau of the MPLA workers party or the Angolan Government. It may be called the president's personal position.

Whatever the course of events, the Soviet Union's attitude to the Angolan settlement was made plain on 26 June, at a briefing of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press sector. A ministry spokesman said that now, when the Angolan Government and UNITA have embarked upon establishing direct contacts, preliminary as they may be, the Soviet side calls on the parties to the conflict to exert every effort to independently coordinate the principles of the forthcoming agreement and seek a secure and long-term cease-fire.

The process of political settlement must become constructive and stable.

Arrests Contradict Somalia's Democratization Aim

EA2706223590 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 21 Jun 90

[From the "World Events Today" program]

[Text] The recent decisions of the Somali Government to democratize political life have raised hopes that the situation prevailing in the country will be corrected. But the move has backfired. AFP reports that some Western diplomats in Mogadishu believe it likely that a situation so complicated could arise as to bring about the rapid evacuation of the diplomats.

Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov said that on 4 June when Mohamed Ali Samantar, the Somali prime minister, was receiving the director of the British (Booker) Company, he told the latter that the Somali leadership was determined to democratize. He added that the aim of amending the country's constitution was to guarantee the Somali citizens the right to elect any political party of their choice and to participate in the formulation of national policies and laws. He also said talks between the government and the opposition were in the interests of Somali people.

A week later it became clear that some of the opposition leaders who had criticized the government in the Mogadishu manifesto had been arrested by the security forces. This is worrying, because the manifesto was the opposition's first peaceful attempt for many years to hold peaceful talks with the government. Moreover, some uncomfirmed reports say those arrested included nationally popular individuals, some former officials of Somalia's first government after independence.

What does this mean? Was it meant to intimidate or was it an act of frustration born of outdated politics? That is possible. It has been officially clarified in Mogadishu that 12 of the 40 arrested were quickly released. It is also possible that this incident displayed great tact. Commentators have said they believe there are differences between the top officials of the Somali administration. The commentators believe that officials who are sincere about the political reforms under review are locked in bitter struggle with others who regard talk of such reforms as treacherous provocations meant to mislead international public opinion. If that is so, does not the arrest of the writers of the manifesto indicate a reactionary attempt to block the implementation of the reforms? The aim of the provocation is clear. If criticism of the government can lead to arrests, then there are few opposition members who would have the courage to criticize.

In fact, differences within the Somali leadership extend to the lower echelons of the government administration. This led indirectly to the mutiny of the forces stationed in Mogadishu. It has been reported that in some clashes in the army barracks firearms were used. A grenade, which fortunately failed to explode, was recently removed from the U.S. Embassy. A few days ago, the people of the Somali capital were awakened by an explosion at the Presidency. It transpired that the building had been the target of a machine gun grenade launcher. It is known that such weapons are exclusively in the hands of government troops in Mogadishu. Although the regime claimed that the explosion was accidental, it would be impossible for trained soldiers to fire at the Presidency accidentally. Foreign journalists report that gunfire at night is normal in the capital of Somalia. This highlights the sinister danger of such acts exacerbating the civil war in the country. This is the danger which accompanies the political game.

East Europe

Romania's Iliescu on Negative Reaction to Events

PM2706144790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Romania: I. Iliescu Statement"]

[Text] Bucharest, 21 Jun—We want to take an active part in all the processes taking place in Europe and to form relations with the continent's countries on a new basis. The renewal of Romanian society is inconceivable without expanding contacts with the world and creating conditions for its greater openness.

President Iliescu of Romania made that statement in an interview with the ROMPRES news agency. Talking about the international public's negative assessments of recent events in Romania, I. Iliescu noted that this was due to the lack of objectivity in the analysis of what happened. The statement by an official spokesman of the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. ambassador's subsequent absence from the Romanian president's official inauguration ceremony were particularly disappointing. We hope, I. Iliescu pointed out, that the U.S. administration will change its assessments in accordance with reality.

Mixed Reaction to Hungary's Plan to Leave Pact

LD2706201790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1645 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the 'International Diary' program]

[Text] [Sergey Pravdin] The Hungarian State Assembly has adopted a decision on the country's leaving the Warsaw Pact Organization [WPO]. A total of 232 deputies voted in favor of this move. One quarter abstained. Somewhat earlier, Hungarian officials were talking of the Republic's intention to leave the WPO before the end of 1991. Here is my colleague Viktor Levin to comment on this report.

[Levin] I think that the first reaction of many Soviet people—if only to judge by the tone of the letters we are getting in our mailbag—will be sharply negative. They will ask, what are the Hungarians up to; NATO continues to exist, and is preparing to get its hands on a future united Germany, while Hungary is undermining the WPO. Let me say bluntly that I also believe that Hungary's decision in the present circumstances is aggravating the imbalance. I think it could also create additional difficulties at the talks between the foreign ministers of the six states taking place under the "two-plus-four" formula, where the highly delicate problem of the future military and political status of a united Germany is being tackled among other issues. Hungary's move also seems to me to be rash because, apart from the considerations of the moment, one can perceive haste in it from the strategic point of view, which is damaging to the whole of Europe, both West and East.

What do I mean? The WPO decisively took the path of radical changes. This organization acquires a political character, and military issues become secondary. This is dictated by the times, by the fact that during the last five years—I use the word "decisively" because during this very time the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been the most effective—West and East Europe have started to move away from confrontation toward mutual understanding and now even to cooperation. I cannot but mention USSR President Gorbachev's personal contribution to this. His book "Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World" proclaimed principles which have evoked the broadest approval. And the realization of those principles led to the fact that both the political and military situations in Europe are currently more favorable than during the entire postwar period.

[Levin] This, I repeat, is what dictated a fundamental change of course on the part of the WPO. At the moment we are waiting for a commensurate, in other words equal, response from NATO. At the conference of NATO foreign ministers at Turnberry, reassuring noises could be heard. But very important decisions are due to be taken early next month in London at the NATO Council session at summit level. And although I believe in the political wisdom of the NATO countries' leaders, to rule out that someone will say at the session, why should we take a tilt towards a political role, why respond to the Warsaw Pact's appeal if the WPO is falling apart at the seams? [sentence as heard] It will be said that Hungary is already leaving, so let's continue to put pressure on them. Such thoughts have already been expressed, and it would be wrong simply to ignore them. The temptation to base everything on strong-arm policies is a real fact, and in this sense, let me repeat, Hungary's decision seems to me unconstructive.

But I would call this just one side of the coin. The other side—and I am deliberately not saying which is the first side and which is the second—the other side, I think, is the position of Hungary itself. Antall, the head of the Hungarian Government, has said: Hungary's membership of the WPO runs counter to the will of the people as expressed in 1956 and confirmed at the recent elections. The actual treaty is unnecessary, Antall said.

As for the first part, this argument looks weighty. After all, in 1956 the Hungarian people came out against the Stalinist regime which had been forced on them by our country. And not the Stalinist regime, but the Hungarian people were brought to their knees under the flag of the WPO. So, from my point of view, the Hungarians' attitude to this organization is understandable. Nevertheless, I would not rush and say that the WPO is already totally superfluous. And as long as NATO exists, our pact is also necessary.

Thus, while respecting the sovereign rights of the people of Hungary, I believe that the State Assembly acted not so much on the basis of political wisdom, as on the basis of emotion. I do not think that such an approach can be regarded as the height of statesmanlike wisdom. But the decision has been taken, and although I can foresee possible negative consequences, as I described earlier, I think that there are no grounds for dramatizing it. Ultimately, the basis of the policies of all states, including the West, is interests of state, and I believe that Hungary's decision will not in the final analysis influence the stance of the NATO Council's London meeting or, for that matter, the development of the international situation in Europe, as a whole. During Antall's meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, held in Moscow recently during the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, the head of the Hungarian Government confirmed the interest that his cabinet has in developing balanced, proper, and equal relations with the USSR, something that, according to him, is of special importance for Hungary. One would like to hope that this is how it will be.

Yugoslav Coverage on Foreign Policy Talks

WA2606143990

For Yugoslav coverage of foreign policy negotiations under way in the SFRY with the Supreme Soviet Foreign Policy Committee under Aleksandr Dzhasohov, please see the Yugoslavia section of the 26 June, and subsequent issues of the East Europe DAILY REPORT.

West Europe

Finnish Firm Decides Not To Cut Paper Exports

LD2706153790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0620 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki, 27 Jun—Finnish paper will come as before to the USSR in accordance with signed agreements and contracts. This news was given to the TASS correspondent by Thomas (Nysten), managing director of "Finnpap".

Several days ago the company, which is the export marketing association of the Suomi paper manufacturers, warned Soviet organizations that if the USSR did not pay off its debt, it would have to cut off paper supplies from 1 July. The USSR's paper purchases in Finland are generally made through the clearing payments system, with which no particular problems have arisen.

However, at the end of last year the USSR, reacting to a significant increase in domestic consumption of paper, purchased several batches of paper in excess of the volume provided for by trade protocol in Finland. It was arranged that these contracts would be paid for in freely convertible currency. Although the deliveries were made on time, the payments for them were not. This resulted in the creation of a debt amounting, according to Tomas Nysten, to 149 million Swedish krone.

The "Finnpap" management decided yesterday afternoon to revoke its decision to cut off paper supplies to the USSR. We have been assured by the Bank of Finland that a considerable part of the sum due us has already been transferred, the managing director said. On the other side, "Eksportles" has assured us that the remainder of the debt will be paid off by the end of July. I think this is good news for both sides.

Indeed, it is good that the crisis, which threatened to taint our many years of good relations with "Finnpap" has been averted, since Soviet publications are already on short paper rations. Without the Finnish supplies, things would have been extremely difficult for a number of them: Finland is our main trading partner in the area, supplying approximately two-thirds of all paper imports. Last year more than 450,000 tonnes of it were purchased through "Finnpap".

Hijacker May Face 12-Year Sentence in Finland

LD2706154390 Moscow TASS in English 1510 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Voitto Leskinen]

[Text] Helsinki June 27 TASS—The Helsinki City Court decided today, on the basis of the data obtained by preliminary investigation, to arrest a Soviet citizen on charges of hijacking an Aeroflot Tu-134 plane.

According to the Finnish Telegraph Bureau, the Soviet citizen Mikhail Varfolomeyev, born in 1969, was arrested here on charges of hijacking a Soviet Tu-134 airliner which was making a Tallinn-Lvov flight with 72 passengers on board on June 24. Threatening to blow the plane up, the criminal forced the crew to change the course and land at the Helsinki-Vantaa International airport, jeopardizing the lives of passengers and the crew.

Last week the Finnish authorities arrested Soviet citizen Oleg Kozlov on the decision of the city court. The same charges were brought against him: the hijacking of a Soviet Tu-134 passenger airliner making a Riga-Murmansk flight on June 19. According to the Finnish legislation, such actions are regarded as a crime, for which a person can be sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment.

"Finland expressed indignation and concern over those acts of piracy. The government strongly denounced the hijacking cases at its special session and stressed that it was a serious crime. [no closing quotation marks as received]

The Finnish Union of Airline Pilots adopted a statement today expressing concern over the latest hijacking of planes to Finland. They demanded that the hijackers be extradited to the Soviet Union, so that they are punished in their home country.

The Finnish press also continues to insist on the need for extraditing the criminals to the Soviet Union. The Haemeenlinna-based newspaper HAEMEEN SANOMAT believes that it would be the only correct step. "The Finnish authorities should respond only in a positive way to the Soviet Union's demand on the extradition of the hijackers," the newspaper stressed. According to the newspaper KANSAN UUTISET, "an agreement on joint struggle against air terrorism, signed by the USSR and Finland in 1974, envisages the extradition of criminals who committed such acts of piracy."

Air Force Chief Yefimov Visits Finland

LD2506180790 Moscow TASS in English 1327 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Helsinki June 25 TASS—Soviet Air Force Chief Marshal Aleksandr Yefimov arrived for an official visit to Finland today.

At the airport, he was welcomed by Finnish Air Force Chief Pertti Jokinen and other officials.

Later in the day Yefimov met Finnish Defence Forces Chief Admiral Jan Klenberg. The discussion, held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, focused on questions of mutual interest.

Netherlands Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow

LD2706162290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1140 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Jun (TASS)—Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek arrived in the Soviet capital today for a two-day working visit. He will also meet USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today. During the conversation, the ministers will discuss topical international issues, including the situation in Europe, as well as aspects of bilateral relations. Toward the end of the day, Van den Broek is expected to give a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists.

Tomorrow, the leader of the Netherlands foreign policy department is expected to meet Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

News Conference Held

LD2706183890 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek told a news conference here that after today's talks with Eduard Shevardnadze he hopes for a real chance to settle various aspects of German unification even this year.

Van den Broek arrived in Moscow today on a two-day working visit.

The minister noted that specific ways to settle this problems can be offered for the consideration of the leaders of 35 CSCE member-countries, who will gather for a summit late this year.

According to van den Broek, the summit will be the outcome of common efforts to give Europe a new peaceful image it deserves.

He also stressed that the German problem cannot be settled without ensuring security measures for all the sides.

However, such measures should be worked out within a broad framework and affect the Armed Forces of not only Germany but also of other countries participating in the Helsinki process, the minister noted.

The Netherlands believes, he said, that the Vienna talks on the reduction of Armed Forces in Europe should work out principles and key elements of the external aspect of German unification.

Van den Broek supported the Soviet proposals on establishing a European structure of security, including regular consultations.

He praised the idea of signing a joint document of a declaration type between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries on cooperation in establishing a new peace order in Europe on the CSCE principles.

Speaking of bilateral relations with the USSR, Van den Broek said that at the talks the two sides signed a contract to study possibilities for salvaging, by a Dutch consortium, the Soviet nuclear submarine Komsomolets which sank in neutral waters of the Norwegian Sea in April 1989.

In addition, the Soviet side was offered medical and scientific assistance in overcoming the aftermaths of the Chernobyl disaster, the minister noted.

Relations, European Security Discussed

LD2706211290 Moscow TASS in English 2049 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—Problems of the European Continent and the quest for new approaches to ensuring its security and stability were the centrepiece of the talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his Dutch counterpart Hans van den Broek, held here today. They discussed, in detail, ideas and proposals on ways of a further development of the all-European process, set forth in Shevardnadze's message to foreign ministers of European countries, the United States and Canada.

The sides exchanged views on foreign aspects of German unity. Shevardnadze called special attention to the need for a joint quest for a solution meeting the interests of all parties concerned and promoting the consolidation of European unity.

He drew Van den Broek's attention to the principles that form the basis of the Soviet Union's approach to the German reunification, put forward at the Berlin conference of foreign ministers of the "Six" on June 22, this year.

In this setting the Soviet side explained Soviet proposals on forming an entirely new relationship between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO and stressed the vital importance of close East-West cooperation in creating an all-European security system, consolidating mutual trust and giving up bloc-oriented way of thinking.

In his turn, Van den Broek set forth the Dutch Government's notion of future Europe. He laid special emphasis on combining new opportunities given by the all-European process and those that are provided by traditional western structures, and stressed the need for drawing united Germany into this process.

The sides expressed mutual conviction that the meeting of leaders of 35 CSCE member states in 1990 would become an important landmark on the way of European development. Both sides expect the meeting to bring the results that would give an additional impetus to Europe's advance towards a new epoch.

The foreign ministers agreed that the reaching of agreements in Vienna on the reduction of conventional armaments and the defining of a mandate of the next stage of the negotiations would promote the success of the all-European summit.

When discussing the state and prospects of Soviet-Dutch relations, the sides described their development as successful, on the whole, and pointed to the importance of maintaining a constructive dialogue, including regular contacts on a high level. The ministers expressed satisfaction over mutually advantageous cooperation of the two countries and said that there existed opportunities for deepening it and making it more dynamic. This refers, in the first place, to economic relations, especially in view of the coming transfer of the Soviet economy to principles of a regulated market.

Van den Broek said in this connection that the EC was discussing proposals on rendering economic assistance to Soviet perestroika and the Soviet Union's gradual integration into the world economic complex.

When the talks were over, a Soviet-Dutch contract on deep-water operations within the framework of carrying out jointly the first stage of the lifting of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets, which sank in 1989, was signed in the presence of the ministers.

Hans van den Broek is staying in the USSR on a working visit.

Western Leaders Discuss Aid to USSR Reforms

LD2706153590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Commentary by S. Dorenko from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] At the session of the European Council, held at the level of heads of state and government, the issue of granting wide-scale economic aid to our country occupied an important place. The financial support of reforms in the Soviet Union is also on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the leaders of the seven Western countries.

[Dorenko] The Soviet Government has not officially asked for assistance, but the situation in the country is critical: National conflicts; the loss of confidence in the center; the reinforcement of orthodox communists who, in exchange for a temporary truce with the general secretary, will make demands of him, but now as president. All this threatens reforms, and makes the future of the country unpredictable.

To support the reformer-president is the objective of many governments, but approaches differ. The FRG and France insist on immediate measures. There will be no reforms in the USSR if there is no aid, President Mitterrand believes. We may have to wait for reforms for a long time, and I do not think we have too much time, Chancellor Kohl said. The Germans, more than anyone else, have an interest in the stability of Gorbachev's course. After all, the future of Germany is now also being decided in Moscow. A decision has already been reached on unilateral aid on the part of the FRG. The Germans stress that these credits are being given not as payment for the GDR, but as a guarantee of broad ties between a future Germany and the Soviet Union.

Britain has taken a cautious stance. It is believed there that if financial aid is not directed at specific, mutually agreed projects, then it will merely prolong the agony of the administrative system. Assistance should be provided in managing the economy, and only then should money be given, Thatcher believes. Under present conditions money will not be used sensibly, Bush echoed.

One way or another, everyone realizes that today the future of the world and Europe depends on stability and democratization in the USSR. At its October emergency session, the European Community will examine the draft of specific areas of aid for the Soviet economy, and a decision by the Seven will be made at the 9-11 July meeting in Houston. [video shows shots of Soviet leaders' cars, Soviet servicemen climbing into armored personnel carrier, and general views from the Dublin meeting of European Community heads of state and government)

RSFSR's Silayev Meets FRG Land Minister

PM2706131990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] On 26 June, I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, received A. Schmidt, Hesse Land (FRG) minister for economics, technology, and transport, and a group of representatives of Hesse business circles.

Questions of cooperation between the RSFSR and Hesse Land in the face of the Republic's transition to a market economy, including in the training of management cadres for Russian enterprises and organizations, were discussed.

Envoy to Vatican Interviewed on Renewed Relations

PM2506160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Yu.Ye. Karlov, USSR representative for maintaining contacts with the Vatican, by IZVESTIYA correspondents M. Ilinskiy and V. Pershin; date not given: "USSR, Vatican: Dialogue and Cooperation"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Rome—As the press reported earlier, the Soviet Union and the Vatican have established official relations. In the sides' opinion this will facilitate direct dialogue on problems of mutual interest and promote useful cooperation in the international sphere between the USSR and the Vatican. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Yu.Ye. Karlov has been appointed as USSR representative for maintaining contacts with the Vatican. A few days ago he presented his credentials to Pope John Paul II. We opened our interview with Yu.Ye. Karlov by asking him about this meeting.

[Correspondents] Yuriy Yevgenyevich, the Vatican press service reports stated that your conversation with the head of the Vatican took place in an exceptionally cordial atmosphere, but they did not disclose any details. Could you tell us more about your meeting with the pope?

[Karlov] The nature and tenor of this conversation are a reflection of the general favorable atmosphere which has taken shape in relations between the USSR and the Vatican since the historic meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and John Paul II in December of last year. My conversation with John Paul II lasted 40 minutes, which is longer than was planned. It was conducted without an interpreter, in Italian, and at no point did we switch to Russian. Confidentiality, as is known, is one of the golden rules of diplomacy. However, I believe that I will be breaking no rules if I tell you that the content of the political discussion was very rich. We discussed how we could accelerate the beginning of the mechanism of bilateral dialogue, identify spheres of mutual understanding as regards international problems, and bring forward the solution of bilateral questions which remain open. I was greatly impressed with the broad political and philosophical approach of John Paul II to world and European problems and the profound historical analysis with which he accompanied his views. He displayed genuine interest in the success of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and profound respect for our country, which was particularly important for me as a representative of the USSR.

[Correspondents] The Soviet Union and the Vatican are entering a qualitatively new period in their mutual relations. What opportunities does this open up for Soviet foreign policy and in what way will the development of Soviet-Vatican dialogue affect the situation in Europe and the world as a whole?

[Karlov] The opportunities are truly great. The Vatican is a full-fledged participant in the all-European process and plays an important role in international affairs. If its policy continues to develop in the direction of the further humanization and democratization of interstate relations, this will have an important impact on the solution of world problems. The establishment of official relations between the USSR and the Vatican can play a useful role here, of course.

Having emerged from the world of ideological make-believe into the world of political and spiritual realities, we have taken a fresh look at the role of the religious factor and the ecumenical movement in world politics and have changed our attitude to the Vatican too. We have realized that in the main spheres—the protection of universal human solidarity, the assertion of humanitarian principles and morality in politics, the elimination of mass destruction weapons and the ecological threat—the Holy See is largely guided by the same values and approaches as we are. And there is something else that must not be ignored. The solution of many foreign policy problems in the interests of our country, including economic issues, as a rule, requires a broad international consensus. Clearly, a great deal here also depends on the attitude of the more than 800 million Catholics who recognize the pontiff of Rome as their spiritual leader.

[Correspondents] What practical steps are being taken? Is it envisaged to open USSR and Vatican missions?

[Karlov] Indeed it is. Both in Rome and in Moscow. As for the Soviet mission, it will have a small staff. Its residence will be correspondingly small. In any case, it will be much more modest that the grand Golytsin Palace on the Via della Scrofa at the very center of Rome where the Russian mission to the Holy See was located at one time.

Establishment of Armenian People's Army Assessed

AU2706203890 Prague MLADE FRONTA in Czech 21 Jun 90 p 5

[Jiri Doubrava report: "The Armenian People's Army"]

[Text] From our USSR correspondent—More and more references to the Armenian Peoples's Army and other armed groups of the local population are appearing in the reports coming from Armenia. The representatives of the Independent Association of Journalists in Moscow gave more details to our permanent correspondent in the USSR.

The Armenian People's Army was established at the end of April last year, but the number of its members has risen in the last few months. Allegedly, some 140,000 men are serving—if it can be put this way—in it. This is more than in other states with a population comparable to Armenia's. Indeed, there are no more than three million Armenians living within the borders of their territory.

Thirty-year-old R. Vasilijan, a part-time student at Moscow's Financial and Economics Institute, has become the commander. The headquarters are in Yerevan in the same building in which the leadership of the Armenian All-Nation Movement is housed.

According to Vasilijan, the establishment of the Armenian Army was in reaction to the critical situation during the first half of last year when the majority of Soviet Army units were concentrated around the Armenian capital Yerevan. And, in fact, there was nobody present on the borders with Azerbaijan. It is mainly the inhabitants of the border regions who felt threatened. "Our only objective," says Vasilian, "is to protect the borders. If our government deems it necessary to declare, or to extend, the state of emergency, it can use us; we do not need Soviet Army units for this. I am of the opinion that every nation is able to introduce order into its own territory; there is no need for foreign help."

The structure of the Armenian People's Army follows up on the practices and rules of the Soviet Army, but their members hold meetings mostly after work. The activity of the Armenian soldiers is reduced now, because the Soviet Army is deployed on the Azerbaijani borders.

There are very few arms, they can allegedly be counted in hundreds only; the arms are mostly hunting rifles and practice machine guns. The Armenian People's Army leadership has already addressed the local party authorities, the KGB, and the Ministry of the Interior with demands for legalization; they have received no answer yet, however. As far as financing is concerned, it reportedly comes from donations made by various organizations and also from private citizens.

Apart from the Armenian People's Army, there are some more armed groups in Armenia. The Armenian People's Army is holding talks with them, and it may be anticipated that they will subordinate themselves to a joint command in the future.

The establishment of the independent Armenian Army—even if armed with hunting rifles only—causes, understandably, a spectrum of unpleasant feelings and worries in Moscow. No direct intervention has yet been carried out, however.

Latin America & Caribbean

Ceremony Marks Nicaraguan Contras' Demobilization

LD2806083390 Moscow TASS in English 0722 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Dmitriyev and Igor Pshenichnikov; all quotation marks as received]

[Text] San Pedro de Lovago (Nicaragua) June 28 TASS—Contra leaders surrendered their arms in San Pedro de Lovago in Chontales Department on Wednesday in a ceremony which wound up the process of rebel demobilisation. The ceremony was witnessed by government officials, Catholic Church, international observers and the diplomatic corps.

Resistance commander Israeli Galeano, known as Commandante Franklin, handed his rifle and ammunition over to Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro. Along with the rebel leaders, 120 contras also surrendered their arms.

A total of 19,094 contra rebels have been demobilised in Nicaragua, Fernando Castanon, a representative of the U.N. peace-keeping forces in Central America, told TASS. They will be settled in the so-called "poles of development" in various regions" of the country, where they will be able to work in agriculture. The total number of demobilised and their dependents to be settled exceeds 100,000.

Speaking in San Pedro de Lovago, Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro called upon all Nicaraguans for national reconciliation and for work in the name of progress in the country. She said that the announced reduction of national Armed Forces was proceeding at full speed. The president urged the civilian population to surrender arms to the authorities and report places where they are kept illegally.

On surrendering arms, Galeano said that the "Nicaraguan resistance" had accomplished its mission. According to him, the resistance "fought for the Nicaraguan Government to be elected by popular vote, for the creation of a law-governed state." Galeano said that on June 27 the contras ceased to exist as a military organisation, but "it did not cease its political activity and will fight for social justice and democracy, the social, political" and economic revival of Nicaragua."

In reply to a TASS question, Galeano said that a political organisation has already been set up on the basis of "Nicaraguan resistance". Its "provisional leadership" consists of former members of the main headquarters.

"However we must now first think how to feed ourselves and only then we will speak about politics," he added.

Contra detachments were formed by the U.S. CIA in 1986. They tried to topple the Sandinista government during the subsequent years with the political support of the United States. The war, which was formally ended on Wednesday, claimed the lives of some 70,000 Nicaraguans and did great economic harm to the Republic.

Cuban Media Improvements, Changes Examined

PM[illegible]2190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by A. Kamorin incorporating interview with Julio Luis Garcia, president of the Cuban Journalists Union: "Limits of Glasnost Cuban-Style"]

[Text] Havana—Does monolithic unanimity have to reign in a socialist society? This question has today really stirred up Cuban society, becoming item number one in the debate taking place in the course of the campaign to prepare for the Fourth Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] Congress, scheduled for the first half of next year.

In the past this question was, for some reason, not asked here: It was taken for granted that unanimity was a synonym for the unity of Cuban society. The synonymous nature of these terms is now being questioned; Cubans are pondering whether it is possible to retain unity in conditions of a diversity of opinions. It is no accident that journalists are the first to tackle this problem. It must be noted that the Cuban mass media have achieved certain successes in recent years. The quality of radio broadcasts has improved sharply, and changes for the better have occurred in television broadcasting and in certain press organs. Furthermore it would be difficult, in formal terms, to accuse the Cuban press of neglecting the "critical component" of journalistic work. Analyses of shortcomings frequently feature on its pages, although, to be fair, it must be noted that in most cases it is a question of a model of criticism with which we are quite familiar: "Someone, somewhere in our country, is sometimes guilty of...."

An extraordinary plenum of the Cuban Journalists Union was held in Havana recently. There was a heated debate about the future of the country's information policy. I have asked Julio Luis Garcia, president of the union, to tell us about this debate.

[Kamorin] What do you rate as most important in the plenum debate?

[Garcia] The main thing is our conviction that the Cuban mass media must continue to change and improve, and that there is no way back for us. The view was also expressed that our press in its capacity as a totally revolutionary press need not be in total unanimity with the official viewpoint. Let the official viewpoint be expressed by official organs, while others highlight those aspects of problems which appear most important to them.

In the past we have frequently tried to justify the "secrecy syndrome" which is characteristic of our information media by citing the external threat and the imperialist blockade. Of course, these factors have played and continue to play the role of an "internal censor" in our press organs. However, at the plenum we came to the conclusion that, although the country is under even greater pressure than before, we must, precisely because of these circumstances, keep persistently moving forward toward greater openness, toward greater efficiency in our work.

It is also important that the conviction which predominated at the plenum was that the problems of the press must be resolved primarily by journalists themselves without waiting for any miracle-working instructions from "above."

[Kamorin] Yet one of the main decisions of your forum was a draft document which will be handed over to the Politburo....

[Garcia] Well, we cannot resolve everything by ourselves! There are questions which need to be examined at a different level....

[Kamorin] What questions, for instance?

[Garcia] The document will incorporate practical measures which are necessary to improve the state's information policy. They are designed to speed up the provision of information, provide more scope for problem analysis, broaden the range of opinions, and introduce diversity in the profiles of the press organs.

[Kamorin] The plenum proposed that a press law be adopted. What is your opinion on this subject?

[Garcia] It is true that a group of comrades put forward such a proposal. There were also opinions to the contrary. This is not a new idea. A draft law was compiled back in 1985 and was ready for submission to parliament. However, at that moment, the process of the rectification of mistakes and elimination of negative tendencies was initiated. The idea of the adoption of a press law was put on ice and was not raised again.

I personally believe that the adoption of such a law now would be premature. We are at the very beginning of the changes in the sphere of journalism, and the adoption of a document of this kind could curb the scope of creative quest. To begin with, it is necessary to create a new press system, and then to give it legal backing. Any formal framework may hamper the solution of the complex task confronting us, which consists of creating a mass media model which, while ensuring the preservation of the fundamental objectives of retaining revolutionary unity within society in conditions of one-party leadership, would make provision for a diversity of opinions.

[Kamorin] A truly difficult task.... Incidentally, what was said at the plenum about the framework within which the Cubans' pluralism of opinions will develop?

[Garcia] This is definitely the number one issue. It goes without saying that all the country's citizens must be able to have their say while remaining within the framework of the political concept which we describe as the Cuban path toward socialism. The main limit of glasnost in Cuba is that of not playing into the hands of enemies, both internal and external enemies. Our conditions are special. The external threat and our state's geopolitical position, as such, provide scope for only two parties on the island—the party of revolution and the party of counterrevolution. Like a powerful magnet, the conflict with the United States is polarizing society.

In today's situation there is no room for a "third" stance within the framework of our system. On the other hand, any constructive criticism is to be welcomed. For instance, it is to our detriment that our social sciences have been totally deprived of a spirit of creative debate. For a long period Cuba has proved to be "excluded" from the development of its own social thought. We seemed to believe: Why should we have to think if other countries have worked it out for us? That was a great mistake. Debate is necessary, and in principle there must be no taboo topics, provided that the stances remain within the framework of certain fundamental values. I mentioned earlier the revolutionary unity of society, which must be preserved at all costs. We must carefully preserve the lesson of the historic path of the revolution and the principles of socialism. The vanguard role of the Communist Party and its leadership is also not open to question, and not just because this is enshrined in the Constitution but also because of the party's truly high prestige in the country.

[Kamorin] But what is to happen to those who overstep this line? Don't you think that a press law could be particularly useful here?

[Garcia] This could be a problem in a country where the participants in the information process interact impersonally. But Cuba is a small country and all of us—journalists, economists, social scientists, and party officials—know each other and maintain personal contacts. This creates favorable conditions in situations of this kind for finding methods of bringing pressure to bear other than legal methods.

Extension of TV Marti Broadcasts Reported

PM2806112990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "'TV-Marti' Will Extend Broadcasting"]

[Text] Washington, 26 Jun—The Bush administration has decided to extend by a further 30 days the series of test transmissions to Cuba by the "TV-Marti" television station, official U.S. State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler reported Monday.

Initially it was planned that the experiment would last 90 days, after which the U.S. President is to present Congress with a report on its results with a view to taking a decision on the expediency of transmitting "TV Marti" programs on a permanent basis. This deadline expired Monday. But the Congress resolution adopted early this year provides for Bush being able, at the same time the report is sent, to continue detailed television broadcasting for a further month while congress studies the results of the experiment.

Tutwiler admitted that the Cuban Government is successfully continuing to jam the television signals. To a request for an explanation of what, in the administration's opinion, can justify the expenditure on this experiment, which is $7.5 million, and the decision to continue transmissions for another month, Tutwiler could find no reply.

Central America To Hold Next Summit

LD2905064890 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 28 May 90

["Dialogue on Central American Problems—Diplomatic View"—TASS headline; by TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 28 TASS—Both analysts and professional politicians now think of what the results of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting will be and whether it would justify the hopes and expectations that arose in view of the reassuring results of the recent talks in Moscow between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

During the talks in Moscow the two sides are known to have devoted main attention to considering matters connected with disarmament issues, the state of affairs in Europe and bilateral relations. At the same time regional problems, including the situation in Central America, also became an important subject of the dialogue.

Direct participants in the Moscow talks at working groups' level point out that the sides agreed that the recent general elections in Nicaragua as well as the peaceful transfer of power to the new government created objectively favourable prerequisites for a steadier advance along the road of normalising the situation both in Nicaragua and in the region as a whole.

The Soviet Union and the United States agreed with the need to render assistance to the Violeta Chamorro government in its efforts to stabilise the internal political situation and to take the country's economy out of the crisis as soon as possible.

The Soviet side persistently emphasised the need to carry out full demobilisation and disarmament of the contras within the fixed time frame as an indispensable condition for the finalisation of the national reconciliation processes.

At the same time officials reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to continue to render assistance to that country, by agreement with the new Government of

Nicaragua, in developing its economy as well as the education and health care systems.

The two sides favoured a political solution to the internal conflict in El Salvador and supported the nascent dialogue between representatives of the government and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] leadership.

Taking this into consideration Soviet diplomatic circles express hope that the forthcoming discussions in Washington this week would also result in reaching understanding about the need for closer and more constructive cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in matters concerning the Central American peace process.

As far as the Soviet side is concerned, it is believed here that it is prepared for that. A Soviet high-ranking diplomat believes that support and assistance in implementing the decisions of the Esquipulas and subsequent meetings of presidents of Central American countries, the decisions which map out a realistic way towards establishing a lasting peace both in individual countries and in the entire region, may serve as the basis for such cooperation.

'Joint Statement' on Argentine Delegation's Visit

LD2206152190 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—The Soviet-American summit in Washington consolidated positive principles in international relations and ensured a turn to mutual understanding, cooperation and interaction of states and the establishment of confidence among states. This is said in a joint statement about the official visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the Argentine National Congress, circulated here today. The delegation left in [as received] the Soviet Union on Thursday.

The sides noted that the attitudes of their countries to the majority of key problems in the world coincide. They emphasised that international economic relations should be restructured on a fair democratic basis and that measures should be taken to decrease the external indebtedness of developing countries.

When regional conflicts were discussed, parliamentarians noted positive tendencies towards the solution of a number of crisis situations by political means. The importance of the effort of Latin American countries towards peaceful and fair settlement in Central America was emphasised.

The Soviet side welcomed normalisation of Anglo-Argentine relations suiting the interests of positive changes taking place in the world.

Political & Social

Reportage on Run-up to 28th CPSU Congress

Draft Congress Statement Published

PM2706110590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Draft "28th CPSU Congress Program Statement": "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism"]

[Text] The 28th CPSU Congress attaches fundamental importance to an objective assessment of the current period, definition of the foundations of the party's policy at the present stage, and discovery of ways to overcome the crisis within society and the party and to advance toward humane, democratic socialism.

I. The Crisis in Society and the Party's Strategic Goals

Assessment of the Current Period

Perestroyka marked the beginning of democratic changes in the country's life. The people are being spiritually and politically emancipated, people are acquiring civic and national dignity and taking on the affairs of society and the state. The myths that obscured consciousness and prevented a vision of the way forward are collapsing. The barriers that separated the country from the outside world are being removed. Preconditions for extricating society from the serious crisis in which it has found itself are being created step by step, in an acute struggle between the old and the new.

The CPSU is convinced that the deep-rooted sources of the crisis lie not in the decline of the very idea of socialism, but in the deformations that this idea suffered in the initial stage of the new system. False notions of socialism as a society founded on monopoly of state ownership and dictatorship by the party-state elite on behalf of the proletariat brought about arbitrary rule, lawlessness, and man's alienation from ownership and power. The natural environment was rapaciously exploited. Dogmatism grew progressively worse, giving rise to intolerance of dissent. A scornful attitude toward the peoples' cultural and historical values and intellectual wealth was inculcated. The world was regarded as the arena of implacable confrontation between social systems.

Deviations from the ideals and principles of socialism during the period between the thirties and fifties limited our country's possibilities and, in the second half of the 20th century, when a major shift developed in the life of all mankind owing to the scientific and technical revolution and the breakthrough to a postindustrial society, the authoritarian-bureaucratic system proved completely incapable of bringing the country into the mainstream of general civilized progress.

Nevertheless the urgent need for radical change was ignored for a long time. The resolution of the pressing historical conflict was artificially checked by a structure of party-state power cut off from the people.

Perestroyka alone decided on a radical shift toward a policy of renewal and of freeing the country from the fetters of social forms alien to socialism. But it also revealed that the simultaneous transformation of all spheres in the life of a vast state with a population of almost 300 million is in itself exceptionally complex. What is more, some decisions and actions by the party's and the country's leadership over the last few years—and this must be bluntly acknowledged—have proved to be inadequately worked out, inconsistent, and, in a number of cases, simply mistaken.

The old economic mechanism is no longer functioning, and the new one has yet to be created. Control of the money supply and the market situation has been lost to a considerable extent. The creation of a legal base for the impending economic and political transformations has been excessively protracted. The country is rocked by interethnic conflicts, moral guidelines are being eroded, and a wave of violence and crime is rising. The prestige of state power has declined. Mistakes in investment and import-export policy, uncoordinated campaigns in the fight against unearned income, the ill-conceived antialcohol campaign, and distortions in the organization of the cooperative movement have had adverse consequences.

The Central Committee and the Politburo have lagged behind the development of events, primarily in the reform of the CPSU itself, often operating by means of trial and error.

The party is living through a complex, crucial period. The renunciation of the former role played by the nucleus of the administrative edict system and its acquisition of the qualities of a civilized sociopolitical organization are accompanied by the painful exacerbation of internal contradictions—the polarization of opinions and positions and a decline of party organizations' activeness—along with growing criticism of the party as a whole.

A rapid process of forming sundry sociopolitical groups and movements is under way in the country.

The conservative-dogmatic stream, whose representatives see the policy of renewal as an encroachment on the principles of socialism and are preaching a return to authoritarianism, is at one end of the spectrum. It objectively attracts that section of the bureaucratic structures which is incapable of restructuring itself, which sees society's democratization as a threat to its political influence and social status, and is therefore doing its utmost to try and freeze the processes of change.

Movements that reject the socialist choice and campaign for the lion's share of social ownership to be transferred into private hands and for the complete commercialization of education and public health are gaining momentum at the other end. Monarchist and even fascist extremists have made their presence felt.

Without breaking with the idea of socialism and retaining its commitment to social security for the population, the social democratic stream often lays the stress on mechanical imitation of contemporary socioeconomic structures in developed industrial states without consideration for our country's specific features; many of its representatives refuse to consider Marxism as their ideological base.

National movements have gained considerable scope in the republics of the USSR. Setting some nations against others and promoting separatist slogans, chauvinistic and nationalist forces—which often turn out to be mouthpieces for the interests of the old or new local oligarchical groups yearning for power—are manifesting themselves with increasing vigor within these movements alongside the democratic stream.

Democratic perestroyka forces oriented to the socialist choice and represented by most CPSU members and many organizations that express the vocational and political interests of the working class, the peasantry, the creative and scientific intelligentsia, young people, servicemen, and veterans are to be found at the center of the political spectrum taking shape in the country.

At a time of political instability which may result either in social chaos or in constructive cooperation between sociopolitical forces interested in escaping from the crisis and creating a democratic social system, the Communist Party sees its task as being to become the party of civic accord and consolidation of the working people, to unite and support all who, through their honest labor, have created, are creating, or will create the people's prosperity and spiritual values. It counters those forces that would like to turn society back—to a bourgeois system or barrack usages—and to incite civic confrontation. The congress considers that a consistent course of shaping a new social system within the framework of the socialist choice is the foundation of the contemporary strategy of advance toward a prosperous and free society and the tactics for extrication from the crisis.

What Kind of Society Are We Striving Toward? [subtitle]

The essence of the perestroyka policy resides in the transition from an authoritarian-bureaucratic system to a society of humane, democratic socialism. This—although difficult—is the only way to a dignified life, to the realization of the country's material and spiritual potential.

While severing links with all that is alien to the ideals of socialism, the CPSU rejects the nihilistic denial of the ideals of October and the Soviet people's revolutionary, democratic gains. It is necessary to clearly distinguish in our country's past between, on the one hand, phenomena engendered by Stalinism and stagnation and, on the other hand, the real achievements of the USSR's peoples. The party gives due credit to the constructive labor and self-sacrifice of all generations of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, and to their heroic endeavors in the name of the motherland.

We hold sacred the memory of the people's sacrifices during the years of most rigorous ordeals.

The CPSU advocates a creative approach toward the theory and practice of socialism and their development through constructive analysis of the historical experience of the 20th century and the legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin freed from dogmatic interpretation. We deem it necessary to utilize all the achievements of human reason and the experience of effective economic management and of developing democratic institutions accumulated in the developed countries of the world.

The CPSU is the party of socialist choice and the communist perspective. Its social ideal absorbs the humanist principles of human culture, the agelong dreams of a better life and social justice.

In our understanding **humane, democratic socialism** means a society in which:

—man and the creation of living conditions for him worthy of contemporary civilization are the aim of social development; social justice and security are affirmed; man's alienation from economic management, political power, and spiritual culture is overcome on the basis of diverse forms of ownership;

—there is free competition and cooperation between all sociopolitical forces operating within the framework of the law; a rule-of-law state under society's control guarantees the protection of man's freedom, honor, and dignity and the free development of all nations and ethnic groups;

—peace and equal cooperation among peoples and respect for each people's right to autonomously determine their own destiny without coercion are guaranteed.

We regard the communist perspective as the natural historic direction for the development of human civilization, as movement toward the kind of harmonious society where the free development of every person will be the condition for the free development of all.

II. CPSU Action Program

The achievement of the CPSU's program goals requires the implementation of both emergency anticrisis measures aimed at reviving the economy, preventing a decline of the population's standard of living, strengthening law and order and the prestige of organs of state power, and eliminating the most acute seats of interethnic and social tension, along with a long-term policy to comprehensively transform society.

The CPSU will strive to achieve these goals exclusively by political methods, relying on deliberate and coordinated actions by communists, including those working in soviets and other state organs and social organizations, and by using its constitutional right of legislative initiative and winning the trust of the masses.

Emergency Measures for Extrication From the Crisis

The party puts forth the following as **immediate tasks**:

—normalization of the consumer market, its saturation by means of the economy's earliest possible reorientation toward the consumer sector, the comprehensive development of entrepreneurial initiative, and procurement of imported goods; maintenance of fixed prices for a series of essential commodities during the transition to free price formation;

—immediate implementation of a package of measures aimed at remedying the financial and monetary situation by reducing the state budget deficit to a minimum, regulating and developing new channels for disposing of the population's income, and implementing finance and credit reform;

—additional funding of urgent socioeconomic tasks by means of reasonable cutbacks of defense spending, ineffective capital investments, and the managerial apparatus; the selling off of material resource surpluses; circulating stock among the population, and streamlining foreign economic ties;

—a sharp increase in the pace of housing construction using state, enterprise, and cooperative funds and the population's savings, and by granting preferential credits;

—elaboration and implementation of effective measures to fortify the people's health, allocation of additional appropriations for public health, maximum use of resources at the disposal of enterprises, economic associations, and republic and local soviets for these purposes;

—emergency aid to ecological disaster areas, creation of effective levers to provide incentives for environmental conservation activity;

—urgent adoption of laws to provide a legal foundation for the implementation of the aforementioned emergency measures; creation of conditions to enable organs of executive power to implement these laws promptly;

—resolute intensification of the struggle against crime and of crime prevention, taking into account strict observance of the presumption of innocence, the right of defense, and the norms of justice;

—elaboration within the shortest possible period of a new treaty on a union of sovereign states founded on strict voluntary participation, mutual advantage, freedom of national self-determination, and equal opportunities for sovereign development.

For Freedom and People's Well-Being

The party regards the safeguarding of man's interests and needs as the central, strategic task of its policy.

Civil rights and freedoms The party advocates:

—the implementation of human and civil rights at the level of internationally recognized norms;

—the elimination of all discrimination on national-ethnic, political, and sex or age grounds;

—reliable legislative protection for citizens' individual and civic dignity, the inviolability of their homes and property, freedom to decide where to live and to travel in and out of the country, confidentiality of correspondence and telephone conversations, and freedom of expression, the press, and information;

—free self-determination for people in their world philosophy and spiritual interests, freedom of conscience and religion;

—the enhancement of the role of the court and public organizations in the protection of civil rights.

Labor and well-being Honest labor is the basis of the well-being of society and each individual. The party advocates:

—guarantees of the right to work, the provision of fair payment for end results without any restrictions; the elimination of leveling, dependence, and the eradication of illegal income and privileges;

—the formation of a flexible system of vocational training that meets modern demands;

—the creation of healthy and safe working conditions, the shortening of the working day and increased leave for higher labor productivity.

Social guarantees The party proposes:

—creating an integral social-state system of social protection and material support for low-income and large families, ensuring that the level of pay, pensions, and allowances is no lower than the subsistence level;

—guaranteeing everyone housing, free medical services, and other social benefits ensuring a proper living standard, and, at the same time, forming a housing market and developing consumer services;

—implementing major measures to improve working and everyday life conditions for women, granting them the right to a shorter working day and a convenient working schedule, increasing the amount of leave before giving birth and leave to look after the child, and extra leave for mothers with large families and single mothers;

—increasing appropriations for the upkeep and development of children's institutions; eliminating the shortage of goods for children and of ecologically clean foodstuffs; adopting immediate measures to improve medical services for children and to reduce child mortality; expanding state assistance for families with children;

—ensuring equal opportunities for young people to make a start in life and secure prospects for their vocational, political, and cultural growth, and elaborating measures to assist young families;

—improving the lot of invalids, veterans, the families of dead servicemen, and all the victims of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and of other disasters and natural calamities and improving the standard of social and medical services for them; implementing special programs to provide them with housing, goods, and services.

Culture, education, and science By protecting creative freedoms, the party will uphold humanitarian values of spiritual life. The CPSU is opposed to bureaucratic administration of the spiritual and academic spheres and wants to see the cultural heritage of the USSR peoples protected. The wholesale transfer of culture, art, science, and education to a purely commercial footing is out of the question. The party will seek:

—to increase budget appropriations and encourage various public initiatives and donations in the interests of the populace's spiritual development; broad and free cultural exchange with foreign countries; the development of physical culture and sport;

—to widen the autonomy of educational and academic institutions, improve the material lot of teachers and educators and enhance their social status;

—to bring Soviet science up to the level of world scientific-technical progress and ensure major progress in promising, modern sectors; to eradicate bureaucracy and cliquishness in science, develop all structures and forms of organization of effective scientific activity, expand scientific institutions' economic autonomy, and increase state appropriations for fundamental research; to effectively assimilate scientific achievements in production and social life; to implement state programs for the development of libraries, archives, and information technology.

For An Effective Economy

The creation of a reliable basis for social progress can only be achieved through the democratization of economic relations, by genuinely emancipating people's initiative and practical activity, and bringing incentives for highly productive labor into play. This is the essence of the program for the perestroyka of the economic system proposed by the CPSU.

Becoming the master and becoming industrious again. The party considers it necessary to create conditions for the formation and development of diverse and equal forms of ownership, their integration, and free competition among them:

—state ownership (all-Union, republican, municipal) must remain not as formal, bureaucratic ownership, but as ownership controlled by working people themselves. A significant proportion of state enterprises and property is to be leased to working people's collectives, wide use is to be made of the joint-stock form of enterprise organization, and collective ownership of industrial, trade, and services sphere facilities will become a possibility;

—it is necessary to develop various types of collective ownership, including cooperative, and also ownership by public organizations, and mixed forms of ownership;

—private labor ownership, which could improve the lives of the whole people, must have a place in the system of forms of ownership;

—the CPSU is against total denationalization and the imposition of any forms of ownership.

Toward a regulated market. In the opinion of the congress, it is necessary to:

—accelerate the elaboration of legislative and legal norms and mechanisms ensuring a switch to a market economy;

—grant enterprises and all commodity producers autonomy, free enterprise, and freedom to compete; separate direct state management from economic activity;

—implement demonopolization of production, banking, trade, and scientific development; give support to the development of a network of small and medium-size enterprises;

—gear the state regulation of market relations to the protection of citizens' social rights, carry out major structural transformations in the national economy and the scientific-technical and ecological programs, and safeguard the country's interests in the system of world economic links. Preserve state management of major transport, communications, and the power industry, and, in the next few years, defense complex enterprises within the framework of a single market on the basis of economic accountability principles and labor collectives' self-management;

—switch, in the planning system, to the elaboration of strategic prospects for economic development and targeted state programs, to indirect regulation through state orders, taxes, interest on credit, and so on;

—ensure the switch to a convertible ruble and to an economy that is open to the world market, the enlistment of foreign capital to ensure the earliest possible introduction of progressive technologies, and the encouragement of competition on the part of foreign firms in the domestic market.

Market and protection mechanisms. The CPSU proposes:

—compensating the populace for losses due to the revision of retail prices of goods and services; introducing a flexible system for indexing the population's incomes and increasing them depending on the growth of consumer prices;

—creating an effective mechanism for maintaining employment, for finding jobs, and for vocational retraining; compensation payments during the period of temporary unemployment, retraining, and acquisition of new skills.

Agrarian policy. In it the party proceeds on the basis of the following principles:

—supporting the soviets' right to own land and the state, collective, and individual farms' right to use and manage land;

—ensuring equal economic relations between city and countryside;

—ruling out any kind of diktat and bureaucratic rule; relying, in all that pertains to land management, on the peasant's free choice; ensuring equal opportunities for the development both of social farming—kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm]—and of newly established individual, family, and lease farming;

—enabling every rural inhabitant to set up his own home and farm holding; making work on the land socially attractive and economically effective.

Toward Genuine People's Power

The civic society and the rule-of-law state. The sole source of power is the people's sovereign will. The rule-of-law state excludes the dictatorship of any class, party, grouping, or managerial bureaucracy and ensures access to involvement in state and public affairs and to the holding of any posts for all citizens.

We understand democracy not only as rights and freedoms but also as the civic responsibility, strict observance of laws, and self-control which are organically linked with them.

The party will consistently advocate:

—the formation of a civic society in which all social groups and communities have the right, guaranteed by law, and the actual opportunity to express and defend their interests, for it is not the person who exists for the sake of the state but the state for the sake of the person;

—the strengthening of the rule-of-law state, in which the state and citizens are linked by mutual responsibility, given the unconditional supremacy of the democratically adopted law, and diverse forms of social self-management are developing;

—a multiparty system and free competition for sociopolitical organizations within a constitutional framework;

—the realization of the principles of universal, direct, and equal suffrage.

The separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial will create guarantees against the usurpation of unlimited powers and abuses of power and will make it possible to clearly delimit spheres of competence and responsibility. The party advocates:

—the democratic and open nature of the legislative process; the fullness of the norm-creating and control functions of republic, oblast, kray, rayon, and local soviets and the formation of their reliable financial and material base;

—annual reports on the activity of the USSR president and the USSR Council of Ministers at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and public control within the framework of the law over the activity of executive power;

—the independence of the court and the prosecutor's office, the enhancement of their status in society, the improvement of procedural legislation, and an effective corrective labor system; the repeal of acts of unfounded stripping of Soviet citizenship;

—the creation of a dynamic, modern state apparatus formed on a competitive base and subordinate to representative organs and the public within the framework of the law.

The Country's Security

As long as the danger of armed conflicts exists, the country needs reliable defense. The party considers it necessary:

—to implement a military reform based on the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency and on the priority of qualitative parameters in military building;

—to keep fundamental questions of the country's defense and of the building, training, and use of the Armed Forces within the exclusive competence of the USSR;

—to strengthen social protection (including servicemen's life and health insurance) and to improve domestic conditions for servicemen and their families;

—to use the Army strictly for its proper purpose, in full accordance with modern Soviet legislation;

—to exercise effective political leadership of the defense sphere and to ensure the military department's subordination to higher organs of power with maximum openness in its activity commensurate with the level of trust [s urovnya doveriya] among states;

—to implement the state conversion program and utilize the capacities so released in civilian production.

While remaining under modern conditions a vitally necessary institution for defending the constitutional system and maintaining public order, internal affairs and state security organs must act strictly within the framework of the law and under the control of representative organs of power. It is necessary to raise the standard of professional training and improve material support for law-enforcement organ workers.

Toward a Renewed Union of Sovereign Republics

Toward a voluntary union of peoples. The CPSU believes that the development of centrifugal trends can be prevented only on the basis of the democratization of relations among the peoples and the national-state formations of the USSR. The party proceeds from recognition of the nations' right to self-determination, even including secession, but does not confuse the right to secede from the USSR with the expediency of such secession and believes that, proceeding from the interests of the country's peoples themselves and the trend of world processes and integration, it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the renewed Union as a dynamic multinational state.

The CPSU upholds the policy of the republics' sovereignty and, in order to realize it, proposes:

—a political and legal diversity of ties between the republics and the center;

—a diversity of their economic relations on the basis of enterprises' economic independence;

—the enhancement of the constitutional status of national autonomous formations and their equalization in the political respect with autonomous republics.

For national revival. The party considers it necessary:

—to strengthen the legal guarantees of cultural-national communities that do not have administrative-territorial status and their right to submit draft laws to USSR and republic organs of state power and to have a representation quota on organs of power;

—to take urgent measures of an economic, legal, and ecological nature that would contribute to the preservation of the habitat and the reproduction of conditions ensuring the normal development of small peoples;

—to assert the right of peoples deported in the past to their historical motherland or traditional places of residence, as well as the right of citizens to return to their historical motherland from abroad.

Human rights and the rights of nations. The CPSU comes out:

—for priority of human rights over a nation's rights;

—for strict and unconditional ensuring of every person's rights and of the expression of his will, including full freedom of choice in individual national self-determination;

—against the existence of any legal norms and laws that assert citizens' inequality on ethnic grounds and the ideology of "priority for the rights of the main nation";

—for respect for the cultural traditions and interests of all ethnic-national groups of the population when adopting the republics' legal norms and laws.

Toward Mankind's Peaceful Development

The party believes that the USSR's foreign policy strategy must contribute in every way possible to the processes of our internal perestroyka, help to ensure international security, and promote cooperation among states and peoples in their joint advance along the path of progress.

Foreign policy guidelines. With a view to strengthening world security the party advocates:

—the energetic continuation of the successfully launched demilitarization of international relations: the reduction of arms and armed forces to the limits of reasonable defense sufficiency; the total exclusion of the use and threat of force from world practice; the further lowering and then the complete elimination of military confrontation;

—the creation of a global and regional security systems on the basis of a balance of the interests of all the sides to prevent conflicts and international instability;

—the underpinning of relations among states with a legal base guaranteeing freedom of sociopolitical choice, sovereignty and independence, and the development of cooperation and partnership with all countries of the world;

—the further normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations and their channeling toward a constructive partnership; enterprising participation in the all-European process; the development of new forms of political and economic cooperation with the countries of East Europe; an active policy in the Asia and Pacific region with a view to turning it into a zone of peace and cooperation; participation in the political settlement of regional conflicts.

Toward a new quality of international cooperation. It is becoming an imperative of world politics to pool the efforts of all members of the international community in resolving the problems facing mankind. The CPSU advocates:

—vigorous joint actions to improve the natural environment and to avert an ecological disaster;

—our country's participation in the international community's efforts to prevent famine, poverty, mass epidemics, serious diseases, drug addiction, international terrorism, and critical imbalances in the development of different parts of the world;

—the intensive expansion of world economic ties and the removal of obstacles to scientific and technical exchange and to the development of contacts in the humanitarian sphere;

—collaboration and cooperation with all international organizations on a regional and a global scale which come out from positions of historical responsibility for mankind's future.

The CPSU advocates surmounting the historical split in the socialist movement and developing cooperation with communist and workers, socialist, social democratic, and national democratic parties and with all organizations and movements that adhere to positions of peace, democracy, and social progress.

III. The Perestroyka of the Party [main subtitle]

As the nucleus of the administrative edict system for many long years, the party itself was subjected to serious deformation. Overcentralization and the suppression of critical thought had a pernicious effect on relations within the party. Tremendous damage was done by the ideological and moral degeneration of a number of party leaders.

Undoubtedly the CPSU bears political and moral responsibility for the situation that developed in the country. And it itself talked candidly about the mistakes made by the country's party and state leadership and condemned the Stalin era crimes. But the congress resolutely opposes blanket accusations against honest communists of both past and present generations. Millions of communists served the people selflessly, worked wholeheartedly, and fought courageously for the motherland's freedom and independence. There have always been progressive forces at work within the CPSU and it is they who inspired and led the perestroyka of society.

The CPSU resolutely repudiates political monopolism and the supplanting of the organs of state and economic management. The dynamics of the change dictate the acceleration of the CPSU's transformation into a truly political party operating within the framework of a civic society.

The Party's Role in Society [subtitle]

The CPSU is a political organization which, by its theoretical and practical activity and its ability to offer constructive solutions to the problems of society's development, will uphold the right to political leadership in free competition with other sociopolitical forces.

The party performs the following functions:

Theoretical. On the basis of a scientific analysis of objective trends in the country's development and an elucidation and consideration of the interests and values of different social groups, it elaborates the strategy and tactics of socialist renewal and socioeconomic, political, and other programs.

Ideological. In conditions of pluralism the party propagandizes the achievements of world socialist thought and its program goals and policy, and draws citizens to the side of and into the ranks of the CPSU.

Political. The CPSU performs daily work among the masses, organizes cooperation with social organizations and movements, campaigns in elections for the majority of seats in organs of power at all levels and, if victorious, forms the corresponding executive organs, and implements its pre-election program.

Organizational. The CPSU conducts organizational work to implement its program guidelines and decisions, defends working people's political and social interests, and develops intraparty relations on a democratic basis.

The party renounces the formal nomenklatura-based approach to cadre policy. The authority for adopting cadre decisions in organs of state power and administration belong to those organs and, within the party itself, passes from higher authorities to party organizations and all communists.

In present-day conditions, it is necessary to form in soviets at all levels party groups and interparty blocs, and communists must be guided by the will of their voters and the CPSU's program goals when participating in those groups or blocs.

Democratization of the Party [subtitle]

Without the most thorough democratization of intraparty relations, the CPSU will not be able to perform its role in society nor will communists be able to regain the people's trust.

The CPSU resolutely rejects democratic centralism as it evolved in conditions of the administrative edict system and rigid centralization, and defends democratic principles—electability on a multicandidate basis and interchangeability, glasnost and accountability, subordination of the minority to the majority and the minority's guaranteed right to uphold their views, including in the party mass media organs.

Democratization in the party presumes participation by all its members and lower structures in shaping the CPSU's policy by means of party-wide and regional discussions and referendums: the right of individual communists and groups to express their views in platforms; collectiveness and openness in the work of all party organs and freedom of criticism. The profound perestroyka of intraparty relations and the party's activity is designed to ensure the democratic unity of CPSU ranks and to prevent a factional schism.

The CPSU's basis is provided by its primary organizations. Autonomously and in the light of specific conditions they determine the tasks and forms of activity, structure, and numerical size of their organs and apparatus, the periodicity of and procedure for holding meetings and political actions, and have the final right on admission to and expulsion from the CPSU. Decisions made by them within the framework of powers vested in them by the CPSU Statute may not be revoked by higher organs.

The territorial and production principle of party building needs adjustment. While retaining party organizations in production and other collectives, it is necessary, in light of the increased significance of the pre-election struggle that is being waged in the population's local neighborhoods, to emphasize the development of powerful and active primary territorial organizations. A CPSU member has the right to choose the primary organization—production, territorial, or both—where he will work. The freedom of the creation and activity of horizontal structures—party clubs, councils of party organizations' secretaries, and other special interest, professional, and other associations—is guaranteed.

The congress does not consider it right to deprive communists in the Army, the KGB, or the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the right to party membership and the creation of party organizations or to other forms of political activity. However, these organizations must be separate from state and administrative organs, including political organs, responsible for the moral and political education of Armed Forces, MVD, and KGB personnel.

The congress advocates the election of secretaries and other party committee members and party forum delegates by direct, multicandidate elections through secret ballot and with the free nomination of candidates. The actual election procedure shall be determined by communists.

Party control must also be democratic. The central, republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon control and auditing organs are elected autonomously, are independent of party committees, and are accountable only to the congresses and conferences that elected them.

The numerical size, composition, structure, and budget of the party apparatus must be determined by party committees for the term of their powers and must correspond to the CPSU's new tasks. The apparatus is expected to consult with and back up the work of elective organs and is strictly subordinate to them.

Autonomy and unity. In the process of the USSR's renewal, the autonomy of union republic communist parties must be ensured. They elaborate their own programs and normative documents in accordance with which they themselves resolve organizational, cadre, publishing, and financial and economic questions, pursue a political line in the sphere of state building and the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republics, and form ties with other parties and social movements including those abroad. The leaders of union republics' communist parties belong to the leading organ of the CPSU Central Committee. In the event of disagreement with a decision by the party's central leading organs, a republic Communist Party Central Committee has the right to demand the discussion of the question at a CPSU Central Committee plenum or party conference or congress. The creation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party is an important factor in strengthening the sovereignty, resolving the socioeconomic, political, and ethnocultural problems, and increasing the prosperity of the people of the largest union republic. At the same time it is expected to help strengthen the unity of the CPSU and the integrity of the USSR.

The Party and Social Organizations

The CPSU seeks cooperation with movements and organizations of a socialist orientation, and dialogue and equal partnership with all progressive ideological-political streams. The party is ready to create political blocs with them.

CPSU members not only have the right but are also required to participate in mass movements acting within the framework of the law. However, the party resolutely rejects political duplicity. It considers communists' membership of other parties or of organizations which propound chauvinism, nationalism, racism, or antisocialist ideas to be impermissible.

The CPSU will promote the rebirth of worker and peasant movements and the social activeness of the intelligentsia.

The CPSU welcomes the rebirth of trade unions and supports their desire to work actively in the interests of working people and the defense of citizens' rights and freedoms.

The CPSU regards the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] as an autonomous sociopolitical communist organization of young people and expects it to take direct part in the elaboration and implementation of party policy. Party and Komsomol organizations must learn how to form their relations as political allies. It is necessary to regard with understanding the emergence of new youth organizations and to promote the molding of their socialist and general humanist thrust. The CPSU directs all its organizations resolutely toward young people's problems. This is also dictated by the interests of the party itself: Without young people it will have no future.

Those are the CPSU's conceptual foundations and political goals, which are designed to be political guidelines for the work of the country's communists until the adoption of a new party Program. The congress hopes that they will be supported by all democratic forces advocating perestroyka and the renewal of our society.

New Draft Party Statutes Noted

LD2806080390 Moscow TASS in English 0752 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—A new version of the draft rules of the Soviet Communist Party, reworked on a basis of broad debate, is published in PRAVDA today.

Many amendments and supplements were proposed to the draft rules over the three months that have passed since the publication of the first version. Many were included in the new version which will be submitted to the 28th congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

A number of articles have been amended. Even the first one, which says who can become a member of the Soviet Communist Party, has been worded differently. It was noted in the first version that a party member "pays membership dues", whereas in the second version it is stated that "he supports the party by funds," which is considerably broader.

The preamble to the section devoted to the party's organisation structure says that "the party is formed of primary organisations." Previously, this was stated in just one of the paragraphs. In the same section, the provision that the forming of factions with their own internal structure and discipline is not permitted in the Soviet Communist Party is supplemented with a substantial provision that the right of communists to unite according to platforms during debates is not restricted.

The new version of the draft rules states that the communist parties of the union republics are independent, whereas in the previous version it was only stated that they are independent "within the programme and charter of the Soviet Communist Party".

There are also amendments in the second section "higher and central bodies of the Soviet Communist Party". It is noted, specifically, that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee interacts with the sociopolitical organisations in the country. This was not stated in the rules previously.

The section devoted to the work of communists in councils, state bodies and public organisations includes a new paragraph, not present in the first version of the draft rules. It reads:

"Primary party organisations and party committees recommend communists for appointment at specific sections of state, economic and public activity. Acting by political methods, they promote their elections or appointment at appropriate posts, give them support, hear communists' accounts of their work and make public the conclusions and recommendations regarding this work".

The new version of the draft rules also envisages the lowering of membership dues. Communists with the incomes of up to 250 roubles per month will contribute only one per cent of their incomes to the party's treasury, while the maximum contribution, 2.5 per cent, will be made only if the incomes surpass 500 roubles.

In the previous version membership dues of three per cent were envisaged if incomes surpassed 350 roubles.

The new version of the draft rules also contains a number of other new wordings.

Medvedev on Draft Program Statement

LD2706205690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] As you know, a draft program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress entitled "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism," was published today. A news conference by comrade Medvedev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary; and members of the working group that prepared the document was devoted to this event. Here is V. Stefanov:

[Stefanov] The draft program statement is a result of the lengthy and heated precongress debate in the party, comrade Medvedev noted in his opening address. It is to a considerable extent a new document if one compares it with the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform. At the demand of many communists a wideranging appraisal of the situation within the country and the causes of the crisis have been included in it, a characterization has been given of the disposition of the social and economic forces in society, and the party's immediate and conclusive goals are more distinctly defined.

Another new element in the draft program statement is the section on perestroyka within the party itself. Comrade Medvedev stressed in particular that the work on the document was conducted in an exceptionally democratic and open way. [Video shows Medvedev and others on platform and journalist in the hall]

[Medvedev] The work on this document was not simply a literary process but indeed a political process, inasmuch as it was a matter of cardinal political questions and in respect of the fact that the process of this work was conducted in interaction with alternative programs. Comrades from among the authors of both the democratic platform and the Marxist platform were involved in the working group. Moreover, it was not merely discussion, advocacy, and criticism, but also textual work, during which agreement was successfully achieved on many formulations so that they have indeed been included in this document, so to speak, in the form of consensus; although, of course, differences on certain issues, and very substantive ones—I would say cardinal issues—remain. Well, this is in general not the working group's prerogative, it is already the congress' prerogative.

[Stefanov] As is the tradition, the journalists, especially foreign ones, were interested in the party's attitude to Marxism-Leninism, the problems of combining the posts of president of the country and leader of the party, and the possibilities of a split in the CPSU. Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev gave detailed answers to these and other questions, but we are not quoting them in the reporting, since immediately after the Vremya program a lengthy interview with comrade Medvedev will be broadcast which will deal with these problems.

A question was asked about the fate of party organizations at enterprises and establishments, how justified their existence is, and whether they will exist in the future. This question was answered by Vladimir Alekseyevich Lyakishev, member of the working group and secretary of the party committee at the Avtopribor Research Institute. [video shows Lyakishev addressing journalists]

[Lyakishev] In those enterprises and organizations where party organizations are led or have been led by energetic party activists, the party organizations have often been in effect the sole defender of the work collective's interests. Therefore, I think that it is not our task to argue and debate over whether or not to remove party organizations from enterprises. It is our task as a party to do everything possible to see that enterprise party organizations are precisely such.

[Stefanov] Even before the news conference began, journalists had been excitedly talking in the press center's lobbies about the possible postponement of the 28th congress. In the past few days a rumor about this had been causing a stir among journalists, and naturally a question on this matter arose at the news conference. [passage omitted]

Medvedev Denies Postponement

LD2706133190 Moscow TASS in English 1327 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Aleksander Mineev]

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—Soviet Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev has denied that the 28th congress of the Soviet Communist Party will be postponed from its scheduled opening on July 2.

He stressed that the overwhelming majority of leaders of republican and regional party organisations favour the opening of the congress on a fixed date. At the same time, he pointed out that a final decision on this issue can be taken only by the plenary meeting of the party Central Committee, which will be held on June 29.

Medvedev spoke at a press conference today at the press centre of the 28th party congress. The topic of the press conference was the results of the discussion preceding the 28th congress.

Medvedev Says Gorbachev Must Stay

LD2706141890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1340 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Panorama" program]

[Text] Forty minutes ago we reported that a press conference was held by Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Foreign Ministry press center—today the press center of the 28th CPSU Congress. He repied to numerous questions and foreign journalists. He replied to a question on the possibility of combining state and party posts, in particular the post of general secretary or chairman of the party and that of president. He said:

[Begin recording] [Medvedev] I think that such a possibility is not excluded, perhaps some time in the distant future. But in the specific conditions of the present political situation in our country, the division of the posts, or rather the country's president giving up a leading role in the Communist Party, would in my view be extremely undesirable. Undesirable. It might lead to serious consequences.

I will tell you—this will probably be no secret to you—that criticism of Comrade Gorbachev is to be heard from various quarters, unfounded criticism, unfounded allegations that he is abandoning the party to the caprices of fate, that he is trying to hide behind the post of president, and so on. At the moment the situation is such that, from my point of view, it is extremely important and necessary for Comrade Gorbachev, as president of the Soviet Union, to keep the leading post in the party as well. What this will be—chairman of the party, or general secretary—that is a question for the congress to decide.

This is necessary in order to find our way out of crisis, to resolve a number of problems, because without the support of the party, this will be difficult to do. Just as the prestige of the party will, evidently, depend to no small degree upon who is going to be at its head.

I think that in the given specific conditions, the combining of these two points is a guarantee of no small importance that we shall be moving further along the path we have chosen, the path of perestroyka, the path towads a regulated market, the path towards the creation of a modern law-governed state—that is, along the path that was chosen in April 1985. [end recording]

Medvedev Gives Interview 27 Jun

LD2706204490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1748 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Interview with Vadim Medvedev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, by unidentified interviewer in Moscow on 27 June—recorded]

[Text] [Interviewer] Vadim Andreyevich, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party constituent congress has been a notable event in the country's political life, and already the most varied assessments are being voiced about it. I will allow myself to quote one assessment—in fact it was published in PRAVDA—in which a correspondent of the Italian newspaper MESSAGGERO says that behind Polozkov and Lobov in their struggle for the leadership stood center left and center right forces. Well, on this occasion, the correspondent asserts, the center right forces were triumphant in the person of Polozkov. How could you comment on that statement?

[Medvedev] I agree that the Russian Federation Communist Party congress is a major political event and a major event in our party's life. But I would not say that this event's importance boils down to what was said by the correspondent whom you quoted. I don't think this is the main thing. The main thing is that a communist organization of Russia has been created, an organization of Russian communists. I don't conceal the fact that there were fears at certain stages in the preparations for the congress, and for the setting up the Russian Federation Communist Party, that this step might serve as a kind of spur to the development of separatist tendencies in the CPSU and serve as a foundation for stepping up the activity of separatist tendencies in the communist parties of other union republics. One can say with satisfaction that the congress did not confirm these fears. It took place under the sign of the Communist Party of Russia being part of the CPSU, an integral part of the CPSU, and in my opinion, in this respect many fears have simply been removed. The Russian organization of the Communist Party means 10 million communists, workers, peasants, intellectuals; and no one is going to deny that the most active and the most intellectual forces of Russian society, perhaps, are concentrated in the Russian Federation Communist Party. Therefore, I think that the question of personalities is of course of enormous importance, but not of decisive importance. And it seems to me that one has to rely not so much upon the impressions that have grown up for whatever reason around the personality of Comrade Polozkov, as upon the real matters and of course, first and foremost, upon those things that the Russian Communist Party Central Committee is going to have to do. Judging by Comrade Polozkov's statement, he is fully resolved to act in the spirit of consent, in the spirit of consolidation, of establishing contacts with all currents, with all moods and with all forces in the party. I think that we only have to wish him success in this matter.

[Interviewer] If we might return to the discussion which unfolded at the congress—in interviews, people are recalling statements made by delegates who said that the need for reports-back, for periodic reports-back by Politburo members to communists has now arisen at this stage in perestroyka. You deal with ideology in the Politburo, and in fact there have been some very sharp, some fairly sharp things said. I remember one of them now: Ideological and theoretical work in our party are now in ruins. What is your attitude to statements like this?

[Medvedev] I regard them with the understanding that the ideological sphere is very sensitive, and reflects all the processes that are taking place in the country. Of course, it has problems of its own, problems of ideological work proper. As regards criticism levelled at me, it can, indeed, be heard quite frequently; I am accused of everything, starting from what takes place in the Arbat up to the development of the concept of a humane democratic socialism. As regards the essence of the criticism of ideological work, as it were, I would approach this matter in the following way. There is criticism and criticism. One should analyze its basis and causes, although all kinds of criticism should be treated seriously and with the understanding that it is a very important factor and under no circumstances can it be disregarded.

[Interviewer] It is not very pleasant, though.

[Medvedev] Not very pleasant, I agree; maybe this criticism is not always justified and substantiated. But the following is very important here: From what positions is criticism being made? When one hears that our ideals have lost their shine, that we are retreating from the principles of socialism, that we are moving in the wrong direction, toward the West, and so on, such criticism reflects a certain political discussion and political struggle. And it is simply difficult to accept it; one should argue with it and prove that our present-day ideological orientation is closely linked with perestroyka, progressive processes, democratization, and so on.

[Interviewer] You mean criticism proceeding from another platform, as the saying goes, already from different positions?

[Medvedev] Yes, from different positions. It may proceed from different positions, so to speak, of a different nature. The following criticism and ideas are being voiced, too: Ideological work is allegedly conducted too rigidly, restrictions on freedom of speech and glasnost are still maintained and so on ...

[Interviewer interrupts] And within the party itself?

[Medvedev] And within the party itself, although it is difficult to agree with this. I do not remember any other period in our country's history—and not only the Soviet period—when freedom of speech would have been manifested so amply as nowadays. There is criticism aimed at exposing real shortcomings and seeking out what needs improvement. When people say that ideological front workers are not active enough in elaborating conceptual socialist issues I think one should agree with this. Our sociologists indeed have somehow been weighed down and depreciated. They found themselves unprepared for the new situation. Not all of them, but many, and on the whole, the sociological front is extremely inert and passive. And we are striving to make it more active.

Finally there is criticism which simply, in my view, springs from being insufficiently informed. At the constituent Russian congress a speaker cricitized me for the fact that I allegedly advocate the deideologization of social relations and even of parties. Yes, and he even called me the main ideologist of deideologization. This of course sounds perhaps witty, but it is simply incorrect. I have never written or said anywhere that it is possible to imagine for oneself a nonideologized society. Society is unable to do without an ideology. Another matter is what kind of ideology this is. Another matter is that we are in favor of the socialist ideology, in favor of ridding our ideology of stereotypes of the past, of extraneous ideas, of sectarianism, of the failure to understand values common to all mankind. And what is more, how, on the whole, can one deny ideology if included in it is a dense layer of values common to all mankind? All this is, after all, ideology. Outside ideology there can be no social development. Another matter is that one must rid ideology of those stereotypes which stand in the way of resolving pressing problems, economic and cultural. While for decades our consciousness has been reared in the belief that everything of the state, everything that is nationalized is a good thing—well, public consciousness needs to be delivered from such a stereotype, ideology needs to be changed. Or when works of literature and art and works of culture were assessed from the point of view of a narrowly ideologized approach: When it was said that our culture must be socialist in content and national in form: This is a stereotype which one must get rid of. That is why the entire question is about what kind of ideology it is to be. If it is a progressive ideology which assists our development, then one ought to develop it, and it is necessary to support it, and in no circumstances must one get rid of this ideology, which sometimes is suggested to us, both from the right and from the left. This is what my position in this matter, consists of.

[Interviewer] Well, by the way, evidently directly contiguous to this, nevertheless, is the question which I have already asked: On Politburo members' report-backs to communists.

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, and the Central Committee report will be a report-back of the Central Committee and also of the Politburo to the congress and to the communists, to the party as a whole. And what is more, I think that there should be addresses by Politburo members at the congress, and I am preparing for such an address in which I want to speak of how much and in what I have been engaged in during the one year and nine months in the course of which I have been entrusted with heading the party Central Committee Politburo Ideological Commission. And what I have already said is that it seems to me that these questions are so important that such a special, a party-professional, discussion is necessary. I would think that within the framework of a special section of the congress, such a talk and such a discussion could be held.

[Interviewer] Incidentally, about the forthcoming congress, for there are literally just a few days left before it takes place, and we are talking in the room where one of the preparatory commission groups for the 28th party congress completed its work a few hours ago. This group—which you headed—prepared program documents, key documents, generally speaking, and one of them, one of these documents is called "Toward a Humane and Democratic Socialism." [Video shows the cover of a document bearing the title "Toward a Humane and Democratic Socialism"] Does this mean that the communist prospect is already, as it were, moving away into the altogether distant long-term?

[Medvedev] Yes, the document was given that title at the start. We feel that the title reflects our aims, the landmarks in our work on perestroyka, and that our party is indeed the party of socialist renewal and struggle for humane and democratic socialism. But this does not contradict the fact that we remain true to the communist prospect, having in mind the movement's general direction. And this is not something that someone has thought up; as we see it, it is a natural, historical, objective process; this tendency is being preserved, not to mention the fact that the communist direction is the political, and if you like, the moral value we have which unites communists of different generations.

[Interviewer] Vadim Andreyevich, within the context, of course, of this discussion and the work of the group, I would also like to hear your personal opinion about such questions of principle as, say, the depoliticization of the Army, the KGB, and the Militia; or, say, the withdrawal of party organizations from production facilities and working collectives.

[Medvedev] It seems to me that there is a great deal that is speculative in the way this problem is being put. There is much that does not flow from the principles and direcitons of society's democratization, and that, on the contrary, I would say it even contradicts it. It seems to me that removing public and political activity outside the gates of enterprises, outside the framework of institutions, including law enforcement institutions, is not the development of democracy but the restriction of democracy, the restriction of the person's right and the collectives' right to carry out any public activity—but to carry it out naturally, not to the detriment of the main functions of the collective in question, the enterprise in question, the institution in question, but in order to satisfy the natural needs of people, and in order to implement their right to any forms of public and political activity that find themselves within the Constitution's framework.

[Interviewer] But does this mean that other parties can create their own party committees at, let us say, factories?

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, that is not being denied, and that is...[changes thought] There should be such an opportunity for all, for all...[changes thought] The creation of public organizations, with their structures, and so forth. But at the same time, we are against sociopolitical organizations having the right of control, and even of interference in the main functional duties and affairs of the given collective. No, they should deal with their own questions, which are within the competence of the relevant parties and social organizations. Provided that activity does not hinder and does not...[pauses] does not have a negative effect on official activity, (?on official work). [words indistinct: Medvedev and interviewer speak at same time]

[Interviewer] (?Who will decide that?)

[Medvedev] That will be decided by...[changes thought] that will be seen from life itself, from the process itself.

[Interviewer] I also asked a question about the depoliticization of one state structure or another. Well, now, the question, the Army question is particularly acute now.

[Medvedev] Well, you...[changes thought] I do not think that you will dispute that the state itself is a political structure, moreover, the main political structure.

[Interviewer] Obviously, it is not possible to contradict that.

[Medveded] Well, I think so. Therefore, how can one talk of the depoliticization of the state? In my opinion, that is on the whole such a—how could I put it mildly—the formulation of the question is based upon misunderstanding.

[Interviewer] That is to say, you take an unequivocal view of the question. Neither the militia, the Army, nor staff of other state institutions, so to speak, should leave the party?

[Medvedev] That is another question. We are speaking of depoliticization. They cannot be depoliticized because their functions are by themselves political functions—the defense of the interests of society and the state. That is the task of the Army, of the law enforcement bodies, it is by itself a political function. The party's influence in them is another matter.

[Interviewer] Vadim Andreyevich, does that mean then that, let us say, servicemen ought to be, for the most part, in the ruling party, since they are to defend the interests of the state?

[Medvedev] That is already a question of political practice, of life itself, of the process itself. But, on the whole, in my opinion, there is simply no doing without political work in the armed forces, in the law enforcement bodies. And world experience speaks of that, too. Well, the demarcation of the political bodies and the party organizations in the armed forces is, in my opinion, the most urgent task on the agenda.

[Interviewer] Vadim Andreyevich, many observers, political scientists—on the whole, a long list could be given here—forecast that the 28th party congress will be a congress of the split of the party. I realize that forecasting is a thankless task. Nevertheless, what is your forecast?

[Medvedev] Indeed, forecasting is a thankless business, and in our practical work we have grown accustomed to talking more about what has to be done, what tasks have to be fulfilled, and to what we have to aspire; although, of course, forecasting is also one of the party leadership's functions, and one cannot live without forecasts. What we, and I personally, expect of the 28th congress is that it should give a powerful new impetus for the party's restructuring and, thereby, to the general process of democratizing our society. In order for these expectations to be fulfilled, what we need, of course, is not a split or alienation, but consolidation, consolidation of healthy...

[Interviewer, interrupts] And yet, with whom can there be no consolidation here, in your view?

[Medvedev] Well, as for consolidating, I have already expressed by view on this subject in an interview, where I expressed my disagreement with the boundless consolidation formula. I feel that we cannot consolidate, on the one hand, with those who cling to the old ways and doggedly seek to hold up our forward movement, and even to turn back. I think that we can number among them several critics who, strictly speaking, were also revealed at the congress, critics of the leadership and Comrade Gorbachev, who hinted transparently that Gorbachev and his team were going in the wrong direction and all but abandoning the socialist path.

[Interviewer] Were there such statements?

[Medvedev] Yes, unfortunately, there were. I disagree categorically with them, and believe that the difference between us and that sort of statement is one of principle. On the other hand, there is also a difference of principle between us and those who think that we must not balk at any means and methods to tackle our problems, including the rejection of our traditional, socialist points of reference, who say that it is not important whether we have capitalism or socialism. That is not what interests people, they claim; what we must do is fill the shelves as quickly as possible. I do not want to say that...[changes thought] This is indeed a task of paramount importance, but it must not be lumped together, as they say, with our social choice. We need to tackle crucial problems, but seek solutions to them through the renewal of our socialist society, along the path of our socialist choice. Nothing else will be accepted, either by the party or by society as a whole.

[Interviewer] Thank you for this interview.

Ligachev on Democratic Centralism

AU2706193790 Paris AFP in English 1858 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, June 27 (AFP)—Soviet conservative hardliner Yegor Ligachev Wednesday rejected any attempt within the Communist Party to water down its Marxist-Leninist principles and ditch democratic centralism.

"We cannot permit the existence in the party of different ideologies, or abandon the Leninist interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism," under which the grass roots must submit to decisions adopted by central party authorities, he told INTERFAX, a semi-independent news agency.

A draft platform, to be submitted to next week's party congress, calls for reform of democratic centralism, an end to rigid centralization and more democracy within the party, notably in the conduct of elections.

"I recognize the right of communists and citizens who are opposed to the foundations of our party to form a new party of their own," Mr. Ligachev said. But it would be wrong to allow people to remain within the party if they called for abandoning the ultimate goal of communism, he added.

"I don't think that there will be a split at the 28th CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Congress.

"Perhaps a number of people will leave the party, but this is not going to be a split," he said, referring to next week's scheduled party gathering.

"Compromises that are reached at the expense of principles do not yield desired results and in the end damage the party," he said.

Democratic Parties Form Alliance

LD2706205590 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] A number of Soviet democratic parties have formed an alliance during consultations in Moscow. This has been reported by the news agency INTERFAX. The alliance united the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, the Organizing Committee of the Free Labor Party and the Democratic Party of Russia. The founders of the alliance hope it will help coordinate the work of democratic forces.

Democratic Platform Pessimistic

LD2806121390 Moscow TASS in English 1143 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Anrey Orlov; all quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Leading members of the Soviet Communist Party's radical wing, Democratic Platform (DP), today described the recently completed first stage of the founding convention of a Russian Communist Party as a "clear victory for conservative forces."

They also told a news briefing that "there is no reason to expect the 28th CPSU (Soviet Communist Party) Congress to go differently."

Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School and a member of the DP Coordinating Council, lashed out at the Russian Communist Party convention as marking a "major conservative turn" and a "slide to an authoritarian regime."

The DP's Moscow regional council issued an appeal, which was read out at the briefing, to boycott the convention's decisions, immediately suspend "the payment of party membership dues, and begin forming alternative party structures.

Shostakovskiy predicted that the 28th CPSU Congress will not make radical progress to greater democracy in the "party either, because, according to his estimates, up to 60 percent of the elected delegates are conservatives.

Speaking of the possible DP reaction, another coordinating council member, Stepan Sulakshin, claimed that 2.5 million CPSU members are prepared to quit the party and register as DP members. The DP will be represented at the congress by some 100 delegates, comprising a mere two percent of the overall attendance.

Sulakshin, who is also a member of the Soviet federal legislature, said that at the congress, the DP will proclaim itself a new left-of-centre party, demand the sharing of CPSU property, and appeal to the "non-party masses" to rally on the left flank of the political arena.

Shostakovskiy said the results of the Russian Communist Party convention made the DP review its attitudes to Mikhail Gorbachev, who is now "in need of the democrats' understanding and support."

Vladimir Lysenko, a DP leader and a member of the Russian legislature, agreed that "Gorbachev will find it very tough at the congress." "While at the Russian communist convention, it proved possible to somehow cushion criticisms against him," he explained, "at the CPSU Congress, the conservative backlash may be more concerted."

"The possibilities for compromise, which has been Gorbachev's main tactical weapon throughout perestroika, are now virtually exhausted. The centre's base is rapidly caving in, and in these conditions Gorbachev will have to make "the decisive choice," Lysenko said.

A split in the party and a mass exodus of its members may only be averted, speakers at the briefing argued, "if the centre and Gorbachev swing decisively to the left, making it possible to keep up the democratic momentum in the face of a right-wing threat."

The DP's efforts to turn the CPSU into a "civilised paraliamentary party" have failed, speakers agreed. They called for putting together a "bloc of democratic forces which are as yet disunited and even fighting one another.

Centrist Bloc Groups Meet

LD2706164190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Kirill Dibrova]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Jun (TASS)—A meeting of representatives of the centrist bloc of political parties and movements was held here today.

The participants discussed and adopted a statute on the centrist bloc of political parties and movements. The document gives an interpretation of the word 'bloc,' which is defined as the voluntary association of political parties and movements of a moderate radical orientation which sets itself the goal of joining forces in the fundamental reorganization of the life of the state and society and of creating an alliance of centrist forces "in order to avert an increase in the influence of extreme left-and extreme right-wing currents in the country's political life."

The alliance, which was set up in early June this year, comprises the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian Democratic Forum and a number of other sociopolitical movements. According to the leaders of the bloc, it enjoys the support of more than 200,000 people.

The participants in the meeting adopted the text of an appeal to all political parties, sociopolitical movements, unions and organizations. It appeals for attendance at an all-Union forum to formulate and agree a joint action program.

Prokofiyev Opposes Postponement

LD2706214290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] What is the reaction of Moscow communists to the newly born Russian Communist Party? What influence will they have on its renewal? Is it expedient to postpone the 28th party conference till the fall? These questions and others were put today by journalists from the television program "Good Evening, Moscow" and "Vremya" to Yuriy Anatoliyevich Prokofiyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.

[Begin Prokofiyev recording] It was necessary to proclaim the party, create an organizing committee, create all the initiative documents, and only after this form the party's Central Committee. I think that at the first stage the only thing that was carried out was the uniting—this was not the creation of a new party—but the uniting of regional organizations into a single party organization—the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party. And also done, in my opinion, was that they let off steam before the 28th party congress.

At the moment, emotions predominate, as well as reaction to the figure of old things, which, frankly speaking, is quite odious. I hope that the 28th party congress will take place in a more constructive way, attempting to understand the various currents in the party. I think that the work of Moscow communists, and in Leningrad and several other major organizations in the country which have succesfully advanced the process of democraticization, will be able to exert the influence of our Russian Communist Party, otherwise we will have a party maintaining dogmatic positions, and this will bring no advantages to society.

There are personal points of view, and I consider that postponing the congress until the fall would be incorrect. Postponement could be perceived as an attempt by the party leadership to continue, so to speak, strengthening their positions. I think that the renewal of the composition of the party Central Committee, the renewal of the party leadrship, may prolong the party's credit of trust. If we put this off it will simply be perceived very negatively, for the whole of society insisted on bringing forward the 28th party conference. I, speaking openly, counted on the situation stabilizing somewhat after the Russian congress, but as you see, I turned out to be over optimistic here; I simply want to appeal to Muscovites and communists not to come to hasty conclusions. It is necessary to relate in a more balanced manner toward those processes which are happening here, and have a very clear idea of things. Our society is a very complicated situation. We are taking a step toward balance, when both the economic and political structures are changing—any swaying to the right of left could capsize the ship of our society. And for this reason I would call for civil agreement and more balanced decisions. [end recording] [video shows Prokofiyev seated at a table]

Razumovskiy Chairs Rules Commission

LD2606193490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 26 Jun 90

[text] moscow, 26 Jun (TASS)—A regular session of a group of members of the CPSU Central Committee commission for the preparation of the 28th party congress, at which draft new rules of the CPSU were discussed, took place today. Congress delegates who were participants in the session put forward a number of specific proposals and additions to the draft rules and examined and expressed their attitudes to different versions of individual provisions in them that are of the most fundamental importance. The session was conducted by Georgiy Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Slyunkov Interviewed on Congress

PM2606140490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed interview with N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, under the rubric "Interview Before the 28th Party Congress": "Main Link in Perestroyka"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Nikolay Nikitovich, it is well known that the 19th party conference adopted a decision that the CPSU should stop doing the work of state and economic organs. How is this decision being fulfilled and what are its consequences for economic development?

[Slyunkov] The process of relieving party committees of the fulfillment of the function of direct leadership of the economy has not yet been completed, although major steps have been taken in this direction. A reorganization has taken place in party committees at all levels. You have obviously noticed that at Politburo sessions nowadays joint resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on economic questions are not adopted. The CPSU Central Committee has abolished the sector Central Committee departments, and the Central Committee apparatus no longer acts as "curator" of ministries and departments or interferes in their economic activity.

The work of the Central Committee Commission for Questions of Socioeconomic Policy (set up by a decision of the 19th party conference) is centered on problems of defining the strategic directions of the development of society's social life and the economy. The commission is charged with the functions of studying the most important questions and preparing proposals on them for the Central Committee in conjunction with the broad party aktiv, scientists, specialists, and public figures, and also analyzing the fulfillment of party decisions and resolutions.

The commission prepares findings on key questions of socioeconomic development and on drafts for resolutions and other documents submitted for partywide or nationwide discussion. In accordance with the party conference's decision, the Leninist principle of collegial discussion and adoption of decisions promoting the deepening of democratism and glasnost in the Central Committee's activity is being revived.

The Central Committee does not duplicate the activity of the government and central economic departments, but concentrates the efforts of communists working in management organs and soviets on the speediest resolution of the msot important and pressing problems and formulates a political attitude toward them.

Sessions of the Central Committee commission have studied, discussed, and prepared proposals on such important problems as the basic guidelines for pension provision for the working people; increasing the effectiveness of capital investments and improving the economic mechanism in construction; and new approaches to resolving the country's housing problem.

After careful analysis and examination of the various options, concrete recommendations (not decisions or directives) have been drawn up on questions of improving the economic mechanism and accelerating the economic reform, and also improving the management of scientific and technical progress.

The formulation of recommendations on these two most important problems was preceded by the holding of all-Union scientific and practical conferences involving more than 4,000 people: leading scientists, party and soviet workers, leaders of ministries and departments, economic practitioners, people's deputies, and representatives of all the republics, social organizations, and the mass media.

The law on pension provision for citizens in the USSR was examined by the government and adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The resolution on economic recovery and the stages of economic reform—by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. A decree of the USSR president was adopted on new approaches to resolving the housing problem in the country and measures toward their implementation in practice.

Party committees in the localities are departing increasingly from production and economic activity. But in the transitional stage this is causing a number of difficult phenomena. In many cases a "vacuum" has formed in management. In effect the territorial party committees often supplemented the sector system of management and took care of links between many different issues involving one or more sectors. This influence has now lessened. And we can see many instances of the breaking of links between sectors, imbalances, and evidence of a decline in contractual discipline. It is therefore important to boost more rapidly the role of local soviets in economic life and set the new economic mechanism in motion, and with it new forms of production ties.

[PRAVDA] What, in your opinion, will the party's role in society's economic life consist of?

[Slyunkov] The CPSU has never shrunk from the formulation of socioeconomic policy and the responsibility for its implementation, nor will it ever shrink from this. The essence of this policy is to boost the working people's material well-being and protect their social interests on the basis of the formation of a highly efficient economy.

The pivot of the party's economic policy is the transition from a command-distributive economic system, which failed to vindicate itself, to a regulated market economy. There is no other way to boost production efficiency and ensure an increase in prosperity.

[PRAVDA] What, in your opinion, led to society's mixed assessment of the government program for economic recovery and the outline for the transition to market relations?

[Slyunkov] I am convinced that the right direction was chosen. It accords with the strategic course of the party's present socioeconomic policy and the interests of the whole of Soviet society. It is based on the achievements of world scientific thinking and practice. But what caused people to feel alarmed? A significant proportion of people failed to see the advantages in the proposed draft either for society or for themselves in the transition to market relations, failed to see clearly designated final and interim objectives of the radical reform, the ways and methods of achieving results from economic changes, and their scale. It was not clear what costs society would have to bear and what it would receive in exchange in the short and long term.

Many people interpreted the government program solely as an increase in retail prices. This perception is erroneous, although this is no coincidence. The reform of retail prices was overemphasized, isolated, so to speak, from the main components of the reform, the creation of a new economic environment, and the formation of a new economic system. The program of social protection for poorly off elements of the population and preservation of socialism's social gains was not set forth clearly.

The following conclusion can be drawn: It is necessary not merely to proclaim, but to guarantee the population real income according to labor, and social rights such as the right to labor, leisure, medical services, education, and so forth. The transition to the market system cannot be carried out at a stroke, too rapidly, or immediately. Progressive stages will be needed. Complex questions cannot be resolved overnight. Our task is to make the transition to the market shorter and less painful. I believe there is simply no other way of boosting the economy and increasing its efficiency.

[PRAVDA] It is three years since the adoption of the decision on radical economic reform. Many people are now beginning to talk of its failure, because the situation in the national economy is not improving, and is even deteriorating. Do you agree with this view, and what are the reasons for it?

[Slyunkov] It is wrong to deny the existence of positive changes in the economy, they do exist. People should look at the transformations which have, since 1987, brought us to the point of the implementation of radical economic reform measures and the transition to a regulated market. These years were not only years of debate, but also years of major scientific economic studies, practical experiments, and gradual introduction of a number of important management and economic mechanisms.

The progressive structural improvements in the national economy cannot but be observed. Consumer goods have achieved priority in production compared with the means of production. The development of the material and technical base of the social sphere has accelerated. Changes are apparent in the implementation of housing policy and elsewhere.

But positive results perceptible to the people have been so few that the state of affairs in the economy, and in particular on the consumer market, is causing justified indignation among the people... The command-distributive system led the economy into an impasse.

[PRAVDA] The outbreaks of conflict in the area of interethnic relations are also apparently linked with this impasse. The companions of the command economy—shortages, corruption, a backward production structure, difficult working conditions—enrage people and provoke clashes. In these conditions, will the transition to market relations not prove to be yet another detonator of social explosions?

[Slyunkov] I feel profound anxiety and sorrow over each such interethnic conflict. True, many of them are rooted in economic factors, and in the present transitional period also in the political power vacuum: Local organs have not yet acquired their new shape. Many local leaders still pin their hopes on the center, failing to realize that they themselves are now the main protagonists in administration.

Incidentally, this idea was expressed in PRAVDA the other day in the article by R. Akbarov, Uzbek Supreme Soviet deputy and kolkhoz chairman. In his article he reproached me for failing to visit Uzbekistan during the conflict in Osh Oblast, although I am supposedly a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from the republic's communists. There is some confusion here: I am not a member of the Supreme Soviet, I was elected USSR people's deputy at a party Central Committee plenum...

But to come back to answering the question. Yes, the transition to market relations could entail a growth in social tension. But the country has no alternative. Any other path leads to the same impasse. A market must be created. It alone can break down national barriers and make people necessary to each other. Unfortunately the new economic system to replace the administrative system is not being introduced comprehensively, and violations of the stages and time frame originally stipulated are occurring. Many correct propositions and even legislative acts that were adopted to reform various components of the economy were not backed up by the appropriate mechanisms. The time scale for bringing a number of the most important components of the reform into action has been dragged out in practice.

The main reasons for the situation that has arisen stem from the novelty and complexity of the task itself, the inert force of the old thinking in theory and practice, the lack of preparation of cadres, and the unfamiliarity of the new approaches to economic reform, and also from the fact that during the period of perestroyka a number of miscalculations and even errors have occurred both at the Central Committee, and in the government, and in the Politburo. We have not always found clear and precise economic approaches, we have not always put things into practice in time, we have underestimated the consequences of certain decisions...

But the right strategic course for economic reform was chosen. This course is supported both by the scientific community and by practitioners. Without the restructuring of production relations and ownership, the creation of a socialist market, price reforms, the improvement of the financial, credit, and tax systems, the development of economic accountability, the consistent implementation of the principle of distribution according to labor, and the transfer of the regions to self-management and self-financing, our economy cannot achieve a fundamentally new state.

[PRAVDA] The situation on the consumer market is deteriorating. The production of goods has increased at a pace only half the planned pace, while the population's monetary income has increased twice as rapidly as planned. And unless urgent additional measures are adopted, it could totally disrupt the consumer market and lead to unpredictable social upheavals. What measures could be adopted?

[Slyunkov] The main thing is to reduce the state budget deficit. This is the source of inflation. It is necessary to organize efficient management of money circulation and stop the unjustified influx of money. In the past four years as a result of inadequate state regulation monetary income has exceeded expenditure on the purchase of goods and services, payments, and fees by nearly 150 billion rubles. Meanwhile trade turnover has increased by only 79 billion. The population's investments in bank accounts have increased 50 percent, while cash in hand has increased by one-third. This influx of money has disrupted the consumer market and cleared all the goods from the shelves. I do not think we should passively wait until 1 January 1991 before imposing a tax on the growth of the consumption fund. The galloping growth of monetary income unrelated to the results of labor must be stopped. Thus in January-May the population's monetary income increased 13.4 percent, or by R29.3 billion, while the growth in the production of consumer goods totaled only 6.9 percent. The review of wholesale, purchase, and retail prices and the introduction of new ones should be accelerated along with the new tax system.

Market mechanisms must be developed on the basis of the laws adopted on ownership, land, and the lease system, in order to galvanize economic life and the production of consumer goods. Small facilities for consumer goods production, services, and trade should be handed over for collective or family leasing, or perhaps even sold. It is also necessary to set in motion new channels for the realization of the population's monetary income—to extend sales of housing, shares for workers at enterprises, and surplus commodity and material assets.

Immediate intervention and additional measures are needed to ensure without fail an increase in consumer goods production amounting to R60 billion, as is stipulated in the plan for 1990.

[PRAVDA] You were an advocate of the earlier implementation of a comprehensive reform of prices and the credit and banking system and a change in interest policy as most important components of the new economic mechanism. Has your position changed?

[Slyunkov] No, it has not changed. I believe that a comprehensive reform of prices and reform of the credit, financial, and banking system should have been carried out more quickly. I think we have wasted at least a year. The longer we go on postponing this, the more difficult the transition to the market system will be. The implementation of measures to absorb the money supply that the population has accumulated (it is in excess of R165 billion) should be accelerated.

Nothing is stopping us from creating literally in the next few months that very important prerequisite of a market system, a modern credit and banking system. To this end the USSR State Bank must be given broad powers, including the responsibility for money circulation, emission, and stable work by the banks. The formation of a system of commercial banks must be accelerated, and we must go over to economically justified interest rates on loans. A new mechanism for regulating money circulation must be created and set in motion. The USSR State Bank and commercial banks must change from being organs of the administrative edict and distributive system into genuinely independent economic regulators of economic life. This package of measures will enable us to stop the devaluation of the ruble.

[PRAVDA] We are talking about the problem of state regulation of the market. How do you see this in practice?

[Slyunkov] During the transition to the market system a gradual, progressive, well-thought-out transition is necessary, based on careful state regulation through socioeconomic, currency and financial, and structural and investments policy, scientific and technical policy, and foreign economic policy. The state employs such levers as targeted programs with the provision of resources, legislation, taxes and customs tariffs, state orders, credits, subsidies, bonuses, guarantees, the regulation of the financial market, and arbitration.

A modern market economy is a flexible system for adapting production to the consumer, but at the same time it is a system of strict state monitoring of the observance of the principles of competition and social protection. An essential condition of the transition to the market is the attainment of financial balance and the normalization of money circulation.

[PRAVDA] You mentioned state regulation of scientific and techncial progress. What is your attitude to the outline set forth in the government program?

[Slyunkov] Positive.

The market will certainly create an opportunity for influencing scientific and technical progress, but will not in itself be the decisive influence. If scientific and technical progress is to become the most important element in boosting the country's economy to a qualitatively new level, we need flexible taxation and credit systems, the creation of the conditions for accelerated amortization of fixed capital, correct price policy, economic normatives, and other forms of economic influence. The state and government should define a policy of national scientific priorities and provide economic incentives for them.

[PRAVDA] There is now much talk of the prospects for convertibility of the ruble. What do you think about this?

[Slyunkov] All this is, of course, a lengthy, stage-by-stage process. We must begin by setting the right exchange rate, which should be an integral part of the price reform.

At this stage there could be two or three ruble exchange rates: for trade and nontrade operations and conversion of capital with the right to withdraw part of the profit. This, for instance, is what happened in Finland, where the process of the transition to a convertible currency was spread over a number of stages. The Central Committee Socioeconomic Department is carefully studying foreign experience and regularly submits evaluations and proposals to the party leadership. The launching of a Soviet market economy and the start of the transition to convertibility of the ruble should be backed up by the creation of a commodity-money balance and a state budget balance beforehand.

[PRAVDA] And to conclude. People want rapid changes for the better. What must be done, in your opinion, to ensure the success of reform more rapidly?

[Slyunkov] The country and people have all the prerequisites for a radical improvement in the economic situation. The production potential is vast, and capable of changing the state of affairs and saturating the market in the next few years.

The main question is how we manage to organize social production on market principles. We must complete the formation of the legal base (adopt about 30 new laws) and ensure the fulfillment of the laws already adopted by creating a mechanism for their implementation. To this end the USSR Supreme Soviet has granted the USSR president and government the right to adopt appropriate decrees and resolutions. That is the first thing. Second. In order to ensure that the reform proceeds as painlessly as possible, it is necessary this year to achieve the maximum possible results in production and eliminate the scattered, uncoordinated nature of actions on the economic front.

And finally, we must mold public awareness in the direction that we need the transition to the market not in itself, but in ourder to achieve a higher living standard. Without coordinated actions by all social strata and public consensus, our new economic policy simply will not work. And here communists have the leading role.

'Top Priority' Discusses Party's Future

LD2406035490 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 22 Jun 90

["Top Priority" program with Dr. (Sergey Plekhanov) and Dr. (Viktor Kremenyuk) of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, hosted by (Irina Tkachenko)]

[Text] [Tkachenko] Hello, and welcome to "Top Priority," hosted today by (Irina Tkachenko), and my guests at the studios of Radio Moscow are our regular participants in the program, Drs. (Sergey Plekhanov) and (Viktor Kremenyuk) of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies.

The founding congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has revived what was nonexistent for over 60 years: the Communist Party of Russia, by far the biggest republic in the country, which is to become what Mr. Gorbachev says the (?caucus), the cementing force of the CPSU and which will obviously form part of the CPSU, although it will have its own rules. The founding congress is looked upon as the dress rehearsal for the upcoming 28th congress of the national Communist Party, which will take place in less than two weeks and 10 days. And it is at the same time evidence of the deep devisions within the Communist Party.

Up to now, speaker after speaker has taken the floor to criticize the party leadership and Mr. Gorbachev himself for the grave mistakes and the failures in running the country for five years. Mikhail Gorbachev even heard calls to resign. He indicated that he, after all, was not hanging on to his post, which means a possibility of a new general secretary. So, gentlemen, my first question is: How bad or how good is a new general secretary of the Communist Party?

[(Plekhanov)] Well, if you're talking about the Russian Communist Party, then it remains to be seen who will be that person. As far as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is concerned, the national Communist Party, it's even more difficult to predict how that congress will go. I think the personality of the leader of the party is very important in our situation. The choice will be determined by the balance of forces in both the Russian Republican Party and the national Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Russian congress has indicated that there is a growing pressure from the conservative forces within the party on the leadership. But it has also indicated something else, and something which we have already seen at the February plenum of the Central Committee, namely that the conservative critcism at the end of the day develops into support for a relatively progressive policy document. We have seen that in the declaration of the Russian Communist Party, a declaration which was opposed by the hardliners among the conservatives, but it got overwhelming majority and that was the position which I understand Gorbachev supported. So there was more bark then bite, and that is explained by the fact that the conservatives in the party recognize that the tide of public opinion is not going for them, it's going against them. So they have to make peace with what people want.

[(Tkachenko)] Anything to add, Dr. (Kremenyuk)?

[(Kremenyuk)] Oh yes, yes. I think that what is important to understand is that the fact that there was a sharp criticism of Gorbachev, of the party leadership now is but natural. Since the situation in the country is difficult, the prospects are rather gloomy, especially in economy, and it would be naive or unrealistic to expect that the people would react indifferently to that or would support that. But that's one thing. The other thing is that, sure, the hardliners, the conservatives, try to use this wave of unrest, of unhappiness, among the people and try to produce the vision that, first of all, this is Gorbachev's failure and, second, that the people are unhappy with Gorbachev, which is wrong.

I think that essentially the people, the rank and file in the party, they understand that this is a difficult period which was inevitable since the perestroyka was started. And it is now only, only logical to continue keeping the track that was taken five years ago. There is simply no other alternative.

I would add also that for the Russian Communist Party now it will be a very serious and severe test now whether to respond to the true public mood and public opinion or to ignore it and to continue as if, you know, that nothing happened and they would like to continue in a very conservative way that was sounding during the congress.

[(Tkachenko)] To trail on what you've just said, both of you are using the term conservative or hardline to describe a lot of the criticism that was already heard at the congress of the Communist Party of Russian Federation. How accurately, do you think, the attitudes of members of the congress reflect the attitudes among rank and file and, if it's not such an accurate reflection, do you think that this congress is going to be an eye-opener for many people at the grass-roots level, and would that indicate possibly the continuation of what we call regional revolution when some of the regional party leaders were overthrown in the general elections of last year and the year before?

[(Plekhanov)] I think there is a definite gap between the position of the conservatives and the main tide of public opinion in the party and outside the party. In fact, some of the opinion polls have indicated that the party rank and file is more radically minded in terms of the major political issues than the nonparty rank and file and citizenry at large. I think that's explained by the fact that it was only within the party that politically conscious people were able to operate in the old times. So you have, as a result of us having had a one-party system for so long, you have a politically more engaged electorate, more concentrated within the party. And the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, by all the public opinion polls which I've seen, is the most popular force. And yet it is that group which was almost chased out of the party under pressure of conservatives. So I think that it is really an eye-opener to a lot of rank and file communists and unless the conservatives somehow make peace with the radical minded majority in the party rank and file, I think they'll be in trouble.

[(Kremenyuk)] Well, I can add a couple of things to what Sergey has said. One of them is, there are two types of reaction of the party rank and file that we have seen so far. One of them is, as you called it, the local revolutions. The other is simply leaving the party. And the amount of those who leave the party is growing. And that means that it is not only the process of erosion of the party positions in the society but also the erosion of the attitude of the party rank and file towards the leadership that indicates or that, well, testifies to the real situation. And I that maybe, you know, this coincidence or overlapping of two things, you know, this difficult summer, the difficult situation in economy, the difficult situation with ethnic problems in the country and the party conference and the party, forthcoming party congress. So they create a situation when the people of some conservative mind especially, they can say, look, what has been done during these five years is absolutely irrelevant and we should go back to some of the basic values. If the delegates of the party congress really choose that way that would be a tragic mistake.

[(Tkachenko)] Let me pick it up from you and try to look at it from a slightly different perspective of how much influence does the attitude or the different attitudes within the party have on society at large. We are seeing that the Commuist Party is, legally at least, is losing the power. First, the notorious Article Six of the Constitution was lifted which granted the monopolist power to the Communist Party. Now, take another example,the parliamentary session of the Russian Federation approved a legal provision which is actually banning party leaders from taking up government posts. At the same time, we are still sometimes, although much less often than before, hearing the assessments of people who say that the Communist Partgy is still considered the vanguard of reform. How much of a vanguard is it still? Is it relevant to say that it's still in control?

[(Plekhanov)] I think when people say that they look to the Communist Party as the vanguard of reform they associate it with the top leadership, with Gorbachev in the first place, so the perestroyka party is the Gorbachev party, it is not the Brezhnev party or the (?Poloskov) party that they are thinking of when they think in terms of the Communist Party as the vanguard. If the leadership changes, if the Communist Party is led by people who are thinking in terms of the eras and methods of the past then I think we might see a very serious turn against the party among the citizens of this country because the party can only stand and can only grow, can only keep its ranks together if it goes forward with the radical reforms that are necessary.

[Kremenyuk)] Well there are two things about the party and the reform, or the perestroyka. One of them is that the party, or the top leadership of the party, started perestroyka. The other is the responsibility of the party for the past and for the whole period which brought us to the necessity of perestroyka, which brought us to the present situation of crisis. When Gorbachev was usually stressing, and other people stressing, that the party started to reform they had in mind understanding that, well look we understand that we are responsible for what happened then and we try to improve the situation. Now those people in the party, those delegates at the party congress, who start speaking against perestroyka they simply don't understand all the amount of the responsibility which is behind those words. It is, you know, it is absolutely irrelevant and I think this is the root, this is the cause why there is an erosion of the party's position recently.

[(Tkachenko)] But you are not prepared to say that the party is actually left outside the main structure, the power structure, of the society yet? It's still very much in control. Is that what you're saying?

[(Plekhanov)] Of course...

[Kremenyuk)] Yes, yes,...

[(Plekhanov)] There's been one party for so long and its influence is still tremendous so there are a lot of powerful people in the party.

[(Tkachenko)] Let me ask you another question. How much hope do we have of seeing the party reform itself radically and how is it going to be, through unification, through the split, how do you see it?

[(Kremenyuk)] Reformed...

[(Plekhanov)] The crystal ball is clouded at this point, my crystal ball. I think very much depends on how the various groups and the various leaders will act in the coming couple of weeks and very much depends on the course that Gorbachev chooses to take because his influence in the party is still tremendous. But I think it would be my optimal expectation if the center of the party, the bulk of the party, continued to move forward in the sense of adopting more progressive planks in its platform, changing the internal rules of the party so that it becomes more democratic to try to catch up with the train which is leaving the station or party may be left in the railway station. If there is such a unity, in the bulk of the party around a progressive platform then it's okay if there are splinters on the right or splinters on the left. But if the party splits right down the middle, into two big factions, I think we may see, we may see such a weakening of the party as a political institution in this society that it will not be soon before it recovers.

[(Kremenyuk)] I would take quite an opposite view. I think this is the high time when there should be a point of separation of different factions, or different forces, in the party. For five years, you know, we understood, everyone of us, that, well, there were in the same party there were people with absolutely different views of the perestroyka, of the party program and so on and still they were in the same, so to say, party. That meant that the party was a loose entity of different people. Now we witnessed, for example, even at the Congress of the People's Deputies, a quite striking polarization of points, of the positions, and I think that this is the time when the party should also try to separate, you know, one camp from the other. Maybe the further step should be unification but before that unification it is absolutely necessary that there should be a clear picture: who is who in the party; who is for the further of change, or maybe at the higher pace; who is against that change, and so on. We should have this clear picture and see what is the amount of those, what is the amount of those, and how they can interact in the future and so on. But without such a process, I think it would be a mistake to talk about unification.

[(Plekhanov)] But you know why can't we have one party with clear differences and views in its ranks and several factions within the party coexisting? The oldest party in the world now is the Democratic Party of the United States. It has survived because it has been able to accommodate various views in the ranks of the same party and every time they try to form an ideologically pure party either on the left or on the right those attempts would be defeated. And the party is still there...

[Kremenyuk, interrupting] It is a possible thing, it's a possible thing but I say, you know, well maybe there can be two or three factions within one party or there can be two or three different parties. I don't think that in a society where we want to introduce democratic values, pluralism and so on, there should be something like unification for one people...

[(Plekhanov)] Well it has been tried. [indistinct interruption by (kremenyuk)] It has been tried recently and it didn't work...[interruption] because it goes against the grain.

[(Kremenyuk)] Yes, yes, that also gives me the right to talk. Before speaking, even, about unification there should be a separation of different people with those different views.

[Tkachenko)] What if then, what if this separation, or this split, happens—and even hypothetically speaking it is a very, very real possibility with the democratic platform already threatening to break away if its demands are not met at the 28th national congress of the Communist Party. Now their opponents of course are just as adamant in their views and there's not much hope that they would make any concessions. The split as you see it Mr. (Kremenyuk) might be not a bad thing, after all, for the Communist Party which is uniting among its ranks people of totally opposing views. But how bad or good a gain is it going to be for the country as a whole? Where do people turn to? What do they look at as their positive role model, as the consolidating force if you like? Any country would need some sort of consolidation to carry the radical reforms through, to carry out the overhaul of the economy, to push some of the very unpopular measures that we are facing right now. Who will provide this consolidating influence?

[(Kremenyuk)] Well one of the points in our heritage is that if we want to do something we should be consolidated, unified and go in one, so to say, row after something. But we are talking about the other thing, we are talking about creating a democratic society, which should consist of different views, which should consist of different parties, which should consist of different political forces. Only then we shall have something, something close to democracy. But if we start talking now about consolidation, unification and so on really I'm afraid there will be no democracy, or something like a democracy, which is not our purpose I think.

[(Plekhanov)] In other words coalition building, consensus building on the basis of clearly understood differences in opinion and political ideology...

[(Kremenyuk), interrupting] Of course, of course,...[interruption] we allow everyone a possibility to have his own view and his own position. But of course around something I agree but this should be not a platform or something, that should be ademocratic process in the country, a legal democratic process, around which the people with conservative views, (?absolutist) views, radical views, or with not any views could be consolidated or could be arranged in one society.

[(Plekhanov)] I think we're witnessing some of that trend in the way the Russian parliament has been operating, the national parliament too. I mean when those people sit together and have to vote for documents which reflect the will of the whole they have to come to terms, they have to bargain and they are able to bargain. So I think that gives us enough hope to be optimistic in the long run.

[(Tkachenko)] Okay, let me then on this optimistic note end this edition of Top Priority. My guests were Dr. (Plekhanov) and Dr. (Kremenyuk) from the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, thank you very much, and hosting this program was Irina Tkachenko. Till next week, goodbye.

Possible Split, Outcome Viewed

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[Boris Kurashvili article: "Is a Split So Terrible? CPSU: Forecasts And Prospects"]

[Text] By all indications a multiparty system is becoming the central question of the current political reform. A week before the opening of the 19th national party conference, I wrote an article on this subject and offered it to one of our very bold newspapers. But even that newspaper did not publish the article, because it said it could seriously "aggravate" the situation in the run-up to the conference. Nor did it publish the article after the conference, because the party leadership was against the "foisting" of the multiparty idea on the society.

Less than two years after the national party conference it became clear that the idea of a multiparty system had been prompted by the natural course of development and that it had been rejected by the party which lagged behind life and did not effectively serve the purpose for which it was founded. It was only in February of this year that a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee called a spade a spade and accepted a multiparty system as a fact.

What is more important for the CPSU: the party itself or socialism?

The CPSU would not be an organization fossilized by decades of monopoly on power, an organization which had lost many qualities of a genuine party as a servant and vanguard of the people if it suddenly demonstrated the ability to react properly to new developments which affect its narrow interests. It has put forward its own plan for a multiparty system, a plan suitable to it and its officials.

Disregarding its read disunity, the CPSU seeks to retain its unity and its leading role. It "consolidates" all groups, rejecting charges of eclecticism. The party condescends to a dialogue and cooperation with other ("sound") parties and socio-political movements. In short, it clings to the monopoly on power which is slipping from its hands. With the emergence of parties that serve as mute supporters, it continues to follow the old thesis: "the party works out and adopts a policy, and the Soviets carry it into effect."

We are witnessing attempts to replace undisguised one-party monopoly with a fictitous and non-balanced multiparty system similar to the one which existed in some of the East European countries. The CPSU evidently hopes to avoid the situation which has arisen there, namely, the establishment of a multiparty system.

Setting its sights on a non-balanced multiparty system, the CPSU leadership says this is needed in the interests of keeping the choice of socialism. Quite the opposite is the case, however. As I understand the present situation, the party will not regain its fighting capacity without a shock. I see only one way out for it, namely, a split into two or three socialist-oriented parties. This means that the parties already virtually in existence within the CPSU will be registered officially and the people will be offered not an eclectic "common" platform, but clearly expressed socialist alternatives. The parties will then be able to compete on a sound basis in their discussions, in the popularization of their programmes and in the election campaigns.

Thus, we are faced with either a split or a withering away, with the party to be thrown overboard in the last act of the drama. There is no other option. It is time to revise the old stand. Intimidation by threat of a split is being used to cover up obsolete dogmas. The time has come to agree to a split, a great motive force of ideology and politics at crucial stages of their development. It should be noted that, when it was necessary, Lenin accepted a split without hesitation.

What is more important for the CPSU, the party itself or socialism? I am sure that not the unity of the party, but its split is now a prerequisite for the survival of socialism, for the triumph for which it seems to exist. A split will lead to the emergence of new, viable parties capable of remaining active in politics and upholding the socialist choice.

The technique of a constructive split is simple and can be described in a few words. A general party discussion must be held in accordance with the party rules, and alternative programmes put to the vote in all branches.

The voting results will show what parties, each with its original programme and composition, have emerged.

I would like to continue the article in an unusual form, if not very original. The future events and situations will be described in a way as if they have already taken place or exist, and for this reason past and present tenses will be used, as in a scenario. The author appears as an observer who travels in a time machine to the year 2000. Thus, here is what has "happened" in the last decade.

A possible scenario: three parties

In the turmoil of the early 1990s, the CPSU leadershp was compelled to accept a split in the party. Incidentally, a split took place without the consent of the party leaders. Some moved to the left and others to the right. These words are used in the sense read into them by all of the world are used except our country: leftism in politics means orientation towards greater social equality, and rightism toward equality, while centrism is a combination of the two trends with a usual predominance of one of them.

Three socialist-oriented parties, the moderate left, centre left and centre right, finally came into being on the basis of the CPSU. Towards the end of the century, they had formed as stable mass socio-political organizations competing among one another and with other parties.

Having dismissed the allegations intended for naive people, namely, "no one knows what socialism is," the socialist-oriented parties reach in principle an agreement on the aims of socialism and on the basic mechanism of achieving them, and are guided by this agreement in their policy.

One of the aims of socialism is to ensure a free and harmonious development of the individual in conditions of social equality and roughly equal provision of every member of the society with material and legal prerequisites for this free activity, or what is called equal opportunities.

Social equality stimulates considerable personal inequality. This depends on the abilities of the individual and of his efforts to develop and use them. In short, social equality, freedom and the encouragement of personal inequality is what society can ensure for man. The degree of prosperity and happiness of the individual depends on his efforts alone.

The social base of the socialist-oriented parties has weak class differentiation. All three parties have their following in the working class, among the peasants and intellectuals, and in other segments of the population. There are nuances, however. The moderate left and centre-left parties enjoy broader support among the workers of large enterprises, engineers and technicians. The centre right party has a bigger following among the workers of small and medium-size enterprises, professionals, cooperative owners and self-employed individuals. The older people and youth inspired by lofty ideals give preference to consistently socialist, moderate and centre-left parties, valuing highly their rejection of private property.

The centre-left party has a better position among the middle-aged people. It wins with a big margin at referendums and in elections to the Soviets, receiving about 50 per cent of the vote. The other two parties enjoy roughly equal support, taking 20 per cent of the vote each. They hope to gain better results in the future.

The Communist Party

It was not without difficulty that the moderate left party freed itself of left radical and even extreme left tendencies which some incorrigible romantic socialists viewed as a saving remedy and which the bureaucratic party and state apparatus used for its purposes. Nevertheless, it is still called communist. It was proposed that it be called a party of organized socialism, and this proposal is still being discussed in the party. The term means a model of socialism which the party wants to build, being confident that many of the fundamental provisions of Marxism-Leninism must be revived. In the opinion of the party, these provisions became ineffective for a brief time only. They were erroneously abandoned in the period of stagnation and in ithe process of perestroyka.

It is not advisable, therefore, to create illusions among the people by promises of full democracy, to raise hopes, stimulate futile activity and cause disappointment. What is necessary is to promote "democracy of participation." The effective forms of "democracy of support" should not be forgotten either. However, only competent and selfless leadership must be backed.

In the opinion of the moderate left party, the forms of government stipulated by orthodox Marxism-Leninism proved ineffective for some time only, and only because they were inconsistently and incompetently used by three generations of post-Stalin political leadership. It is considered a neo-Stalinist party, and it agrees with this view while renouncing Stalinism. The moderate left party also considers itself the only worthy successor to the great victories of socialism.

The Party of Democratic Socialism

Such is the name of the centre-left party. The basic aim of its policy is the transfer of state property into the hands of the people, the creation of a sector based on the people's ownership of the means of production realized in the form of transfer of these means to work collectives for economic use.

The Party of Democratic Socialism favours full independence for the greater part of industry, whose enterprises have neither compulsory plans nor their substitute, compulsory government orders.

Planning has been preserved only for basic industries in which competition is complicated (the fuel and power, defence industries and transport). On the whole, the people's enterprises gain their prosperity on the competitive socialist market. Prices are set only by the market, by competition with other people's enterprises and with collective farms, cooperatives and individual businesses. Joint ventures created with other countries are also permitted.

In the political sphere, the Party of Democratic Socialism proclaims and guarantees extensive political democracy. It believes that only a center-left policy ensures a broad social consensus, the interested and active support from the majority of the people, and the necessary measure of agreement with the left and the right.

The Social Democratic Party

The center-right party, which advocates an economic policy akin to the New Economic Policy of the early 1930s, could call itself, for the sake of accuracy, a party of socialism with a multistructure economy and, in order to look more attractive, a party of free socialism. However, it prefers to be called the Social Democratic Party. In this way it expressed the similarity of the model proposed by it to the model described in the programmes of Western Social Democratic parties as democratic socialism.

Thus, there are three models of democratic socialism: the Soviet center-left model, which rejects private property, the Western social democratic model, which favours private property as the basis of the economy, and the intermediate model of Soviet Social Democrats, who advocate the legislative equality of all forms of property, including private, but propose the transfer of half the economy to private capitalist direction.

The term "free socialism" is frequently used to depict the third of the mentioned models, and such democracy is envisaged in programme documents. But soberminded people warn that for the shaping of the market (capitalist or semi-capitalist, because the socialist market is without grounds declared a chimera, like "Aryan physics") a long period of dictatorship will be needed, tacitly admitting in this way that mass resistance from the left will have to be put down.

The main trump card of Soviet Social Democrats is therefore not political democracy, despite their conviction that it will grow in the soil of economic freedom, but the possibility of rapidly achieving economic prosperity on the basis of private capitalist enterprise. "We shall feed you," the Social Democrats tell the people. "At what price?" their rivals ask.

As has been mentioned above, the three socialist-oriented parties are the most significant, but not the only ones.

The Liberal Democratic Party

A noticeable role is played in the country by the liberal bourgeois party which is called Liberal Democratic. It polls about five per cent of the votes. The Free Democrats advocate almost complete denationalization and, without sophistry, propose a return to "the main line of development adopted by all of civilization," that is, the line now followed by new capitalism. Most important, as its proponents say, it is a system which could feed the people better than socialism.

There is a joke that Free Democrats say openly what Social Democrats think about. However, there is only a grain of truth in this joke. The two parties have substantial distinctions. While the Free Democrats speak, in fact, on behalf of "shadow (illegally obtained) capital," and those who believe it should be legalized, and represent neocapitalism as the only way out of the crisis, the conscientious Social Democrats have not renounced their socialist views and consider themselves to be representatives of the working people.

The Greens

A special place in the party system is held by the Green movement, which became a party in the 1990s. The movement does not work out its own programmes for the socio-economic and political development of society, but joins the programme or the party which, in its opinion, ensures the ecological interests of society in the best way.

The greens are firmly consistent in their orientation with the forces which can preserve nature for the future, more reasonable generation. They understand the inevitability of compromises between economic and ecological demands. However, when necessary, they support even ultra-left groups and extremist nationalistic movements when they find in them staunch champions of their concepts.

In the first half of the 1990s, as in the late 1980s, a very active role, especially in some republics, was played by moderate and extremist movements, fronts and parties which had advanced issues of national revival and sovereignty to the fore and did not give proper attention to the solution of social and economic problems.

However, the social and economic problems proved more important. As a result, nationalist organizations exist to this day, the year 2000, although only as allies of and factions in major parties whose ideas they share to a certain extent.

The constructive, functioning multiparty system has not arisen overnight. The break up of votes (50, 20, 20 and 5 per cent for social parties, and 5 per cent for others, mainly the Greens and nationalist parties and movements) is characteristic of the second half of the 1990s. In the first half of the 1990s, especially in the early 1990s, the situation was quite different.

For the victory of the consistently socialist trend of development represented most productively by the Party of Democratic Socialism, it had to display political artistry. The inevitable clever compromises with the left and right wings of the socialist forces did not deform the look of democratic socialism, though they led to the adoption of some ambiguous laws, first of all on property, which remained in effect until the mid-1990s.

However, neither the Party of Democratic Socialism nor its political opponents consider their position firmly guaranteed. With the beginning of the new century, we are again faced with a question: what social system, remaining humane, will not resort to oppressive compulsion humiliating the dignity of man, or to economic and non-economic coercion, and will ensure the optimal total effect of the motive, technical and organizational factors of production?

In other words, the social price to be paid by society for its economic successes has again become an acture problem. The problem of a tougher ecological rationing of production and even consumption (the use of individual transport, travel and public services) has also arisen sharply, though not without delay. European integration has begun to assume practical contours. The spiral of development has again led to discussion of social choice and to shifts in the correlation of political forces.

And so from century to century, the law and happiness of life consist of constancy and changes.

Congress Commission Formed

LD2606130190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] A commission formed from delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and comprising scientists, workers, collective farm workers, and the heads of a number of enterprises, organizations, ministries, departments, party, local soviet, and trade union bodies is at work at the party's Central Committee. The commission is studying the government's concept and is examining alternative options for and various views on the transition to a regulated market economy, with a view to drawing up proposals to the congress on this matter.

Former KGB General Kalugin Urges Reform

AU2706182890 Vienna Television Service in German 1730 GMT 27 Jun 90

["Exclusive interview"—"the first interview ever given to a Western medium"—with former KGB General Aleks Kalugin by ORF correspondent Christian Schueller in Moscow; date not given; in English with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Kalugin] I am only three months away from the KGB. Nothing has changed there. The face has changed, but the methods and, above all, the spirit of the organization is just the same as it was five or 10 years ago.

[Schueller] Could not a situation arise where there is no way back anymore, also not for the KGB, as has happened in the GDR, where Stasi [State Security Service] finally has been dissolved?

[Kalugin] Well, that would be very unfortunate/ if this happened. The KGB should reform itself. But they do not seem to realize that the situation is really coming to the point when they may become kicked out as has happened in the GDR.

[Schueller] Was the KGB not also involved in the start of perestroyka? After all, Gorbachev was one of Andropov's men.

[Kalugin] Besides Gorbachev there is also Ligachev in the Politburo. And he, too, was brought in by Andropov, you see.

[Schueller] It looks like the party is falling apart more quickly than the KGB.

[Kalugin] Indeed, yes, and I think that after this party congress of the Russian Republic I personally do not see any reason anymore to stay in the party. I will not stay in this party under Polaskov. I am not interested in his leadership, and I do not feel like doing anything with him together.

[Schueller] Having been trained in the KGB and having worked there for 20 years, is it possible at some time to cease being an agent?

[Kalugin] Well, it is hard to answer. I am a free man now. The only thing that still binds me are certain professional secrets. I cannot spill them out, at least for the time being. But if I am forced I will go farther.

Usmanov Views Ethnicity, Party Factionalism

PM2106154990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by unnamed correspondent; place, date not specified: "Trying To Be Realistic"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Gumer Ismagilovich, the range of problems which you handle as secretary of the CPSU Central Committee includes the questions of interethnic relations in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. This, as recent events have shown, is a particularly acute and delicate area fraught with the possibility of unexpected complications which are difficult to foresee. How do you view the current state of affairs in this area and the prospects for the development of ethnic relations in the republic?

[Usmanov] Let's be honest, the so-called "resolution" of the nationalities question that was proclaimed in the past has turned out to be a dangerous illusion. The desire to eradicate ethnic problems based on a distorted and primitive concept of the class approach led to the situation whereby everything that failed to fall within its framework was described as nationalism. There were also times when strong-arm methods crudely interfered with the delicate fabric of interethnic relations. There was a deep gulf between the official version and what the peoples—in whose historical memories a sometimes hidden sense of frustrated national aspirations had built up—saw and knew. The era of glasnost and democratization has revealed this gulf.

Today it is clear that there is no going back. Nor are there any pat solutions. We are tortuously seeking solutions, cognizant of the immense complexity of the road ahead to harmony in ethnic relations.

The list of Russia's ethnic problems is as long as the list of peoples living in the republic. There are more than 100 peoples, including the Russian people, whose current woes run the gamut of economic, ecological, and ethnosocial problems. The North Caucasus, the Volga, and Eastern Siberia could be said to be Russia's "hotbeds" of tension. And each of these problems—I am convinced of this—has not only been individually brought about by history but must be individually solved, taking account of its unique features. I can see the prerequisites for this in the new approaches to a federal basis for the Russian state—approaches based on different attitudes to each national region and each people.

The maxim that people become necessary to each other when they feel profoundly needed should be applied in big-time politics.

[PRAVDA] The word "sovereignty" has become one of the most popular political slogans in a number of Russia's autonomous entities. How would you define this concept? What is your attitude to the centrifugal trends clearly visible of late in mutual relations on ethnic grounds?

[Usmanov] I wouldn't call "sovereignty" a popular political slogan. This concept has now become part and parcel of everyday life and subsumes the hopes of the most varied social strata. To all intents and purposes sovereignty expresses for people the power of liberation from the shackles of the administrative-edict system, a recognition of the need for national rebirth, and, I would say, a rejection of "anonymity" [obezlichka] in the world community.

Sovereignty is a summit open equally to large and small peoples. You can't have more or less of it—you either have it or you don't. Remember with what unanimity the declaration on RSFSR state sovereignty was adopted at the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

Genuine sovereignty is dialectical: The economic and the political are organically bound up within it. We should not assume that the resolution of urgent economic problems will have a proper impact on the political aspects of sovereignty all by itself. Just as it would be naive to expect the full implementation of peoples' political rights without eliminating leveling in the utilization of the economic potential they have created. That is why sovereignty means that each people has the inalienable right to fully enjoy the fruits of its labor.

Sovereignty for each Soviet people also means free national development for that people. But this does not mean distancing peoples from each other or the destruction, collapse, or breakdown of the union. Moreover, in my view, for well-known deep-seated reasons centrifugal trends both in the union and within the RSFSR are nonetheless largely being artificially encouraged. And it is important to bear this in mind when making political decisions.

I support with conviction the USSR president's concept of the Union as a union of sovereign socialist states. Its impressive outlines, quite frankly, have not yet been grasped by everyone. Yet its implementation would make it possible to protect each republic's interests on the basis of the use of the advantages of a single multiethnic state.

[PRAVDA] Does the experience you acquired during your years of soviet and party work in the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] help you and, if so, to what extent? As is well known, it is commonly thought nowadays that people who have spent many years in "apparatus" work are allegedly incapable of operating successfully under the new conditions since they are "hostage to stereotypes." Do you share that opinion?

[Usmanov] It's not enough to say that my previous work experience helps me—I rely on it. Above all, the experience I gained in Tataria during the perestroyka years. As perestroyka got going it was necessary to abandon certain working methods that had been used for years, and, quite honestly, I was happy about it. It's too much when people have made a great effort to produce work which then has to be cleared by higher authorities, and when leaders are valued for their contacts and their ability to get clearance or obtain resources.

I do not share the opinion that people who have spent a long time in the apparatus are incapable of operating successfully under the new conditions. Even previously the apparatus contained many people who were thoughtful, honest, and irreproachable in their words and actions, who cared about their work, and who had authority with the people. Today there are more and more such workers. It is important to notice them, to help them develop their ability to work with people, and to make sure they do not impede initiative.

When I worked in Tataria, cadre renewal was, in my view, a most important element in the restructuring of party life. Recruits to the oblast party committee, for instance, came from Kazan University and other higher educational establishments. These were young doctors and candidates of sciences—guys with backbone who had their own opinions, defended them cogently, and achieved results. Their arrival was marked by improvements, commensurate with the times, in our work with emerging social formations.

This new blood has helped us in our work. I would even say that it made the others pull their socks up and knocked them "into shape." We did not select people for the apparatus, guided by the principle: "the darker the night, the brighter the star."

I think that today we need more than ever to synthesize the experience and knowledge of leaders who have been through major schooling and of young, keen, and vigorous people who have original and modern views on problems. Both sides have their advantages, which could augment our efforts if combined. A long or short stint of responsible apparatus work—like every age group—has its own merits which should be utilized.

The situation in society and the party is rapidly changing and time is limited. This means that cadres should change too. I am sure that, as elective organs and the apparatus are reorganized following the Russian forum and the 28th CPSU Congress, we will learn many new names. I expect a major cadre renewal.

[PRAVDA] Many PRAVDA readers are interested about the relationships in leading party organs. Are you producing any initiatives at Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo sessions? Do others support you? Do you align yourself with the so-called "conservative" wing or, conversely, with the "democratic" wing?

[Usmanov] It sometimes seems to me that the interest in relationships in the party leadership is dictated by a desire to learn some secrets supposedly hidden from prying eyes. Yet there are no secrets. Our relationships are comradely and businesslike. There is a common goal which unites us. But genuine comradeliness does not mean sham unanimity, much less blind obedience. That is why, when it is a question of ways of solving one strategic task or another, various options are proposed and opinions contrasted—including in a polemical form. In my opinion, this is quite a normal, healthy, and I would even say natural form of activity for a collegial organ. As for shades of position among members of the party leadership, these are quite well known from the mass media.

At Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat sessions the atmosphere is always conducive to a wide-ranging discussion of issues, and almost everyone takes part. This, you will understand, promotes initiative. All opinions are taken into consideration.

For instance, the question of setting up a Russian Communist Party was discussed in great detail at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. I stated my position on the issue back at the September (1989) plenum and I had every opportunity to defend it.

On the whole, my less than one year's tenure of the post of Central Committee secretary has been very busy. In the course of implementing the CPSU Central Committee nationalities platform I have had to deal a lot with the elaboration of conceptual approaches to the problem of autonomous entities and the quest for ways of implementing the rights of peoples and ethnic groups which lack their own statehood. In close contact with the public, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and people's deputies a package of proposals has been drawn up to resolve the highly acute issues of the national rebirth of the numerically small peoples of the North and Siberia. At the same time, a great deal of work has been done on a whole range of documents connected with the mechanism for establishing Russian economic sovereignty.

I must say that in all this work I have experienced the necessary support—and not only from the party leadership, but from Central Committee departments and the republic's party committees, with which I try to keep in constant contact.

Now to the question of "political wings."

You know, there is often a simplistic approach taken to this question and a desire to divide people into "democrats" and "conservatives" using some primitive algorithm. I have no time for the kind of approach whereby people try to determine someone's political views from their subscription to various journals. And even the terms themselves have become rather distorted of late. After all, healthy conservatism is a necessary component of society's political life. For us it is almost a swearword.

I am trying to be realistic. I have convictions which I do not change as circumstances change, although I am well aware that the main mentor for any politician is life itself. If we're talking about methods, I advocate balanced and well-considered decisions. I reject categoric approaches in principle. Essentially no realistic policy is possible outside of the profound democratization of our society. That is why for me being realistic means adhering to democratic ideas.

[PRAVDA] What is your attitude to the platforms which communists are bringing to the congress? Won't the diversity of the platforms be a factor in splitting the party?

[Usmanov] I was recently asked a similar question at the party conference in Volgograd. I replied that I welcome varied approaches in seeking ways to renew the party and I advocate collating everything that is valuable in different platforms.

At the same time, it is obvious that the discussion about platforms has long since gone beyond the bounds of a discussion on their merits and shortcomings. Two political positions have emerged. One is the search for compromise and the desire to unite the party on the basis of the constructive ideas contained in different platforms. The other is strict adherence to the letter of one's "own" platform, ruling out consensus. The second position is primarily taken by those who are pushing the party into a split and retirement from the political scene, and who are preaching liquidationist ideas.

I'm sure that there is no other real political force in the country apart from the CPSU which is capable of guaranteeing social stability, pooling the efforts of society's various components, and ensuring progress. At the same time, the party has for too long been in thrall to the dogmatic complex of monopoly rule and monopoly control of the truth. We have sometimes acted contrary to the logic of democratization and the building of a rule-of-law state, and we have not always struck the right chord in relations with new sociopolitical movements, thereby encouraging them to take political steps that are insufficiently constructive. A paradoxical situation has come about whereby the CPSU itself has produced opposition sentiments. This is at the root of many problems which threaten to produce a potential split and which have noticeably thrown a certain number of party members into disarray.

It is a pity that at the initial stages of perestroyka the party failed to work out a mechanism for supporting forces which would today have grown into a strong political ally and possible partner in pursuing the idea of the socialist choice.

In this regard it is necessary for Russian communists at their forum and the 28th CPSU Congress to provide clear answers to the questions of where we are headed, what society we want to build, and how we intend to arrange our relationship with emerging parties and sociopolitical movements. If we clearly answer these questions the CPSU will be able to rally around itself a large proportion of society, and it will grow stronger morally and organizationally. And only then, it seems to me, will we be able to avoid any possible upheavals in the party and society.

Group Examines Approaches to New Union Treaty

PM2506154590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Working Group Meeting"]

[Text] By agreement a meeting of a working group of representatives from the union republics devoted to a discussion of approaches to the elaboration of a new union treaty was held in the Kremlin 20 June. On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of the Federation the meeting participants were warmly welcomed by R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

Opinions on the procedure for elaborating a new union treaty were exchanged in a frank and businesslike atmosphere. Taking part in the exchange were R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; V.B. Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; V.I. Sholodonov, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet; I.V. Chirgadze, deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]; K.A. Abdullayev, first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Kazakh Gosplan; N.A. Medemariashvili, Georgian SSR Council of Ministers' permanent representative at the USSR Council of Ministers; Academician A.F. Dashdamirov of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; V.S. Pushkash, deputy chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet; Yu.Ye. Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers; S.B. Begaliyev, deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Kirghiz Gosplan; K.A. Aslonov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; V.G. Otchertsov, deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet; V.B. Isakov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic; A.A. Akayev, president of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences; S.S. Sartayev, member of the Kazakh SSR Presidential Council; Belorussian SSR People's Deputy V.N. Zablotskiy; Professor V.A. Vasilenko of Kiev State University; M.N. Korneyev, Kirghiz SSR deputy minister of justice; S.I. Doroguntsev, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences' Ukrainian SSR Productive Forces Research Council; Kh. Saidmuradov, vice president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; I.I. Yakovlev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's International Law Administration; G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities' Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations; Yu.K. Sharipov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities' Commission for Questions of the Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs; and G.I. Revenko, member of the USSR Presidential Council.

During the discussion constructive ideas and proposals were expressed which could form the basis of the procedure for a treaty process. The meeting participants agreed to continue work at expert level and to submit its results for discussion by subsequent sittings of full representatives of the union republics' supreme soviets.

Socialist Party Founding Congress Ends

PM2706133790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

["INTERFAX" report: "Program And Statutes Approved"]

[Text] The founding congress of the USSR Socialist Party ended in Moscow 24 June. The congress announced the creation of the party, approved its program and statutes, and elected an executive committee. One of the socialist leaders, Boris Kagarlitskiy, told an "Interfax" correspondent that their main aim is to protect urban hired workers from all types of exploitation.

Komsomol Central Committee Plenum Concludes

LD2606222190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1940 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Jun (TASS)—The plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (VLKSM)—a mass youth organization of the USSR—that ended here today was devoted to the elaboration of the position of the Central Committee of the VLKSM regarding the 28th CPSU Congress. Vladimir Zyukin, first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee, who delivered a report, characterized the position of the youth union with regard to the CPSU and changes in Soviet society. Having called the VLKSM "an organization which over 70 years have stood nearest of all to the party," he stated that Komsomol members are concerned over the precongress discussion.

The changes taking place in the youth environment are more dynamic than in the party, Vladiir Zyukin thinks. According to the Rules adopted by the 21st Komsomol Congress, the model for the VLKSM has become fundamentally different: the unitary organization has been replaced by a federation of youth unions. As the Komsmol leader put it, the organizaiton is today a "mass pluralist organization of a left-wing persuasion."

Addressing the Komsomol members, Oleg Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who took part in the work of the plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee, noted that the relations between the party and the Komsomol were now based on principles of parity. In the long term, he did not rule out the amalgamation of both organizations so as to form a single party. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee favored a living link between the party and young people.

In the adopted resoluton, which it was decided to distribute to delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, those attending the plenum declared themselves to be in favor of "the radical renewal of the CPSU, and the consolidation of the progressive forces in society united by the ideas of democracy."

It was also decided at the plenum to reorganize the apparat of the VLKSM Central Comnmittee, reducing it considerably.

USSR Supreme Soviet Session Assessed

90UN2160A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by TRUD political columnist V. Golovachev: "Will the Government Master the Situation? Reflections After the Completion of the Work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] It seemed strange at first: On 13 June the USSR Supreme Soviet was considering a question of utmost importance to the country, one that disturbed, without exaggeration, the entire population—the transition to a regulated market, but there was no particularly heated passion in the meeting hall, nor any hot arguments in the lobby. However, everything became clear quite simply. First, the concept of a transition to a regulated market economy in the USSR submitted by the government, as is known, had already been discussed earlier (at that time, 89 deputies spoke in the debates), and many speakers criticized it severely. And, second, as became clear, the main debates on the transition to a market are now being postponed until autumn. For it was proposed to the government that by September it develop a specific program of measures for the formation of a structure and mechanism of a regulated market economy, and to supplement and make changes to the concept that was submitted. The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on this question was considered paragraph by paragraph by the deputies during the entire day, and, moreover, they considered it scrupulously, and with difficulty, introducing numerous amendments and additions.

But, nonetheless, what does the decision that was reached mean? Support of the government's concept, or dissent from it? The opinions of a number of deputies and of journalists accredited to the Kremlin differed. "Basically, the government concept in the form in which it was presented did not get support. Therefore, the government is being given a last chance to prove itself and to develop by autumn a really effective program that will help lead the country out of the crisis," they said. "Supplementing and changing a concept is not unusual. And such a formulation is indicative of the fact that the government concept was essentially supported," others asserted. "We will take a look at what the government specifically proposes in autumn, and how this will be met by the supreme soviets of the union republics, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and, most importantly, by the people. Then, everything will become clear," still others remarked.

However that may be, in autumn the government will really have to pass perhaps its most difficult test, and words about the "last credit of trust" which could be heard at the session are, in my opinion, a very serious warning. Questions are encountered more and more frequently in the editorial mail: Can the government master the situation? It is not only the sad legacy of stagnant times that explains the current worsening crisis in the economy, but also the errors that were committed—is not the price of economic errors too high? A note was read at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet with a question from Deputy A. Sobchak: "The second congress approved a program of the government on measures to improve the economy. A year has passed, and not only has there been no improvement, but the economic situation of the country has sharply worsened. What are the guarantees that the next government program will not have the very same result?" There is no denying that the question has implications...

One of the reasons for the economic innovation "wheel-spinning" is that even adopted progressive laws are virtually not working. That is why there was talk at the USSR Supreme Soviet session of accelerating the formation of necessary conditions for changing to a regulated market economy and, for this purpose, to recommend to the president of the USSR that edicts be published or that the USSR Council of Ministers be instructed to adopt provisional decrees and regulations in the near future on the implementation of laws about property, about freedom of economic activity and enterprise, about the denationalization and decentralization of property, and so forth.

It is important to stress: The idea of the transition to a regulated economy has increasingly more support. The people understand: There is no other way out of the crisis. But the real question is: When and how to implement this transition, and what measures must be adopted for the social protection and adaptation of the population. These difficult steps can be taken only with national agreement and with the readiness of a majority of the population for unpopular measures. This, incidentally, is one of the important features in the position of trade unions...

But here is the question that has become the center of public attention: How does one define national agreement specifically? In other words—hold a referendum or use various forms of public discussion? Today it is proposed to conduct discussions at all levels of soviets after summing up the opinions of representative organs. Indeed, this was talked about at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Speaking on behalf of a working group for the preparation of a draft decree, Deputy A. Boyko said that in letters that come to the parliament the Soviet people do not insist on a referendum. However, the mail of the Supreme Soviet is probably not the only source of analysis of public opinion. Many TRUD readers who call us up on the telephone, come to the editorial office, and send letters demand just the opposite; namely, the conduct of a referendum. Because, in their opinion, only a referendum will give a full and objective picture of the mood in society.

Let us talk frankly—why are some people against a referendum? Well, because they think: The people will not support an accelerated transition to market relations—whether they will be regulated or yet another kind. Therefore, a collection of well-known arguments is also cited: Our country, they say, has no law on a referendum, there is no experience, it will cost a lot, we will lose valuable time... Although, it seems, a presidential ukase would be enough for the conduct of referendum.

But, in my opinion, the thing that many opponents of reform agree on is that the people may not support abrupt economic innovations. They were dissuaded, they are not ready, they gave up hope... And from a purely psychological aspect, who will support a drop in the standard of living (even if only temporary), given our poverty? Thus, it is very difficult to forecast the outcome of a referendum...

Where is the way out? Because without a change to a market, there is no way for us to get out of a breakdown. This means that it is necessary to convince the people, to prove, to give weighty arguments and alternative versions, to develop clear guarantees of social protection, to reach everyone...

Quite naturally, everything is difficult, troublesome, and exhausting. Therefore, it is simpler, of course, to hold discussions in the "representative organs": Nevertheless, people there are more competent, and they can find a common language quicker...

I do not at all want to say that the soviets do not reflect the opinions of the people. No, of course, they do reflect them, but still there are things that apparently must be decided by a referendum. For the proposed "stepped" path is fraught with great dangers. If the people do not make a deliberate choice, and if they do not assert a deliberate readiness for the market with all of its pluses and difficulties, then there is no guarantee that there will not be any social explosions when millions of people run into the realities of the new economic relationships... Indeed, how does one make abrupt changes in a democratic state, if there is a danger that the people can vote against them? In any case, it is worth giving serious thought to all of this...

Thus, the government will take its main test in autumn.

The USSR Supreme Soviet session will begin work after the summer vacation on 3 September.

Gubenko Airs 'Depressing' Cultural Problems

LD2506210490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] It is by no means absolutely necessary to shout in order to make oneself heard; sometimes dead silence can be far more deafening and sobering. Workers in culture are of this opinion, and have decided ito make a last gesture of desperation—five minutes of silence. This action is planned for 1930 on 28 June. The initiators of this action, in the person of all the creative unions of the country, and a number of ministries and departments, met journalists today under the chairmanship of USSR Minister of Culture Nikolay Gubenko. Answering questions, the minster said:

[Begin Gubenko recording] The point of the action is to mobilize society in defense of the spiritual foundations of its own life. The attitude to culture is a measure of a people's self-respect, without which there can be neither economic nor social progress. Spiritual poverty is not only a consequence but also a direct cause of material poverty. Here are the figures which have been depressing me personally for the six months that I have been aware of them. Almost 40 percent of the capital stock of culture and arts is worn out; 12,500 clubs and 2,400 libraries are unsafe; and almost half of the museums need capital repair. People are stopping going to clubs, since many of them are technically equipped far worse than any apartment. A video recorder is a rare and exotic thing in a club. A considerable proportion of the country's population is excluded from the boons of culture altogether because this has such a weak material and technical base. There are 59 major towns with a population of over 100,00 which have no theater; and 102 towns with a population of over 50,000 have no museums or even an exhbition hall. At the start of the five-year period, an attempt was made to substantially increase investment in the sphere of culture; however, this attempt largely petered out. The plans for capital construction of cultural projects are not being fulfilled.

The introduction of new retail prices in the conditions of a market economy will result in an increase of material expenditure to the tune of 1,800 million rubles within the system of the Ministry of Culture alone.

Culture nevertheless is not a field where it is appropriate to lay the salvation of the drowning man upon the drowning man himself. The calamitous material situation of the main mass of cultural workers demands priority attention. We persistently explain, but without success, that their lives cannot be judged by the incomes of a couple of hundred famous literary and artistic personalities, who are in the public view. For instance, only 200 men of letters under the All-Union Copyright Agency receive over 1,000 rubles per month. Yet the Supremne Soviet is taking only these 200 writers as its benchmark when it talks about taxation of the whole mass of writers and men of letters.

Societies have throughout the ages regarded it as their duty to provide the most outstanding talents with complete material prosperity. The fact that this principle has been brought into question in our country is one of the symptoms of the loss of culture. In terms of average salary, culture comes bottom of the branches of the national economy. Thousands of librarians and club workers and actors earn about 100 rubles per month. Can one live on this money? And what will happen tomorrow, when prices rise? It is time ot understand that drawing up and adopting legislation on culture and also on national education and health care is a task that brooks no delay. Culture, morality, and spiritual and ethical values are needed equally by all, and we must think about how we can help.

This action is designed to draw society's attention not only to the crust of bread which is prime among the needs of our population. But people must understand that this explosion of bleeding human wounds currently seen within the context of the freedoms that have been granted is mainly based upon lack of spiritually, lack of culture, and ignorance of how culture can be helped in these fundamental misfortunes on which we are today focussing. [end recording]

Economic

Voronin Comments on Soviet Debt to West

LD2706144290 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—The Soviet debt on current payments to foreign partners now runs to approximately $2 billion. However it will be redeemed in the near future, TASS was told by First Deputy Prime Minister Lev Voronin.

"In a bid to develop the initiative of Soviet enterprises," he said, "the Soviet Government has allowed too many of them to deal on the foreign market. Without sufficient expertise and knowledge, some enterprises concluded commercial deals with foreign partners, for which they could not pay.

Many agreements failed to meet the requirements of the Soviet economy and reflected only the interests of enterprises. Thus, while steering away from decades of state monopoly on foreign trade and giving freedom to enterprises, we failed to take into account that only the strongest survives in the world market. Therefore in future the Soviet system of foreign trade will be based on large mediating firms and trading houses."

The reform of the Soviet economy and foreign economic relations, as well as a fall in world prices of a number of Soviet goods, which accounted for the bulk of foreign currency earnings, also affected the current situation, Voronin noted.

"Neither did we take into account that the psychology of Soviet people over more than 70 years cannot be changed in a year or two. This is a more complex and lengthy process," Voronin said.

The Soviet Union boasts great financial and material resources which can guarantee the repayment of the outstanding debt to foreign partners.

Graduates of National Economy Academy Interviewed

PM2606101990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 22 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by S. Milyanchikov and V. Avdeyev, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] A graduation ceremony for the latest batch of economic managers has been held today at the National Economy Academy.

[Correspondent] To be honest, I was a little worried on the way to my latest assignment, to cover a graduation ceremony at the National Economy Academy. I was aware that it was no longer possible as in previous years to submit a glowing optimistic report on this year's graduation ceremony, the 11th. Everyone, from pensioners to schoolchildren, can judge the state of our economy not by hearsay but by the state of our store shelves.

Will the 150 economic managers who are receiving their diplomas at the academy this year be able to change the current state of affairs? What are their plans for the future?

[M.I. Rukavitsyn, director of Voronezh "Stroymaterialy" production association, identified by caption] I am returning to my former job with the conviction that what is necessary to develop the construction materials industry are joint-stock companies and associations which will help to promote socioeconomic development.

[M.V. Ivankov, chief engineer of "Tenzor" plant, identified by caption] I believe that what is needed is a renewal and expansion of the product range and entry into the market, gaining a foothold in the market.

[V.Ye. Khrapov, director general of the "Murmanskaya Sudoverf" production association, identified by caption] We must create conditions for all the workers which will enable them, proceeding from economic interests and their personal interests, to ensure that our company, our Murmansk shipyard, flourishes and with it the whole of our country.

[A.G. Aganbegyan, rector of the Academy, identified by caption] The most advantageous financial investment is investment in people. There is no more important cause than the training of cadres, education, and the training of economic managers.

All-Union Conference Debates Market Economy

904A0445A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent A. Dzhapakov, Sverdlovsk: "The Price of a Market"]

[Text] So much has been written and said about a market economy recently that it would seem all of us know everything about it. Actually, it is the other way around: The more we read and hear about a market, the more extensive the area of the unknown becomes, and therefore of what we find alarming about it. This attitude was easy to detect in the auditorium where the all-Union scientific and practical conference "Market in the USSR: Mechanisms of Formation and Stages of Development" was held. About 900 enterprise managers (members of the All-Union Association of State Enterprises which sponsored the conference) attended it, as well as party, soviet, and trade-union functionaries from many regions of the country.

They met with those who had developed the government program for a transition to the market—the heads of central departments and scientists who delivered reports at the conference. An interesting discussion took place.

So, we are switching from words to deeds. However, even the first step on this road, the publication of the government concept of our transition to the market, swept almost everything there still was off the store shelves like a mighty hurricane. At present, the bewildered question is heard everywhere which was also asked at the conference: "Why was it necessary to announce price increases ahead of time—after all, it was clear what this would bring about?"

An answer was also given: "The costs of glasnost were a factor. Is the old practice of price increases really better? All of us remember how it was done: on the sly, secretly, unexpectedly, with the pill subsequently being sweetened—supposedly, this was a 'temporary' measure."

The command-administrative system amounts not only to a certain way of conducting economic operations but also to corresponding morality and special mentality. The explosion of panic buying is but a response of yesterday's mentality to a quite democratic step taken by the government.

All of this indicates that we have not at all changed as radically as we would like to in the five years of perestroyka. The ship of our state is heading to unfamiliar shores where shortages and lines are unknown through the stormy elements of the market with a crew which has been peacefully adrift all its life in the slimy bay of stagnation.

Let us keep facing up to the truth and acknowledge that at present the mood of a large segment of the crew is not upbeat. For example, this is how G. Kostin, the director of a plant from Voronezh, expressed it: "A market economy is unavoidable. It is unclear what good it is going to do, but it is clear that it will get worse."

Well, both the enthusiasm of optimists and the heightened sense of danger of pessimists are necessary for our common cause to succeed, as long as we do not lose touch with reality by giving in to one of the extremes. At present, being in touch can only mean knowing the price of the market. It is clear that we will not get it "free of charge," without losses. However, what is the price? The main point is: What will we get having paid it?

It so happened that previously, when they just started talking about the market in earnest, its proponents emphasized mainly its advantages. However, the closer we came to the turning point, the more prominent losses appeared. The government concept contained no promise of a bright future either.

This made the entire list of advantages which the market has in store for us offered at the conference by USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] First Deputy Chairman L. Vid all the more pleasant to hear. This included extensive opportunities for talented and practical people to apply themselves which we have unsuccessfully sought to ensure for many years, and so on. L. Vid endeavored to prove that all of this would be an inescapable consequence of the introduction of market relations. However, the reception given to his words by the audience was quite cool.

This was not due to some special conservatism of the thinking of the audience. It is just that experienced people gathered there—enterprise directors who are used to drawing conclusions on the basis of specific economic calculations. This is why they found much more substantive the part of the report in which L. Vid outlined a forecast of the development of our economy in the immediate future done by the Gosplan on the basis of a mathematical model.

The forecast promises a sizable further decline of production in 1991 and a drop of gross national income. In 1992 the decline will stop, and in 1993 growth will begin which, of course, is gratifying. However, we should also keep in mind the fact that the expected growth will begin from a level to which we will have to fall next year, and which will be lower than that of this year, which, in turn, is still lower than the level of last year. This is the abyss we will have to climb out of. What awaits us at the bottom?

Having mentioned the unavoidability of price increases, Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices] First Deputy Chairman A. Komin stated that they would be shouldered entirely by the high-income strata of the populace. The latter will have to lose up to 10, and some of them up to 15 percent of income. The rest will be compensated for everything.

Still, it looks like the entire society will have to pay. This became particularly clear based on the report of a USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] representative, A. Baranovskiy. He gave the following as the most realistic numbers: 2.7 to 3 million unemployed in 1991 and 5 to 7 million in 1995. Understandably, employees with few skills and, consequently, low wages and the mothers of many children, a good number of whom are unemployed even now in the absence of a market, will be the first among them.

A. Baranovskiy discussed the measures being prepared for supporting the people who are going to be left out. If these measures are adopted, the future of the unemployed will be as follows. They will receive their previous average monthly wages for the first three months. The wages will be paid by their enterprises. (What if the people find themselves out in the street exactly due to the liquidation of enterprises? This question was left unanswered.)

Furthermore, the local soviets have the right to draft the unemployed for so-called "public works" for between two and nine months, apparently to sweep the streets and so on. In the course of this, the people will be able to draw 70 percent of their previous average wages, and subsequently unemployment benefits which are no less than the minimal wage. Finally, once 18 months have elapsed after the loss of their jobs, there will be benefits amounting to one-half of the minimal wage. A network of job-placement centers and those for retraining the labor released will be created with a view to preventing this. The services of the centers will be free of charge for the unemployed.

What is the minimal wage going to be? It is planned to set it at R90 beginning in 1991, and subsequently increase it to 100. In addition to it, there will be compensation for price increases and inflation, and the minimum wage may thus grow to be R140 to 150. However, the speaker did not explain how these numbers were derived.

Could it be that they are derived from the calculations of the expected subsistence minimum? Hardly. The Goskomtrud representative discussed in detail how the current subsistence minimum was calculated. It comes to R78 a month. However, the minimal consumer budget of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] comes to R80.25 for some reason.

According to Goskomtrud specialists, this is how this money can be broken down: R44 for foodstuffs, R28 for nonfood goods, R7.80 for commercial services, and R3.45 for other expenses. It turns out that for R44 a month you can eat 53 kg of meat and 250 eggs a year, drink 343 kg of milk, and so on. Understandably, they proceeded from current state prices in the process.

I do not think that there are many people in our country who regularly buy meat in stores at state prices. To be sure, there are such people, but it is doubtful that they are the ones with minimum incomes. A majority get their meat in the markets where prices for it exceed state prices by a factor of three or more. Therefore, it is unrealistic to purchase 53 kg of meat a year for R44 a month. As far as R80.25 a month are concerned, this is the kind of income about which a friend of mine said: "This will last you a long time if you do not eat or drink anything."

This is how the current subsistence minimum has been calculated. Can we hope that there already is one for tomorrow which will be closer to reality, given the lack of clarity concerning regulated prices and the still greater one concerning market prices which will, of course, go up still more? We cannot seriously expect meat to appear on the counters in abundance at R5.50 (the price proposed by the government) immediately after the new year just because it will have become more expensive. These calves are yet to be fattened; meanwhile, this has been getting worse rather than better with every passing year in our country.

All of this brings us to the sad conclusion that the expected minimum wage has been derived old-style—plucked out of the air. In general, it is incomprehensible what is going to happen with wages. Fine, according to a new law on state enterprises, wages of the employees of a plant will depend entirely on the performance of this plant. What about the people on fixed incomes who receive a salary?

We are facing such uncertainty for the first time. Previously everything was much easier: Here are the results of yet another "overfulfilled" five-year plan, here are targets for the new one by the end of which the standard of living will undoubtedly increase—here are the exact numbers for you on the magnitude of the increase—

proceed without fears and doubts! Indeed, such crudeness is no goodness, because this is exactly what has brought us to where we are now.

As A. Komin said at the conference, we are now being forced to get out of the traps sprung on our route many years ago. These traps (rather than a transition to the market) are to blame for our current and future problems. The mass of unfavorable developments accumulated in our economy has become critical, and its decay is proceeding at an accelerating pace. It can only be stopped by the market, and this is the main conclusion of the conference.

However, we should hardly regard our transition to the market as the lesser evil only. The market is a general human value; its essence is to democratize the economy, and this is a regular stage of perestroyka. Democratization is nothing but the expansion of the limits of the freedom of choice which, in its turn, is always fraught with risk and losses.

Not all of the latter have been predicted and calculated. Perhaps, it will be possible to do this only after the specific mechanisms of our transition to the market, which are currently under development, are known.

How low will the minimum standard of living be, what will the average and high standard be? How will a consumer basket look a year, two years, or five years from now? Had this been known in advance, the people may not have purchased macaroni by the sackful having just heard about the expected increase of prices for it, all the more so because such reserves make no sense at all. Is it not clear that within several months they will be eaten by mice and cockroaches rather than customers? At what level do they expect to arrest inflation, and is a reverse process possible? If this were known, the people would not rush to the savings banks in order to withdraw their savings and invest them in anything at all, sometimes even in unnecessary things, but would keep the money in order to buy shares which can bear dividends. A great many such questions may be asked.

Answers to at least some of the questions could reduce the level of uneasy tension which exists in our society at present, and thus reduce the price which we will have to pay for the market. After all, alarm is an integral part of the price. Steering a ship in uncharted waters without bearings is a stone-age pursuit. Only the feeling of reality and precise knowledge will help us avoid many dangers.

We do need a market, but not at any price. This thought was stressed in a speech made by AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Secretary V.N. Makeyev in the debate. We cannot but agree with this.

Transport Problems Hamper Export Efforts

PM2706161390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Batalov and V. Zhuravlev, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] Our next report is about total mismanagement, about the lack of coordination in the transport sphere.

[Correspondent] Abandoned trains. [video shows train loaded with timber] These 10 trains have been waiting for the green light for a week now. Trains loaded with goods for export in dead-end sidings have created a dead-end situation in the transport sphere. Enormous foreign currency resources are immobilized on the railroads, not to mention 500 freight cars for which miners in Vorkuta, Inta, and Kuzbass are waiting.

[A.V. Karamyshev, chief of Leningrad-Finland Railroad branch, identified by caption] There is evidence of lack of coordination between three parties—the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations and foreign trade associations, the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, and the Ministry of Railways. In their pursuit of profit, goods exporters seek to dispatch their goods as quickly possible. But the ship arrival timetable is not in the least coordinated with the arrival of goods at the Vyborg maritime port.

[Correspondent] Lack of coordination in the transport sphere is a chronic ailment. It has now been further exacerbated as a result of enterprises' opportunities to enter the external market. This calls for a restructuring of the work of the vast transport mechanism and its clientele. Patchy measures and cosmetic changes will not do the trick. Around 30,000 tonnes of coal and vast stacks of timber are just lying around. The reason is poor organization and blatant irresponsibility.

But there is another facet to this matter. Take the Svetogorsk paper and pulp combine near Vyborg, for instance.

[Unidentified man] The combine's deputy director, Golovchenko, told me that while they suffer from a shortage of raw materials, timber is being shipped out through Svetogorsk railroad station to Finland. This timber could be used by our consumers. And when the schedule of allocations has been worked out and coordinated with the shipping timetable, timber could be shipped to the West without the present drawbacks. At the moment the reverse is happening. In the pursuit of foreign currency everyone tries to get their goods to the port, and no one is bothered how Soviet enterprises are managing.

[Correspondent] The road toward business contacts has been cleared. The main thing is to ensure that they are developed without detriment to the fatherland.

Supply Shortages Constrain Housing Program

PM2706114390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Rezinovskiy, F. Belik, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] An alarm signal has been received from Magadan. Construction materials plants in Kolyma and Chukotka are threatening to grind to a halt. Our report provides the details.

[Correspondent] Another truck is returning from the Magadan construction materials plant empty. [video shows truck entering Severovostokstroy production association] This means that there will be little progress on the construction sites of the Severovostokstroy association, the main contractor in the sphere of the construction of social, cultural, and everyday facilities.

And these are the very ceiling slabs which are responsible for the almost total lack of progress on the oblast's construction sites. [video shows piles of slabs] They look real enough, but they lack the main thing—the steel reinforcement—which enables them to bear the load in multistory buildings. Almost the entire staff of the precast ferroconcrete shop has been forced to take vacations, and those who remain take long smoking breaks.

Until now construction workers in Magadan have managed, at the cost of tremendous efforts, to keep up with intensive plans for the commissioning of housing. However, in 1990 the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] has contrived to arrange the delivery of almost three-fourths of small-diameter rolled metal to our oblast in the second half of the year, mainly in the last quarter. All our efforts have been nullified.

[Correspondent] What can you say about the measures to ensure your suppliers' liability toward you?

[M.V. Eydinov, deputy director of the Severovostokstroy production association, identified by caption] Unfortunately, these measures are so feeble that our suppliers' liability toward us in no way matches the losses sustained by the construction workers.

[Correspondent] Allow me to clarify. The Magadan Glavsnab [Main Administration for Material and Technical Supply] pays only an eight-percent fine on the goods it fails to deliver. At this rate it can afford not to make a special effort to rectify the situation. As a result, the move of thousands upon thousands of Magadan inhabitants from shacks to better housing is being delayed indefinitely.

Bank Provides Loans for Housing Construction

PM2606153990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by K. Kharlamov, A. Sabin, and P. Fedorov, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] As is well known, under the "Housing-2000" program every Soviet family was to have been provided with its own apartment by the year 2000. However, I believe that I will not be sinning against the truth if I say that this program is not likely to be fulfilled on time. The point is that right now more than 89 million families require individual housing, while more than 100 million people lack standard sanitary conditions. As you can see, this is a problem of the utmost importance. How can it be resolved? All kind of methods have been proposed, including the recently issued decree of the USSR president "On New Methods of Solving the Housing Problem in the Country and Measures for Their Practical Implementation." We can only hope that the new methods that are being proposed by the contry's leadership will work.

Meanwhile here is a report by our correspondent.

[Correspondent] "How much does it cost to build a house?" This is a very serious question, even though it is taken from a joke. It would be nice to be able to build this type of house. [video shows small detached houses] However, not everybody can afford it. After all, it takes many thousands of rubles, as well as building materials which are virtually unobtainable.

This 80-apartment block is being built by the Moscow Oblast "Voskresensk Tsement" Association [video shows construction site] with a R1,000,000 loan obtained from the "Strombank" joint-stock commercial bank at an advantageous interest rate. The association was able to get this interest rate as a cofounder and shareholder of this bank, which is one of the first of its kind. A total of three such apartment blocks will be built this year. And by 1997 the management of the "Voskresensk Tsement" Association plans to have provided its almost 3,000-strong work force with housing, plus a kindergarten, stores, and a sports complex. This is quite natural given the successful commercial activity of the "Strombank," especially since it has been set up with a view to the development of the construction materials industry. And the profits which it makes from providing credits and the sale of shares, or rather the greater part of these profits, will be channeled into the construction of housing in the country.

[V.I. Mikhaylov, deputy chairman of the "Strombank" Board, identified by caption] The "Voskresensk Tsement" Association is not the only enterprise which we have supplied with a loan for the construction of housing. We have given similar loans to other enterprises in Siberia, the Far East, and the Baltic republics. In order to increase its loan fund "Strombank" is trying to attract shareholders and depositors not just by the size of the dividends and interest rates which it pays out, but also by assisting them in the acquisition of construction materials.

Nonetheless, we believe—and this view is shared by the Moscow Banking Union—that the impact of the market mechanism, and of commercial banks in particular, on accelerating the solution of the housing problem in the country would be much more effective if provision were made for preferential taxation of the commercial banks' revenue from the provision of loans for housing construction, social sphere amenities, and the protection of the environment.

[Correspondent] Such preferential treatment will also be needed by the "Svoy Dom" [Your Own House] joint-stock company which is currently being set up. It will operate in Moscow City and Oblast. At Roshchino it is already possible to obtain R20,000 loans for individual construction. If the rate is favorable, there are bound to be more people who want to build their own housing.

Light Aircraft Safety Issues Examined

PM2606143990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 22 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Tyabotin and A. Tselitskiy, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] Here is a report by our correspondent on the problems of the development of light aviation in the country.

[Correspondent] [video shows a number of light aircraft in flight] These economical, highly maneuverable light aircraft and powered hang-gliders can be of invaluable assistance to communication workers, ecologists, agronomists, doctors, and journalists. They can carry laboratory equipment for aerial surveys of oil and gas pipelines, tracts of forest, and power transmission lines.

The attitude toward light aircraft has noticeably changed now. Conversion at defense industry enterprises has opened up scope for the mass production of this equipment. It is true, however, that this has also given rise to new problems. Experts at the Siberian Aviation Research Institute have already encountered these problems. The Ministry of the Aviation Industry has entrusted the institute with the research part of this program. However, increasingly not just individual designers, but entire industrial enterprises are ignoring flight safety requirements in their pursuit of future profits. They are in too much of a hurry to get their equipment airborne.

[Doctor of Technical Sciences A.N. Seryeznov, director of the Siberian Aviation Research Institute, identified by caption] In view of mass production, it is necessary to adopt a very strict attitude toward the structural strength, aerodynamic qualities, and certification of aircraft to ensure their compliance with airworthiness regulations. After all, they can endanger and put at risk not just the lives of pilots and passengers, but also third parties, that is, people who may come to grief if an aircraft crashes or explodes in the air.

[Correspondent] There are special driving schools for people learning to drive a car, there is the motor vehicle inspection service. But where can people learn to fly?

[S.T. Kashafutdinov, deputy director of Aviation Institute, identified by caption] The status of amateur pilot does exist in our country. But unfortunately there is still a lack of training equipment for piloting light aircraft on which training could be provided at DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] organizations.

Baklanov Views Kuzbass Worker Grievances

904F0186A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 1

[Report on interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov, by unnamed TASS correspondent—special to TRUD; place, date not specified: "Kuzbass: On the Road to Social Stability"]

[Text] In late May and early June, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov visited the Kuzbass. As already reported, during his stay in Kemerovo Oblast he met with the working people of the Kuznetsk and West Siberian Metallurgical Combines, the Abashevskaya Mine in the city of Novokuznetsk, the labor collectives of the Progress scientific-production association, the Severnaya Mine and the Kedrovskiy Opencast Mine in the city of Kemerovo; he took part in the proceedings of the 22d oblast party conference.

A TASS correspondent approached the CPSU Central Committee secretary with a number of questions:

[Correspondent] Oleg Dmitriyevich, your meetings with the workers of the main industries of the Kuzbass were held one year after the miners strike. What is your perception of the situation in the labor collectives? On what points do you stand together with the working class?

[Baklanov] Everywhere I visited I felt that the people worked intensively and stood firmly on the positions of perestroyka. This is the main conclusion. However, we cannot fail to see that at present as well the citizens of the Kuzbass are facing many unsolved problems. Almost a year ago, a government commission and the council of workers' committees of the Kuzbass signed a joint protocol with a view to solving the problems. Subsequently, the government adopted a number of important decisions on the Kuzbass jointly with the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], as well as the well-known Resolution No. 608.

[Correspondent] How is it being implemented, to your mind?

[Baklanov] From my point of view, its implementation is running well behind schedule. Besides, even many solved problems are not necessarily brought to the attention of specific people. For example, the issue of retirement benefits has been resolved. However, as my conversations indicated, locally it has not been explained to the miners how this will influence the life of families and every specific person. The issue of leave has not been resolved. Or let us look at the shipping of the coal produced. A great deal has been said about it, but millions of tons of fuel continue to sit on the storage sites of mines without movement, and cannot be sent on to consumers before the onset of winter; meanwhile, this influences the economic performance of mines.

I believe that the criticism by miners of their own ministry and the Ministry of Railways whose duty it is to improve the state of affairs is fair and justified. Failing to respond to it means asking for trouble.

Now about the social sphere. It was developed in the Kuzbass on the residual principle, and an abrupt turnaround in this sphere cannot be accomplished. The people understand this well. However, we cannot accept the situation whereby one family in three or four remains on waiting lists for housing for 10 or 15 years.

Of course, we cannot say that nothing has changed in this regard. There are wonderful examples, say, at the Kedrovskiy Opencast Mine headed by Director Pristavka. There, they build houses with their own resources. One immediately perceives a normal moral and psychological situation in the collective. However, such good signs are, unfortunately, uncommon. I believe that a lot depends in this matter on local authorities, beginning with the allocation of lots for housing construction.

There are issues which call for urgent decisions on the part of departments. This involves the allocation of machinery, assistance with creating the facilities of the construction industry, and the freedom of signing commercial contracts with partners, including foreign companies.

All of the above are means for working in real earnest on the main problem, housing, instead of developing the production sphere in a lopsided manner. After all, this is the worst "bottleneck" which outrages the people and prompts them to take extreme measures; hence, there is also talk of a new strike and sharp views of the work of the government, the CPSU Central Committee, and the Politburo.

We cannot fail to see how certain forces speculate on the workers' movement allegedly separating itself from the CPSU. The Communist Party has always been and remains on the positions of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. Those who intend to drive a wedge between the CPSU and the working class bet on our mistakes, blunders, and procrastination. This is why the strict monitoring of all decisions adopted on the Kuzbass is particularly necessary at present. Everybody in the region should know what has been done and is being done specifically in order to improve the life of the people. Not a single one of the measures scheduled should be left without attention or postponed "until tomorrow." I believe that in this case the situation of waiting for the execution of the mutually signed documents will be replaced with the confidence of the people in their social protection.

[Correspondent] Did you feel the concern of the working people of the Kuzbass in conjunction with the measures for perfecting the system of price setting proposed by the government? If so, which organs should work, and how, on ridding the populace of a shock of sorts which has brought about the devastation of shops?

[Baklanov] I also visited a number of stores here, as I do everywhere I go. There is no foundation for saying that in Kemerovo store shelves overflow with merchandise. This is not so; they look the same as everywhere else in our country. The concern of the population of the oblast was expressed in a consumer boom which brought about the devastation of stores. The point is that, being unable to grasp profoundly the essence of measures for switching to a regulated market economy, the people understood literally only the intention to raise prices, and responded to it immediately.

It is common knowledge that everything associated directly or indirectly with the deterioration of life is received with great sensitivity. This is why I would say that in the course of working on the entire market problem it is necessary to make cross-sections of all strata of our people—the workers, the rural laborers, the low-income families, and so on—for all people to understand what is in store for them. Of course, the consent of the people needs to be secured for that.

Apart from this, all price changes cannot be discussed without taking into account the overall situation in our country. The responsibility for measures which are unpopular with the populace will devolve on the party one way or another. Considerable explanatory work is needed. It must be done. We should answer the legitimate questions of the working people in a detailed fashion and honestly. We should proceed from the fact that the set of measures proposed can be implemented legitimately only if ultimately the people are going to live better.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, are there prerequisites for complying with the protocol signed in July of last year in the Kuzbass by the government commission?

[Baklanov] Yes, there are. I believe that, with a view to invigorating work on the implementation of the points of the protocol, there should be a continuous dialogue between government, local party, soviet, and trade union organs, and workers' committees and the councils of labor collectives, as well as a regular mutual exchange of information on the progress of the implementation of assignments and agreements.

No effort should be spared in order to stabilize the social situation in the Kuzbass.

Agricultural

Agricultural Developments for 21-27 Jun Reported

LD2806012490

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 21 to 27 June. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parenthesis at the end of each item.

21-23 June

No significant developments reported.

24 June

Continuous rains have flooded fields, meadows, and pastures in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] and have brought field work to a standstill, because machinery cannot operate in the waterlooged soil. Potato failed to be sown in the area of 1,000 hectares, and cabbage and other vegetables, on several hundred hectares. Only 38 percent of pastures have been sown with annual grasses for cattle fodder. Only 45 percent of the works of spring crops sowing has been fulfilled. The government of the Komi ASSR has appealed to populaiton with a request to render assistance to agricultural workers to complete the sowing urgently. (1500)

25-26 June

No significant developments reported.

27 June

The grain harvesting and thrashing of winter wheat was started today in North Osetiya. Shops of Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Khabarovsk Kray, have received cucumbers which were grown in June by Chinese leaseholders in the fields of Zavety Ilicha collective farm and Petrovskiy state farm. Vegetable growers from China's Heilongjiang Province for the second year running have been leasing over 100 hectares of pastures to grow cucumbers, tomatoes, peppers, and other vegetables. Chinese vegetable growers have undertaken to supply over 2,000 tonnes of vegetables to local shops. (0800)

Open-Air Feedlot Cuts Costs on Kostroma Farm

PM2706160390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Chistyakov, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] How is one to manage in conditions of shortages? This is worrying many leaders of enterprises, organizations, and collective and state farms [kolkhozes and sovkhozes], as well as you and me. So far there is no market. And it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain raw materials, equipment, and construction materials from allocated stocks. Everyone is trying, by hook or by crook, to obtain what he needs and more, if possible. However, is this always right? Here is a report from Kostroma Oblast.

[Correspondent] On this site a new livestock yard, to replace an old one, was to have been built at a cost of more than R200,000. However, people at the "Karl Marx" kolkhoz worked out that to demolish the old livestock yard and build a new one would be too expensive. And they built an open-air livestock-fattening unit here. They spent a total of R17,000. They put in 100 bullocks and recouped their expenses in less than a year. The animals thrive in the fresh air and gain weight rapidly. Care consists solely of bringing in feed and distributing it. This has been entrusted to a family link—the Osipovs.

[Unidentified man] We have been using this method since June 1989. The prime cost of 100 kg of meat using this method is in the region of R183, as against R235 under the old method. Labor costs and feed consumption are lower.

[Correspondent] An association set up in Kostroma Oblast has helped the kolkhoz to master this low-cost, resource-saving method. Another unit, for heifers this time, has been built at the kolkhoz. Why are other farms not showing more interest in the new method?

[Man] People have not yet convinced themselves of the advantages of this method, but life will force them to do so.

[Correspondent] Perhaps it is not just the unorthodoxy of this method of livestock raising, which is, on the whole, sufficiently well known, which is hampering its broader application. Perhaps it is also that people cling to the old cost-based method of management which has outlived its usefulness.

Scientific

Meteorological Satellite Launched 28 Jun

LD2806102690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0944 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jun (TASS)—Another meteorological earth satellite, Meteor-2, was launched in the Soviet Union today by a Tsiklon carrier rocket.

The satellite was placed in an orbit with the following parameters: Initial period of revolution—104.1 minutes, apogee—974 km; perigee—951 km; orbital inclination—82.3 degrees.

The satellite carries instrumentation to obtain global depictions of cloud covering and of the underlying surface in the visible and infrared ranges of the spectrum, in both the preset and direct transmission modes, as well as radiometric instruments for continuous observation of the currents of penetrating radiation in near-earth cosmic space.

Besides the scientific instruments, the satellite carries: a system that insures the satellite's orientation toward the earth, a power supply system with autonomous orientation of the solar batteries toward the sun, a radiotelemetary system to transmit data to earth about the functioning of the satellite's service systems, a radio system for the precise measurement of the orbital parameters, and a radio complex to transmit scientific information to earth.

Satellite instrumentation is functioning normally. The satellite is being controlled by a command-measurement complex. Information from the satellite is being received for processing and utilization at the State Research Center for the Study of National Resources and at the USSR Hydrometeorological Center of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology.

Belousov, Japanese Official Discuss Space Mission

LD2706174690 Moscow TASS in English 1728 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov and Tetsuro Aoki, representative of the Japanese TBS TV Company, today exchanged opinions on preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-Japanese space mission aboard the Soyuz TM spaceship and the Mir station.

The sides noted that the Soviet-Japanese space flight would further improve relations between the two countries and peoples. The meeting was held in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere.

Comparison of Petrovskiy, IAEA Head Meeting

PM2706091790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 June 1990 in its Second Edition on page 6 carries a TASS report under the heading "Meeting with H. Blix" on the 25 June meeting between USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy and IAEA Director General H. Blix.

The PRAVDA report has been compared with the Moscow TASS International Russian version published in the 26 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 67, revealing the following variation:

Column one, paragraph two, sentence two reads: ...the agency's programs for nuclear safety, including questions like the handling and burying of radioactive waste, which are acquiring priority significance and importance.

Issues relating to... (adding elements)

Military

Yazov, Gorbachev Address Officer Graduates

PM2706142590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[TASS report: "Kremlin Reception"]

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate organized a reception 26 June in the Grand Kremlin Palace in honor of military academy graduates. It was attended by generals, admirals, and officers from the Soviet Armed Forces and foreign countries' armies who have completed their training at Soviet military training establishments, professors and teachers who trained the new detachment of highly skilled military specialists, and military commanders.

The following were present: USSR President M.S. Gorbachev; USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov; R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; Presidential Council members V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.M. Primakov, G.I. Revenko, S.S. Shatalin, and D.T. Yazov; L.N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; and CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, addressed the gathering. The Soviet Armed Forces, he said, and our officer corps are receiving fresh reinforcements. The 1990 graduates are being sent to divisions, regiments, aboard ships, to staffs, and to military training establishments.

Each set of graduates has its own distinguishing marks which remain in the memory throughout their subsequent service. Each of them is unique in their own way. In this respect you have something to be proud of.

You are embarking on a great career as officers in the year of the 45th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. By this token you bear particular responsibility for continuing and augmenting frontline traditions within the troops and fleets. One of the sources of the Army's lofty moral spirit lies in the continuity of these traditions.

This is the first time M.S Gorbachev, USSR president, supreme commander in chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, and chairman of the Defense Council, has attended a reception for military academy graduates. This confirms yet again the tremendous importance of the country's defense for the future of perestroyka and the renewal of socialism and gives graduates many obligations.

Lastly, after completing your training you are returning to troops and fleets at a difficult, crucial stage in perestroyka. Its success and the results of the military reform and of the renewal of the Armed Forces depend in many respects on you and on your knowledge, energy, and professionalism.

So, a long voyage lies ahead of you graduates. It is a matter of honor and dignity for you as officers to be worthy of your lofty vocation and honestly perform your military duty.

The minister gave M.S. Gorbachev the floor.

M.S. Gorbachev's Speech

Dear comrades!

Esteemed representatives of friendly states!

Today according to established tradition we honor the officers of the Soviet Armed Forces and foreign countries' armies who have graduated from military academies. I cordially congratulate all the graduates on completing their training. I wish you success in your difficult but noble chosen path of serving the people and the fatherland. You are leaving your academies at an exceptionally dynamic and crucial time.

The world community has reached a crucial turning point: There is a historic chance of eliminating the threat of self-destruction and putting the resolution of highly acute global problems and contradictions that have called the very survival of the human race into question, into a civilized framework. Whereas yesterday many people saw this prospect as wishful thinking, today we have begun to bring it closer in reality, in practice.

This goal can only be attained if the international balance of interests is preserved and strengthened and the levels of interbloc and interstate confrontation are reduced in a comprehensively well-considered fashion and this confrontation subsequently eliminated. The supreme degree of interdependence of all parts of the world today necessitates a radical improvement in relations between countries and peoples.

Responding to the challenges of the time, the Soviet Union has embarked on in-depth renewal of all spheres of public life. We have reached a critically important point in the changes which are possibly the most important since October 1917.

Overcoming the consequences of the grave deformations of the past and ridding ourselves of certain miscalculations committed in the course of perestroyka, a modern civil society and rule-of-law state are gradually being shaped.

The assertion of new ideas is not painless. You can see this and feel the effects for yourselves. Costs and losses have to be borne. But, to use military terminology, there is no retreat. Solutions to the fundamental questions raised by life itself are not to be found behind us, in a return to the past. On the contrary, answers to these questions can only be sought and found by stepping up the forward movement, in accordance, of course, with our supreme responsibility to the people and mindful of the Soviet Union's role in the world community.

Now on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress, the diverse social activity of various social groups and strata of our society is particularly manifest, along with their interest in renewing the political system and all institutions of state power and government.

The guaranteeing of the country's security must, of course, accord with the profound changes in the country and the world. In our time it is more important than ever before to consider all the factors of this security—military, political, economic, and diplomatic—extensively and thoroughly. Understanding of the dynamic interdependence of all these factors is no longer perhaps the algebra now, but the alphabet of security in the modern world. Politicians, diplomats, and military men are not and cannot be realistic and skillful without mastering this alphabet.

Coordinating its actions with changing global realities, the Soviet state is making a universally recognized contribution to the normalization of the international situation, above all in Europe, where the unprecedented concentration of state-of-the-art armed forces and arms is among the unique remarkable features that still have to be borne in mind.

The recent Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Moscow advocated reviewing the nature and functions of the Warsaw Pact this year in the spirit of the modern political thinking and defensive doctrine. The international public is now entitled to expect and demand a reciprocal process from the North Atlantic alliance. Major changes are needed in NATO military doctrine and in the activity of the alliance born of the cold war in order to make real progress toward a new all-European security system. It is precisely this kind of system that could best guarantee the preservation of international equilibrium and fruitful peaceful interaction.

The Soviet Union submitted a whole series of specific constructive proposals aimed at speeding up the Helsinki process and creating new institutions of all-European cooperation for consideration by the European states, the United States, and Canada. This cooperation can be organically linked with the resolution of the foreign policy aspects of German unification, which must farsightedly consider the legitimate interest of its neighbors and all Europeans, including the Germans themselves, of course.

In our opinion, this approach would enable us to arrive at a quite reliable level of trust, stability, and prosperity throughout Europe. This—in view of Europe's significance in world politics—would stimulate and speed up positive changes in other regions and on a global scale as a whole.

Abiding by the principles of equal security and maintenance of strategic stability, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in advancing toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. The essence of the new Soviet military doctrine resides in the prevention of war and the reliable guaranteeing of defense sufficiency.

This is also the purpose of our military policy which is notable for its increasing openness and readiness for new forms of international cooperation in guaranteeing security. Meanwhile the country's leadership is doing and will do everything necessary to ensure that our Army and Navy are strong and accord with the highest contemporary demands of military practice and science. No one either in our country or abroad should have any doubts on this score.

We are resolutely and consistently ridding ourseles of the elements of dogmatism and routine which affected our defense organizational development too the past and cost it and, of course, our entire country dear.

The work on the concept of military reform is in the closing stages. The draft military reform is to be examined at the USSR Supreme Soviet. Today's military academy graduates—each at his own post—are to directly implement and take charge of putting into practice the plans and ideas of the reform.

The imminent reorganization of the Armed Forces undoubtedly affects the future of many people. The problems of improving servicemen's living and working conditions that have accumulated over the decades are now the center of attention for the country's leadership.

The government has prepared a series of concrete practical steps encompassing all aspects of social security for people who threw in their lot with the Army and Navy. First, the legal basis for active military service and the procedure for social security for servicemen and their families is being substantially reinforced. Major material and financial resources are being specifically allocated for this, in particular for housing construction. The corresponding state program is calculated for a five-year period. Appropriations will total several billion rubles a year. They will rise as economic development stabilizes and improves.

The state and society are obliged to do everything necessary to ensure that the Army is constantly conscious of the people's concern and support. The slogan "The Army and the people are one" must assume real substance and authenticity in the country undergoing renewal.

Comrades! In a few days you will leave your academies where you received basic theoretical knowledge and practical skills in leading units, ships, and formations. But completing your training at the academy is only one stage on the way to real professional skill. The main thing and perhaps the most difficult thing still lies ahead: proving by your daily work your right to the mandate of trust vested in you by the state and the people.

Life does not stand still: Equipment and arms are becoming more sophisticated and complex. Troops are receiving highly accurate combat systems, complex automated systems, and radioelectronic systems. And the sphere of mutual relations is becoming increasingly complex within troop collectives.

At this difficult time it is particularly important not to lose correct moral and political guidelines. It is important to be closer to your subordinates, to know and understand their needs, to take care of them, without reducing, but rather heightening, professional demands, and to insistently strengthen the fraternity of the troops.

Skillful work with people, unswerving strengthening of conscious military discipline is particularly important now in conditions of glasnost, democratization, change, and sometimes even the exacerbation of socioeconomic processes in the country.

I want to stress that on the whole the Soviet Armed Forces are fulfilling their set tasks worthily and honorably today. In the most complex situation, military men were and are to be found where the going is toughest. On territories affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe, in the earthquake regions of Armenia—wherever courage, composure, and fortitude are needed our officers and men are in the front ranks. At the cost of their own health and sometimes even their life these true patriots bring selfless aid and protection to those who need them.

In recent years hundreds of military servicemen have been given high state awards for the exemplary fulfillment of their military and civic duty.

At the same time, it would be wrong to deny or underestimate a number of really serious negative phenomena in Army life which must be resolutely and thoroughly combated primarily by military collectives themselves and, of course, first and foremost by officers, by setting an example of impeccable personal conduct and high responsibility and initiative.

The solution of the urgent questions of Army life, the protection of the honor and dignity of military servicemen, and military-patriotic education—these are statewide tasks. In turn Soviet military servicemen and Soviet officers are of course not some protected caste but an inalienable part of our society linked most closely with the country's entire life. The modern officer is not only a well-trained military specialist but also a fighter for social consolidation and the strengthening of our statehood. That is shown by the constructive activity of a number of military deputies in representative organs at all levels. And the total number of such deputies has grown appreciably during the years of perestroyka. This is a new phenomenon, too. And it is very important to make full use of the potential of military deputies in the interests of all the people and, of course, in resolving the urgent problems of strengthening the Army's ties with society.

In giving this admonition to today's graduates I am bound to express words of gratitude and recognition to the commanders, political workers, and professors and teachers—everyone who contributes his wealth of experience, intellect, and heart and soul to the training and education of a new reinforcement of the Soviet officer corps.

This is an exceptionally responsible and creative task. Today's Soviet officer is expected to continue the best traditions of the Army and Navy and, at the same time, must find innovative solutions to qualitatively new tasks, know how to get his correct bearings amid the new domestic political and international realities, constantly raise his own general cultural level, and be responsible for the reliable protection of the people's peaceful labor in the dynamically changing conditions on the threshold of the 21st century.

On this ceremonial day, I should also like to greet the officers of the friendly armies who are graduating from Soviet military academies and wish them fruitful work in the interests of preserving peace on earth and the strengthening of ties between our states.

I express confidence that academies' graduates will fulfill their military and civic duty honorably and make a worthy contribution to our country's defense might and the successful solution of the complex tasks of renewing the Soviet socialist state.

Farewell, comrade officers! May you enjoy great successes in your military labor!

In conclusion, D.T. Yazov, speaking on behalf of the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the Main Political Directorate and graduates, professors, and teachers of the academies expressed profound gratitude to the USSR president for his kind and warm sendoff speech.

The officer corps, he stressed, are the backbone of our Armed Forces. The officer's high professionalism, political maturity, moral purity, and spiritual affinity with his subordinates, both soldier and sailor, are the ultimate foundation of combat readiness, military order, and discipline.

Those are the very qualities that the times demand of us. The time of perestroyka, renewal, the rebirth of Leninist principles of socialist military organization. A difficult time, full of contradictions and problems, demanding a clear life stance and an officer's firm and strong-willed character.

The leadership of the Soviet state and the Communist Party is confident that Soviet officers will be equal to the demands of the times. And it depends to a considerable extent on the new crop of graduates who are completing their training in academies and entering the armed forces to ensure that this confidence is borne out by practical results in the implementation of the military reform, the improvement of combat readiness, the strengthening of discipline, and the attainment of a qualitatively new state of the Armed Forces.

Officer graduates are grateful to the president and to the entire leadership of the country and party for their attention and exacting concern. The Soviet officer corps and all Armed Forces personnel will continue to be loyal to their constitutional duty, military oath, their people, and the motherland. In the difficult time which the country is experiencing, Soviet people may be calm: The Armed Forces are reliably protecting the foundations of our statehood, stability in the country, and socialism and peace in the world.

Permit me, dear comrades, on behalf of graduates and professors and teachers of military academies to thank the leadership of our country and the party once more for taking part in today's ceremony.

Good health and happiness to you all, comrades, and success in serving the people and the fatherland.

The reception took place in a friendly atmosphere.

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Leaders Talk With Gorbachev

LD2706201990 Moscow TASS in English 2014 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis and Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene had a one and one-half hour talk with President Mikhail Gorbachev here today, according to officials in the Lithuanian mission in Moscow.

Landsbergis and Prunskiene arrived in Moscow today evening [as received] to "seek points of mutual advantage" with Soviet authorities, Lithuanian parliamentary spokesman Virgilius Savickas said.

These were not official talks, but an attempt to discuss the sides' positions, Savickas explained.

Lithuania is seeking a reasonable compromise in order to avoid senseless decisions that will be rejected by the other side, he stressed.

After the meeting, Landsbergis and Prunskiene flew back to Vilnius.

This was Landsbergis's second visit to Moscow in as many days.

On Tuesday, Gorbachev met Landsbergis to discuss Lithuania's unilateral declaration of independence.

Gorbachev told Landsbergis that talks between the two sides could begin if Lithuania suspended for the time of talks the independence declaration passed on March 11.

The move will be in line with a dialogue between constituent republics on the preparation of a new federation accord and the forming of a union of sovereign socialist states.

Soviet Stand Demanded

LD2706222390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] About 1800 this evening president of Lithuania's Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis, and Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene left for Moscow. They met Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, late in the evening.

Before the departure the Lithuanian premier, Kazimiera Prunskiene, told newsmen that the meeting would take place thanks to her efforts.

Yesterday Lithuanian Supreme Council heard Vytautas Landsbergis' account of his meeting with President Gorbachev earlier that day and Kazimiera Prunskiene's information about her telephone conversation with President Gorbachev some time after the previous meeting in the Kremlin. The Soviet president's stand as to the concessions expected of Lithuania differed in the two talks. Yesterday no debates on the possible moratorium on the independence act or its consequences were opened in parliament, while Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene undertook to find out the exact stand of the Soviet leadership on the Lithuanian issue as soon as possible.

Before leaving Vilnius, Kazimiera Prunskiene also pointed out that in Moscow she would press for the Kremlin's stand to be stated in an official TASS dispatch. In yesterday's information about the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Vytautas Landsbergis, the Soviet news agency TASS distorted the essence of the talks.

Today's meeting between the Soviet and Lithuanian leaders was reported to have been held at the Soviet president's villa outside Moscow. The Lithuanian delegation is expected back in Vilnius late at night.

Although the initiative of both yesterday's and today's meetings came from Vilnius, the Kremlin leaders seem to be in a hurry to bring the Lithuanian issue out of the deadlock in some way or other. That wouldn't in fact be so bad if the cause of that rush were not so obvious: that is, the 28th Congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, scheduled for Monday, which is likely to be extremely significant for Mikhail Gorbachev's further position.

We should recall a certain semblance of maneuvering by the Kremlin on the eve of the summit meeting in Washington.

Prunskiene on Talks

LD2806110490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1020 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Jun (TASS)—"The Soviet Union recognises the possibility of holding talks with Lithuania immediately following our declaration of a temporary moratorium on the act of 11 March restoring an independent Lithuanian state, and of that same evening starting up gasoline supplies to the republic and halting other economic sanctions," said Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of Lithuania.

She was replying to questions from journalists last night when she returned with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of this Baltic republic, from Moscow following talks with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Vytautas Landsbergis assessed yesterday's conversation as "lengthy and useful, during which many issues were discussed." "First and foremost, there was discussion of future talks between Lithuania and the USSR, and under what conditions it would be possible to start them," he stressed. "The main condition put to us was a moratorium on the act on independent Lithuania."

Kazimiera Prunskiene told journalists that as a result of the talks one could draw conclusions about the possible further development of events. "From a moratorium to talks, and through talks to the realisation of independent Lithuania." She said that "the other side, recognising the possibility of realisation of our independence, is thinking of offering us a wide range of possible options."

In the prime minister's words, Moscow promised not to force upon Vilnius an unacceptable option that suits Moscow alone, and to insure the principle of talks on an equal footing. Concluding her short interview, Kazimiera Prunskiene said: "We have to move forward."

The Lithuanian Supreme Council continues its work today, continuing to debate—among other issues—government proposals concerning the possibility of declaring a moratorium on the act on independent Lithuania.

Prunskiene Makes Report to Supreme Council

LD2706173490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1538 GMT on 26 June broadcasts a live relay of Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene's report to the Lithuanian Supreme Council in Vilnius.

Prunskiene begins her report, saying that having declared our independence we have reinstated it de jure; however, harldy any of you would like to maintain that we have the entire content of it de facto.

She says that the problem now with regard to independence is one of tactics, and that strategies should be chosen which would enable the independence to become a de facto issue. Prunskiene says: "First we must reach agreement with the Soviet Union and then receive global recognition—I mean from the West. These matters are interconnected."

Prunskiene says that Western countries, including Poland, have expressed their viewpoint and have linked their position and their possibility of recognition very explicitly. They agree about the necessity of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, she adds.

On the matter of the government arriving at a decision of a moratorium, Prunskiene asks the deputies for any other better ideas they may have of solving the problem. She says that the present government does not have any magical power to solve the problem, and says that probably candidates who may form a new government will have magic powers and be able to solve the problem. "Let them demonstrate these powers and we shall test them to see if they really work." Prunskiene adds.

Prunskiene goes on to talk about the negotiations on independence and says: "Where does the risk and the danger lie? In the current situation, if such a document were adopted the risk does not appear automatically, because at the moment we are not discussing the object of the negotiations or the conditions of negotiations. In general we are taking a step on our part so that these negotiations may start. This is not going to be the only step taken toward starting negotiations. After all, we may decide not to hold negotiations. Why should our cunning, our wisdom, and our adherence to principles vanish if we decide that negotiations are unacceptable after the conditions have begun to take shape?"

On the matter of the Soviet embargo, Prunskiene says that even these harsh times have not proved that Lithuania must go down on its knees. On the contrary, a sense of independence was consolidated, both in the minds of the Lithuanian people and in the West.

Prunskiene then goes on to talk about the telephone call from Mikhail Gorbachev, which has already been processed in second referent item.

Speaking about the necessity of a moratorium, Prunskiene says that "such a step must be made while one is standing—I stress this—while standing."

Prunskiene speaks about the particular version of the moratorium presented by the government, without specifying any details. She says: "The government's proposal was rather risky in the sense that it embraced the minimum of what the other side expected. And as you can see this minimum was preliminarily recognized. I therefore propose the following: If we continue with this stand—I am not speaking here to anyone individually—then we will have to recall all the documents adopted earlier—not all of them, that would be too great a compromise."

Prunskiene says that the task which the government has to carry out will neither be pleasant nor popular. It simply has to be done by somebody, she says.

Speaking about Lithuania's international position, Prunskiene says: "I would like to stress once again that there are international guarantees. However, Lithuania can be integrated into the community of West European states only when Lithuania reckons with common interests. I doubt there is any way by which Europe would attempt to bring the Soviet Union to its knees before Lithuania." She adds that in the case of any military conflict, not a single European state would come to Lithuania's aid.

K.Prunskiene gives her assessment of all the eight versions proposed for the declaration of the moratorium. She says that she did not think that any decision should be adopted mainly because two differing Soviet positions were heard today and these should be first given careful consideration. At the same time, she says, the second position voiced by the Soviet Union is more favorable to Lithuania than the first one.

At this point K.Prunskiene concludes her report, which is followed by questions to both Landsbergis and Prunskiene.

Answering the first question, Landsbergis says that this meeting was on his initiative.

Deputy Jasukaityte asks Prunskiene if it is not necessary to make some important step until 2 July when the CPSU Congress begins. The deputy beleives this to be a very dangerous date because the conservative forces would consolidate there, especially the servicemen.

Landsbergis says that he is sure that it would become clear after the congress where the ruling power would remain. According to the USSR constitution, all power is given to the soviets: However this is still not so as the CPSU Central Committee is the ruling power. He says that it remains to be seen if the power of the president would increase.

Landsbergis says: "If you think that an upheaval by the [word indistinct] will take place at the congress, then it would be able to wipe out any document or to interpret it namely in a way which would be most unbeneficial to us."

Deputy Tamulis asks the prime minister if President Gorbachev explained in any way his motives for making a phone call, and if he gave any motives for such a rapid change in his position. Prunskiene says that first he made a friendly greeting and later speaking about the meeting he said that it was not an easy one. She says: "I understood that this was made in order to make a clearly stated conclusion which he wanted to be made know to the parliament."

Deputy Rupeka, representing the right-wing faction, asks if this was not meant to set the parliament against the government. Prunskiene does not agree with this. Here she mentions that probably their relations as persons have always been rather satisfactory which influenced his decision to make a phone call. She says that in a situation such as this there is no point in finding out who phoned and why he did so. The essence of the matter was what question was being solved and if a solution was near.

Deputy Jasukaitete asks if the start of negotiations would have any impact on Gorbachev's position at the CPSU Congress and after it. Prunskiene says: "It is clear that in the current situation I think that this would give a positive impact—most probably a positive impact—on the stabilization of President Gorbachev's position, perhaps even in the sense of relations with the democratic forces, which by the way, the West is also expecting. However, I do not think that our actions should be adjusted along the lines of helping or not helping somebody. First of all it us who we have to help."

Deputy Antanavicius says that although Gorbachev agreed with the interpretation of the moratorium as presented by Prunskiene, is the prime minister sure Gorbachev correctly understood what she meant. He says that he heard on the radio that it was said that either Lithuania remained in the federation or it would lose some territory.

Prunskiene refers to the position vocied by Ryzhkov that they saw two ways for the solution of the Lithuanian problem: First, which the Soviet Union is planning to propose, is to remain in the new union with extraordinary status. Further she says that the second variant was an independent state like Finland, but that then the Soviet Union would raise the issue of territory. Prunskiene says that this is known to the world already.

A question is asked concerning the international guarantees. Prunskiene says that these issues should not be discussed here in the parliament.

Lithuania Prepares USSR Draft Agreements

LD2706203790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] A meeting of the commission for the preparation of draft agreements with the Soviet Union was held today at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, chaired by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas.

A draft bilateral agreement on the principles of mutual relations between the republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union was presented to the participants in the meeting. The authors of the draft listened to remarks about individual articles in the agreement. The question was raised on how to reflect in the agreement Lithuania's striving for neutrality. It was decided that this is a long-term problem stipulated by external factors. The bilateral agreement, in the opinion of the participants in the meeting, will be a basis for the whole system of agreements by individual departments.

Problems facing Soviet citizens in Lithuania were examined. It was decided that these complex problems will be decided by bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union or with individual republics.

The Nationalities Department submitted to the Ministry of Justice draft agreements on legal aid and cooperation in the sphere of social insurance with the Soviet Union, which would legally define the position of the Soviet Union's citizens in Lithuania and of Lithuanian citizens in the Soviet Union. Other departments also submitted draft bilateral agreements of concern to them.

Also today a meeting of the commission's group of geographers took place. The problem of the borders of the republic of Lithuania was discussed. Opinions were exchanged on how better to prepare for negotiations on the state borders with all the interested sides while stressing the principle of the inviolability of the borders.

Lithuanians Discuss Independence Declaration

LD2706180890 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius June 27 TASS—The Lithuanian government's proposal to freeze the declaration of independence has caused fierce public debate with opinions ranging from categorical opposition to complete approval.

Statements by Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis and Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene in parliament on Tuesday added more fuel to the fire.

Although today Lithuanian parliamentarians discussed other issues in parliamentary committees, their minds were on the moratorium.

Parliamentarian Vyta Slicite vehemently opposed the freeze in an interview with TASS, saying it is illegitimate.

Colleague Aleksandras Asisalas echoed her, saying that a freeze was not the best way out. Talks between Lithuania and the Soviet Union should begin with no strings attached, he said.

Meanwhile, parliamentarian Lenginas Siepietis supported the government proposal, calling it a "vital step, designed to strengthen independence."

"To achieve this, Lithuania should start talks with the Soviet leadership as soon as possible," he said.

On Thursday, the Lithuanian parliament will again take up the issue of a moratorium on the independence declaration—a move that can open the door for talks with the Soviet Union and help Lithuania tackle mounting problems.

Latest Developments in Lithuania Examined

LD2706160190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1408 GMT on 27 June, as part of its "Panorama" program, carries a six-minute interview with the station's Vilnius correspondent Yelena Kurkletyte, asking her to comment on the latest developments after Gorbachev's talks with Landsbergis and his telephone conversation with Prunskiene.

Recalling the reports on the moratorium delivered yesterday by Landsbergis and Prunskiene, Kurkletyte says: "Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, and Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the republic, yesterday reported to the deputies about the moratorium. They also informed the deputies about their conversations with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. The appraisal of Landsbergis's personal conversation and Prunskiene's telephone conversation was somewhat contradictory. Vytautas Landsbergis said that following his previous meeting in the Kremlin, and also following the visits and conversations of Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, he had formed the opinion that a certain flexibility and goodwill towards Lithuania's aspirations had appeared in the Kremlin's position. But, Landsbergis noted, it seems that now there are now insufficient grounds for this. Although the conversation was friendly and open, the position of the Soviet Union continues to be inflexible. Kazimiera Prunskiene gave a more optimistic appraisal of her telephone conversation with Gorbachev."

Asked on whose initiative the Landsbergis-Gorbachev meeting was held, Kurkletyte says it was Landsbergis's idea, with the aim of clearing up some of the unknowns in the situation. Asked when discussion of the question of a moratorium will begin, and what the deputies are saying in general about this, Kurkletyte replies: "It appears that the deputies will begin discussing this question tomorrow, at a plenary sitting of the session, although today, as on all the preceding days, debates are being conducted on the moratorium both by deputies in standing commissions, and by the Lithuanian public." She continues: "Some deputies are for a moratorium, others are against, while still others are undecided. A very heated debate is in progress, and this is shown by the 10 versions of a draft moratorium, to say nothing of the basic one proposed by the government of Lithuania. This is a temporary moratorium on the act of 11 March.

Asked about the public mood, Kurkletyte says it is divided, with some people determined to hang on to independence come what may, others deterred by the inconveniences, especially transport difficulties, and still others making profit out of the shortages. Kurkletyte gives some details of public opinion polls, which show that Prunskiene enjoys the support of 61 percent, Brazauskas 50 percent, and Landsbergis 28 percent of the population. Feelings about political forces were also gauged, on a scale of plus 100 to minus 100 per cent. "Sajudis lost out to the communists for the first time, although the rating of the communists themselves also fell. Thus, Sajudis had a 27 percent confidence rating, while the independent Lithuanian Communist Party had a 39 percent rating among those polled. The Lithuanian Communist Party got a minus 56 percent," she concludes.

Report on Worsening Lithuanian Econmic Situation

LD2706211690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1920 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] A report by the Statistical Department of the Lithuanian Republic: As a result of shortage of raw material and fuel resources, 17,500 people are out of work in industry, transport and building; while 23,100 workers are taking paid early holidays. In the conditions of the blockade, 49,200 workers in industry, transport, and building have been forced to discontinue their normal work. On collective and state farms, 8,600 machine operators were not carrying out their normal duties.

Losses caused by the blockade, according to the estimates of the enterprises, have amounted to R115 million and increased during the week by 13 million. As before, 10 industrial enterprises are not working.

The financial situation of the republic's enterprises and organizations has worsened. According to information from the banks, [words indistinct] in the sum of R16.5 million [words indistinct]. Debts in short-term credits have increased since 1 April by R190 million. From 16 April to 20 June, money turnover in the repubic has become worse. During the blockade the banks have failed to receive R84 million in expected income; payments by the banks are R96 million higher than expected; and savings bank deposits have declined by R145 million.

Lithuanian Congress Delegates State Positions

LD2706210490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] A meeting between delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Lithuanian Communist Party [CPSU] with the Vilnius party aktiv took place in the Lithuanian capital today. Each of the deputies who spoke set out his position which he will defend at the country's supreme party forum. Thus, delegate to the congress and secretary of the party committee of the Vilnius Scientific Research Institute of Radio Measuring Instruments Antonov said: I do not think that this congress will resolve all the problems which the CPSU and the country as a whole are now facing, but I am profoundly convinced that after this party forum the Central Committee will become the nucleus around which all the party's healthy forces will rally and will be able to bring the country out of the critical situation which has arisen. The delegates also assured their party comrades that all of them will defend the CPSU platform at the congress. The participants in the meeting gave mandates to the delegates and wished them fruitful work.

Prunskiene Interviewed on Union Relations

AU2706172190 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23-24 Jun 90 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Lithuanian Premier Kazimira Prunskiene by Elzbieta Sawicka and Marek J. Karp in Warsaw, date not given: "An Accord Is Essential"]

[Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] Madame Premier, since 11 March the world has been closely monitoring events in Lithuania and relations between Vilnius and Moscow. How do you assess the current state of these relations? Has the situation changed lately?

[Prunskiene] The situation is developing. We have reason to say that we are proceeding toward a solidification of our independence. A real possibility of talks with Moscow has arisen. A start on these talks can already be felt.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Moscow still insists that a suspension of the Lithuanian declaration of independence is a condition for the talks to start. As we know, the views of the Lithuanian government and parliament on this issue are not identical.

[Prunskiene] The parliament and the government should not argue about who loves Lithuania the most. The discussion ought to be based on logical arguments and the factual possibilities of achieving results. The government has a concrete vision and arguments in favor of the road that has been proposed. An accord with Moscow is essential, just as an accord with the West is.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Do you think that the Lithuanian parliament is keen to reach a compromise, or will most of the deputies oppose it?

[Prunskiene] The parliament is not displaying excessive enthusiasm for a compromise. Up to now, something akin to contests has been taking place, and deputies have been competing against each other over principles. But now differences in opinion are emerging. I think that after this heated stage, the debate will be calm and businesslike. We must present the deputies with arguments that can only be viewed from beyond Lithuania. I mean the attitudes of other countries, and I know what these attitudes are from direct contacts with politicians and from diplomatic sources. We will try to convince the parliament.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Who do you find it easiest to talk to in Moscow, and who the most difficult?

[Prunskiene] Since the declaration of Lithuania's independence, all talks in Moscow have been complicated. But they have become a little easier since President Gorbachev's return from Washington, and our attitude has probably also become a little more flexible. The situation has changed somewhat. There are no longer such categorical assessments of Lithuania's activity. Various possible solutions are being considered, including a recognition of our independence. Even the question of whether or not we should remain in the Soviet Union is being considered. Before, such a view was unthinkable in Moscow. Of course, Moscow's relaxed tone has also influenced a change in our attitude. We can trust the other side to an increasing degree, and suggest certain solutions. Therefore that is the direction in which we are heading, so that we do not remain out in the cold.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Do you think the improved contacts with Moscow are connected with Boris Yeltsin's coming to power in the Russian Federation?

[Prunskiene] We maintain contacts with the Russian Federation and with Boris Yeltsin, the chairman of its Supreme Soviet. However, we are not placing all our hopes in Yeltsin. That would be unwise. We are not sure if his position will be stronger than that of the central Soviet authorities. We need to reach an agreement with one side and the other. Apart from that, no one knows what kind of government Yeltsin will form.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Do you not think that the radical views of the new political activists in the Ukraine are favorable for the Lithuanian cause?

[Prunskiene] Yes. In any case, that applies not just to the Ukraine. Changes are also occurring in other republics, for example Moldavia. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the strength of the KGB and Army, in other words the structures that serve the central authorities. Therefore we must strike a very careful balance in this situation.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Several days ago, Moscow announced a relaxation of the blockade....

[Prunskiene] This is a very insignificant change. It mainly concerns deliveries of natural gas, whereas crude oil is the most important commodity for us.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Has Lithuania responded to Moscow's blockade by stopping food exports?

[Prunskiene] We have not exacted revenge in this way. Withholding food exports would affect the inhabitants of Moscow and Leningrad, against whom we have no particular quarrel. We did not want to harm those who are innocent. Apart from that, we wish to continue cooperating with them, and implement a direct exchange of goods in order to obtain the commodities we need. Were it not for this exchange, we would have been in a critical situation one month after the blockade, but as it is we have already survived three months.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Has the blockade created unemployment in Lithuania?

[Prunskiene] Yes, four percent of our population is unemployed now. That is not much compared with other countries, but we never had unemployment before, and no funds were set aside for it. If we do not receive any oil during the next few weeks, there will be even more unemployed.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Is the specter of unemployment not quenching Lithuanian society's hopes for independence?

[Prunskiene] Not yet. We do not need such a dramatic development. We want the economy to function normally. We must not permit a collapse. Of course, that is the government's concern rather than the parliament's. The parliament is not too concerned about it. We do not think tens of thousands of workers would want to travel to rural areas looking for work. They are not used to doing so, therefore they will demand employment. That is our duty.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Does Lithuania have any chance of economic aid from the West?

[Prunskiene] My impression is that the Western countries do not want to woo us before we have started talks with Moscow. I think that if we start the talks and the political situation becomes stable, this aid will become reality. That is what I felt during my recent visit to Greece.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Have the Lithuanian emigre communities in the United States and Canada offered any help?

[Prunskiene] Most of them are cut off from Lithuanian society. Not everyone realizes what the Lithuanian reality looks like. However, I have not encountered any communities which, following a careful examination of the situation, did not admit that our aspirations are correct. The world generally supports the idea of Lithuanian independence, provided that it is achieved not by means of conflicts, but by means of accords with the Soviet Union. That is the stance of President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, and the Polish Government.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] With what impressions are you leaving Warsaw?

[Prunskiene] Very good ones. I feel my views have encountered understanding. There is no doubt as to the prospects of Polish-Lithuanian relations. I met government leaders who understand common interests, both our interests and those of Europe.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Over the past few weeks there has been a lot of talk about opening an office for Lithuanian interests in Warsaw. In your talks with members of our government, did you receive any promises concerning this subject?

[Prunskiene] The Polish side is very eager for talks about the possible opening of a Lithuanian consulate. But this is a considerably more complex problem, requiring time. I received no concrete promises, but I was assured that this matter would be examined further.

Documents on Mass Deportations Displayed

LD2706222890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Lists of the victims of mass deportations in June 1941 have been found in the archives of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers and are being exhibited in Vilnius. Three large books contain names of 22,161 persons. This is the number of people deported to Russia in eight days starting on 14 June 1941. This day is marked now in Lithuania as the day of mourning and hope.

These documents are very important in compiling the register of all victims of Stalinism in Lithuania. A special commission for the investigation of the crimes of Stalinism headed by composer Professor Julius Juozeliunas is at present summarizing information obtained from many sources. It has been possible even to find the names of people included in deportations which were being planned. The documents concerning the June deportations contain not only the names, surnames and patronymics of the deported persons, but also their profession, place of residence, and even the place of exile of some people.

These are invaluable documents in Lithuanian history.

Historian Stresses Lithuania's Socialist Choice

LD2806113990 Moscow TASS in English 1055 GMT 28 Jun 90

["History Speaks for Union, Ideologist Says"—TASS headline]

[Text] Vilnius June 28 TASS—There are no reasons to question the choice made by Lithuanian people when they restored Soviet power in Lithuania in July 1940 and took the socialist road of development, said Professor Juozas Ermalavicius, chief of the Ideological Department of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the platform of the Soviet Communist Party. The totalitarian regime of the bourgeois dictator Smetona fell in June 1940, Soviet power was restored in Lithuania in July and in August Lithuania joined the Soviet Union.

Ermalavicius said that the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania became a historic event in the destinies of many thousands of poeople. He said that different views now exist of this event. The new Lithuanian government suggests that the Soviet Union, beginning a dialogue, should recognise as invalid the legislative act of August 3, 1940, when Lithuania entered the Soviet Union voluntarily.

The scientist believes that Lithuania's decisive turn to the socialist road of development stemmed from both domestic and external factors. On the one hand, the exploitation of the working people was constantly increasing, class differentiation of society deepend and social antagonisms aggravated. More than 200,000 people were unemployed in rural areas alone. From the twenties, more than 100,000 people left Lithuania in search of a better life.

The treaty of mutual assistance concluded between the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union on October 10, 1939 was of much importance for saving Lithuania from Fascist occupation. In accordance with the treaty, the USSR turned over to Lithuania the city of Vilnius with adjoining rural areas and pledged itself to give the republic all-round assistance and support. A limited contingent of the Red Army was then deployed on the Lithuanian territory, Ermalavicius said.

By the summer of 1940 the revolutionary upsurge of the masses was crowned by the overthrow of the bourgeois government on June 17. A popular Lithuanian government came to power and held general elections on July 14-15.

Numerous witnesses to these events testify that the Red Army did not exert any influence on the holding of elections. They were a true manifestation of the Lithuanian people's will, the professor said.

Convening its first session on July 21, 1940 Lithuania's People's Sejm adopted a declaration on Lithuania's entry into the Soviet Union. The declaration expressed confidence that this would ensure Lithuania's genuine sovereignty, progress in industry and agriculture, the flourishing of national culture and development of material and spiritual resources of the Lithuanian people. All this meant a turn of the Lithuanian working people to the construction of socialist society in the republic jointly with all Soviet peoples, Ermalavicius said.

Sajudis Sejmas Members Meet Landsbergis

LD2606152390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1354 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] The Sajudis Information Agency reports: The members of the Sajudis Sejmas met with the chairman of the Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis; secretary of the Supreme Council, Liudvikas Sabutis; and the prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene; and her deputy Romulas Ozolas in the Supreme Council building today.

Vytautas Landsbergis briefly described today's situation in Lithuania, blocked links with the world and the railway blockade. It was decided to organize in the future monthly meetings of the Sajudis Seimas Council with Supreme Council Presidium and members of the government. The present status of the Sajudis and its situation during this complex time were described.

Estonian Supreme Soviet To Halt Financing KGB

LD2706180690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Tallinn, 27 Jun—TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan reports:

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet today decided to stop financing from the republican budget in the second half of this year the activities of the KGB, of the Main Directorate for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), and of the Military Registration and Enlistment Office of the Estonian SSR. Sixty deputies voted in favor of this. It is intended to channel the funds "saved" in this way into the government's reserve fund. In the view of some deputies, the insignificant financial dividends from such an operation are incomparable with the political and economic complications which may emerge in interrelations with the center after the adoption of this decision.

Estonian Parliament Adopts Immigration Law

LD2706123790 Moscow TASS in English 1219 GMT 27 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn June 27 TASS— The Estonian parliament today adopted a bill on immigration. Russian-speaking deputies, who described the bill as discriminatory, refused to vote on the issue.

The new law establishes entrance quotas, introduces permanent and temporary permits for residence and regulates other matters connected with the entry and stay of foreign citizens in Estonia.

There is no quota on the entry of those who had Estonian citizenship prior to June 17, 1940 (the day Estonia joined the USSR). There is no quota either for their descendants who had to leave Estonia for military service.

Deputy Kaido Kama, representing the interests of the Congress of Estonian Citizens, believes that this is "the best of all the laws adopted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet". The Congress of Estonian Citizens favours Estonia's complete and unconditional independence.

Deputy Vladimir Lebedev has a different opinion. He believes the law does not guarantee the observance of human rights and contradicts the constitutions of the Estonian republic. He believes that the vote itself was in violation of the constitution. A qualified two-thirds majority, and not simple majority, we needed to pass the bill, he said.

The parliamentary majority believes that Lebedev's reference to the constitution is groundless. They say that the constitution has not operated from the moment the period of transition was announced in March and Soviet power was proclaimed illegal.

Before the vote the Russian-speaking deputies pointed out that the bill did not state clearly who are regarded as Estonian citizens.

Even deputies from the Congress of Estonian Citizens now admit that many contradictions regarding the law on immigration could have been avoided and that there is a need for a law on citizenship. The bill has been prepared and published in Estonian. However, the bill does not mention Estonia's Russian-speaking population.

Economy Commission Official on Estonian Budget

LD2806100290 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Interview with Ivar Raig, deputy chairman of the Economy Commission, by correspondent Raul Malk at the Estonian Supreme Soviet on 27 June—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage indistinct] [Malk] I would like to find out the stance of Ivar Raig on the two issues which were perhaps discussed most of all here [at the Supreme Soviet session], with the first one perhaps being: Will there still be a Union tax built into the budget or will we adopt the line we will not pay and will allocate the money to somewhere else?

[Raig] Well, I think for the time we should adopt this kind of moderate line, with it being built in, while at the same time we have very many, several receipts into the budget from the Union means, as before. If we do not plan for a Union tax, we will not receive those other monies and we would in essence arrive at the same point, perhaps would even lose more. I naturally cannot in principle see a need to have this Union tax because in essence this now boils down to maintaining Gorbachev and, well, and [pauses] perhaps some other minor functions of diplomatic representation and writing out of visas. Because of the present political situation, however, I still think we should now adopt it the way it is. [passage omitted]

Banks Allowed To Offer Currency Cash Services

LD2606130490 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Report by correspondent Ain Saarna]

[Excerpt] The government adopted today a resolution on hard-currency cash operations in commercial banks, at the initiative of Tartu Commercial Bank. Mehis Pilv, chief director of the Foreign Economic Board will talk about it in more detail.

[Pilv] The government has allowed that commercial banks begin temporarily—until the Estonian Bank sets up a corresponding procedure—offering hard-currency services in cash to juridical persons—that is, establishments, enterprises as well as joint ventures—as well as to individuals. What lies behind this resolution? Behind this resolution lies of course the fact tht nearly 600 establishments in Estonia now engage in foreign economy, and financial services with hard currency and banking, so to speak, are very insufficient. One foreign economy bank cannot ensure this and perhaps confidence in it has been partially lost. [passage omitted]

Latvian Parliament Adopts Law on Party Activities

LD2706213390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Latvian parliamentarians have been working today with thoughts of the future. The Latvian parliament adopted a decision on the activities of parties, public political organizations, and structures of political leadership in state institutions, organizations, and at enterprises in the Latvian republic. Here is N. Kasyanova:

[Kasyanova] This decision is only the first step; it will be in force only until the law on political parties, which is now being drawn up, is adopted. What is behind the construction of the new document? Is it an attempt to somehow extinguish the heat of political passions, to at last return people from rallies to their forgotten benches and offices, or is it an outlawing of professions and a hidden sword against the CPSU? Membership of that party can be a reason for dismissing someone from his work. [video shows Supreme Soviet in session]

[S.A. Beskrovnov, identified by caption as secretary of the party committee of the Daugavpilsskiy general construction trust, (equal rights faction)]. There is no doubt that the document adopted arouses a feeling of dissatisfaction and anxiety for several reasons. In the first place, the inconsistency of the document's authors who, in essence, attempt to depoliticize not only the bodies of authority and administration, but practically all labor collectives, organizations, and enterprises in the long term. The second thing is that this decision essentially proposes the destruction of communist party structures, since no party, no public-political movement, has yet created its own primary structures in labor collectives. One can come to the conclusion that this document on depoliticisation is in essence effective; however, it rather proposes a repoliticization away from communist ideas toward the Popular Front's ideas. It is a gross violation of the Latvian republic's Constitution, and at the same time, in my view, of human rights.

[Yu.Ya. Dobelis, identified by caption as engineer of the Lauktseltnieks technical center (Popular Front faction)] I think that we have a Supreme Soviet where it is possible for representatives of various parties to express themselves and exchange opinions, and there is absolutely no necessity for there to be any primary organizations in the KGB, or the Ministry of Internal Affairs or in major collectives, and so on. This will only hamper work. And to talk of some kind of role, like the vanguard, of the Communist Party—this is simply, excuse me, naive. Once we agree on democracy then, please, we will observe this democracy. I hope that our decision will perhaps somehow influence the life, the political life, of the Soviet Union's republics, and that many will follow our example. [video shows Kasyanova interviewing the two men, standing next to each other, in the foyer of the Supreme Soviet]

[Kasyanova] Speaking about democracy, one foreign journalist said: Democracy is when various parties can live together in peace and tolerance. Has our own history really not taught us that moral lessons which should be sufficient for all generations to come: What does a prohibition on thinking turn into for man? Mental aggression. Nature itself determined the multifacetedness of the world and people. Yes, we are, and will be, different, but we will be honorable.

Baltic States To Adopt Appeal to Union Congress

LD2706222190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2050 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Delegations of the independent Lithuanian and Estonian communist partys have arrived this evening in Riga. Together with like-minded people in Latvia they will conduct negotiations on future cooperation of the communists in the Baltic Republics supporting the restoration of the independence of their states. In conclusion of the negotiations it is planned to adopt a joint appeal to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Baltic Leaders View Recent Developments

PM2706170090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 25, 1-8 Jul 90 p 4

[Undated interviews with Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis, and Estonian President Arnold Ruutel by Grant Gukasov: "Reciprocal Steps"]

[Text] Vilnius-Riga-Tallinn—Moscow News asked leaders of the Baltic Republics the following questions:

1. What, in your opinion, has changed after Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration that the renovation of the Soviet Union can now be seen as a formation of a union of sovereign states?

2. How do you visualize future relations between the Baltic states and the market economy which Russia is to become?

3. Have the economic blockade of Lithuania and certain isolation of Latvia and Estonia resulted in the rise of sentiments against the Centre?

Here are the answers given by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Latvia: Anatolily Gorbunov.

1. This new formula shows an understanding that the enforced enthusiasm in relations between the nations must be replaced with a commonwealth based on true friendship, with regard to mutual interests, economic and political gravitation. Time is not on the side of the unitarian state. Since the right of nations for self-determination has been acknowledged, so must the will of a democratically elected parliament, whose first act was the Declaration of the State Independence of Latvia.

2. We are by no means interested in cutting ourselves off and hope to continue close cooperation with all the Union republics on the basis of fair exchange. Each republic has its own particular capacities. Nevertheless we can surely obtain what interests us from our neighbours, and we hope our offer will not fail to attract their attention. I'm very glad that a recent meeting between a Latvian delegation and Boris Yeltsin outlined plans for direct contacts and hope that these will grow with each new day.

3. This practice is deplorable for the faith in the Centre's desire for increased democracy. Indeed, there is a certain rise of antipathy against certain circles eager to return to the past and regain power. But this antipathy is spearheaded mainly against the local orthodox partocracy, which is pinning all its hopes on the use of force, not reason.

Lithuania: Vytautas Landsbergis.

1. I regard this as an important step towards further democratization of the country. The sooner this kind of

union is created, the more genuine concord—and consequently controllability—it will have, and the easier it will be to cooperate with. We would hail it and wish it "all the best."

2. These, as well as any other, relations directly depend on reaching corresponding bilateral agreements. Lithuania favours square, mutually-profitable and good-neighbourly relations. In future, Lithuania can do Russia a good turn as an intermediary in the issue of the common European home.

3. Of course, this policy cannot boost sympathy towards the Centre. However, it does not give rise to any special antipathy, even less hatred, as is sometimes misreported by the mass media. Our people are adamant in their will to pull through and have begun to seek and develop alternative relations, bypassing the Centre.

Estonia: Arnold Ruutel.

1. This new formula for state structure offers a solution to lots of burning issues for the Soviet Union, including those in the realm of international relations. Once we have a union of sovereign states the confrontation rising from this issue will immediately be removed. A union built on a contractual basis solves the majority of issues which have lately been in the public limelight in Estonia. I think that this new formula advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev is essential in the foundation of a new state, as well as for developing and strengthening relations based on goodneighbourliness and trust between republics and different nationalities.

2. First of all, the Union must build a new market operating on the basis of equality. Once it is capable of entering the world market and, first of all, the common European home, Estonia will become not only Russia's "outlet to Europe" but also a benevolent and fair economic partner.

3. The blockade against Lithuania can lead nowhere.

RSFSR

Union Party Member Views Russian Party Congress

PM2806092290 Paris LE MONDE in French
28 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Andrey Grachev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, by Bernard Guetta in Moscow on 26 June]

[Text] Moscow—"This congress," [the Russian Communist Party congress] Mr. Grachev told us, "was undeniably a missed opportunity for the delegates who claimed to represent the Russian communists. They missed an opportunity—the opportunity to declare themselves a force in favor of perestroyka and thus to choose the future for their party. They preferred the past to the future, probably thinking that by voting for the past they were voting for their future.

"This is an illusion, because this is a defeat for perestroyka, for the delegates who did not make that choice and for the president (Gorbachev—LE MONDE editor's note) who is thus deprived of political support. It is primarily a defeat for the party which has thus been brought to the brink of a process of marginalization. A party based on the old apparatus, on cadres from another age, and—for obvious reasons—on senior army officers, a party which appeals to nationalist forces and lumpenized elements of the working class, emerges in fact as a force of the past. This involves two threats for it: losing any creative and dynamic potential and placing itself in open conflict with society and the Russian parliament, at least with its legitimately elected members."

[Guetta] Are you afraid that this victory for the past will influence the Soviet congress?

[Grachev] At the Russian congress last week we witnessed an unsuccessful variation of the October 1964 plenum (the one during which Khrushchev was ousted—LE MONDE editor's note). That did not have comparable consequences as regards the drafting of state policy and instead it underlined how far we have come since then and the irreversible nature of the process started by Mikhail Gorbachev. The latter has emerged unscathed from this attempted coup d'etat, because, thanks to his policy, that party no longer has the same influence or the ability to reverse the course followed by the country's leadership. This is a considerable source of consolation, particularly for our foreign partners who might otherwise have thought that some statements by General Makashov were a real threat. [1]

[Guetta] You talk of an "attempted coup" and recall Khrushchev's ousting—are you not overdramatizing the situation?

[Grachev] The facts are simple. With the Russian party in its present form a party opposing perestroyka has been formed. Why not? But the problem is that, contrary to all the laws of governing a civilian society, we have the opposition party but not—at least for the time being—the government party. Perhaps the 28th congress will rectify this situation. I hope so, because it would be the CPSU's last chance.

[Guetta] How would its collapse be a tragedy for the reforms and democracy in the USSR, for the policy which you advocate?

[Grachev] There are people in the USSR, party members, who already see themselves outside its ranks. The fact that the conservatives have openly emerged will, they think, speed up the deterioration of the party's image in society. They welcome that, but I do not, because I do not think that the collapse of the party and the huge vacuum that would create would be a positive element and would facilitate the development of perestroyka. When a ship sinks, everything around it is drawn down in a vortex toward the bottom.

That would present an enormous danger for the reforms and for the whole country. Whether you like it or not, the CPSU is a potential force for uniting democrats, people who are competent, capable, and ideologically oriented toward a left-wing and not a right-wing alternative to the system which we are trying to overcome. This may surprise your readers, but the vast majority of the 20 million party members, who must not be confused with the several tens of thousands of its officials, are men of this type—advocates of democracy.

These men are the elite of society, its leaders. Deprived of a program or objectives, they would simply be an Army without generals whose men would disperse and go and strengthen the other existing political groups.

[Guetta] What would be wrong with that?

[Grachev] Unfortunately, at present most of those groups are extremist, and the country's cadres would thus be recruited by destructive, nationalist, or extreme left-wing forces. Whether you like it or not, today, pending the full development of the elected assemblies, the party is the only power framework in this country. Moreover, this is not just the result of its infrastructures but also because it still psychologically represents power for a large section of the population. It is impossible to hand over this power to the forces hostile to perestroyka.

[Guetta] So, how do you see the 28th congress?

[Grachev] It could have two possible consequences and they may be parallel. The first would be a mobilization of the vital and responsible forces, determined to make this congress the congress of the party's renewal, not just the 28th congress but also a first congress.

The second, unfortunately, would be apathy, disillusionment, loss of interest, especially among those who, at grass roots level, did not join out of romantic ideals or militant spirit but for personal gain. These two trends will emerge between now and the start of the congress and during that congress. I hope that the former will be supported and guided by the party leadership.

[Guetta] In practical terms, by Mr. Gorbachev?

[Grachev] I was naturally talking about perestroyka's leadership.

[Guetta] And this leadership, like Mr. Yeltsin, is in favor of postponing the congress?

[Grachev] I can only speak for myself: Postponement would be valuable if the time gained was used to prepare a new congress which would not be likely to extend the negative political and psychological effects of the Russian congress.

Footnotes

1. In an extremely tough speech, Gen. Makashov, commander of a military region, specifically accused several reformist leaders, including Mr. Yakovlev, of destroying the country's defense and strengthening NATO after destroying the Warsaw Pact. Implicitly comparing Mr. Gorbachev to King Lear, he also made a statement full of implications: "Some 68 percent of the Soviet Army's troops are deployed on the Russian Federation's territory. The Army's party delegation here represents more than 800,000 communists. We will not capitulate ideologically."

Party Congress Assessed, Split Possible

LD2406134590 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] Vitaliy Gurov looks at the first stage of the congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation:

[Gurov] In the first place, let me remind you that the issue in question is the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the biggest Soviet republic. Indeed, there was certain injustice in the situation wherein Russia and its communists, even the 60 percent of members of the National Communist Party, didn't have a party of their own, unlike all other republics of the country. Yet, this is not the main thing. Strange as it may seem, debates at the congress of the Russian communists were not marked by a broad range of opinion, despite the era of glasnost and pluralism. True, supporters of the radical left-wing group—the Democratic Platform in the Soviet Communist Party—and the Centralist Marxist Platform, did make statements. However, they were few, and it seemed to me they didn't have much impact on the other delegates to the congress. Conservative views prevailed. Many participants in the congress shared this view. A statement to that effect was made at a news conference by the first secretary of the Moscow Communist Party Committee, Yuriy Prokofyev. Another delegate, journalist Pavel Roshanov, said the congress was extremely conservative. Many delegates, however, disagreed with such statements. The Leningrad Communist Party chief, Boris Gidaspov, argues that the congress is quite democratic and far from any right-wing tendencies.

Well, different people seem to be having different systems of moral and political coordinates. And yet, an impartial analysis of speeches at the congress confirm that most of the delegates are not going to write off the idea of the party's leading role in society. In their view the party's departure from economic management is the reason for the current crisis in the country. Calls for upholding the principles of democratic centralism, greater emphasis on ideological work, andfor protecting the Marxist-Leninist theory from attacks vere central to most speeches. Besides, Mikhail Gorbachev was strongly criticized for what was described as the party's failure to discuss the concept of transition to a market economy. It is a significant detail, that whereas before Mikhail Gorbachev was more often criticized from the left, now he has come under fire from the right. In most cases that criticism was biased, however, and incorrect.

Now, what's to happen next? If the trends prevailing at the congress are not just an expression of the point of view of the delegates but are supported by the rank-and-file party members, the party's split is evident. On the other hand, I cannot but point to an opinion poll at the congress, which has found that most delegates believe the party's future is in the consolidation of all groups in society supporting the idea of socialism. However, there is one main condition for consolidation: All forces must meet each other half way. Both the right-wingers and the left-wingers. There is no other alternative. The newly elected first secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Ivan Polozkov, called precisely for that.

Yeltsin on Congress of Deputies, Party Conference

PM2006134990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin by correspondent Yu. Makhrin: "Not Confrontation—Cooperation"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Sixteen delegates have been elected to the Russian party conference working presidium. They include B.N. Yeltsin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. At the end of the first day of the Russian Communist forum's work, your PRAVDA correspondent asked him a few questions.

[Makhrin] Boris Nikolayevich! Two events are taking place almost simultaneously, as it were, one right after the other—the Congress of Russian People's Deputies and the Russian party conference. How would you comment on their course?

[Yeltsin] The Congress of People's Deputies has not ended work yet but I think that it will end tomorrow. Nevertheless, it is possible to assess some results of its work even now. Despite a number of difficulties in the work of the congress and despite the fact that we took a quite bold step and registered 30 different deputies' groups—sectoral groups, "Communists of Russia," "Democratic Russia," autonomous entities, an agrarian group, and so on—straight away, a very broad range of opinions immediately assailed the congress platform. Very broad! The number of people wishing to speak on each question then was 150-200. A time limit was imposed so as to enable a large number of deputies to speak. There were very interesting speeches, interesting proposals. The discussion was keen, especially on such principled questions as the agenda. The one prepared by the apparatus was not adopted. A completely new agenda was adopted, almost twice as long as the old one, and included such principled questions as a Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Russia, the sovereignty of the people, and the agrarian question.

There were errors, there were also moments in the congress' work which, admittedly, were quite difficult. But the coalition approach helped, that is, the participation of all groups in the formation of the organs of power and in the discussion of various questions, and the creation of a coordinating committee of 200 deputies which discussed alternative candidacies for all the leading posts which are to be ratified at the congress. A minimum of three candidates was proposed as an alternative although according to the Constitution I could nominate them individually.

And, of course, the most important event was the adoption of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Russia, which used to be a permanent appendage of the center and had virtually no statehood of its own or independence. Now it has become independent, within the Union, of course, with full autonomy [samostoyatelnost]. And only the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will determine how much power it will transfer to the center. Probably questions of the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and so forth.

Now about the Russian party conference. Today was its first day of work. The proposal to listen to the various platforms was right, this should bring to light the range of opinions. But that hasn't happened yet. It seemed to me that at the moment the discussion is somewhat one-sided. Perhaps tomorrow we will see pluralism. There were the standard, orthodox speeches which, by the way, were applauded.

There were also sharply critical speeches aimed at the party Central Committee and the Politburo. I think that this was justified to some extent because it is necessary to answer for the past five years—for the results of the five-year plan and perestroyka. There is some sense in this, although one shouldn't accuse the party leadership alone, for example, because this is a vast democratic process which is bound to take a certain time. Three years ago I talked about mistakes in the tactics of perestroyka and they have now taken their toll. If that path had been taken three years ago we would have had different results now.

[Makhrin] What do you expect from the Russian party conference?

[Yeltsin] If the conference takes a purely mechanical approach to the question that the Russian Communist Party is nothing but a territorial part of the CPSU it will not accomplish its mission. If the conference or the congress elects only the Central Committee, elects only the secretaries and the leadership. This mechanical approach is not the issue. The issue is that it is necessary to begin with a discussion, and a very serious one, both in primary organizations and here, at the congress: What should the party be like? What should be done to restore the role and prestige of that party—the Russian party—among the people? That is the main thing. And then deal with the organizational structures, the choice of leadership rather than arranging the leaders in their places straight away. I do not think that this is the prime task for delegates.

[Makhrin] But judging by their mood, the republic's party will be created, there is no doubt there.

[Yeltsin] I think so. Generally speaking the time for that question has come, it has been discussed throughout Russia. The overwhelming majority of party organizations supported this idea—and fervently and energetically, too. Undoubtedly this should have been done long ago, but since it wasn't it must be done now, the Russian party must be formed.

[Makhrin] In your view, what opportunities are there for cooperation between the organs of state power and the party which is being created?

[Yeltsin] There must be new forms of cooperation. Having renounced the monopoly of power and the command style, the party must indeed cooperate; you have chosen the right word there. There must be mutual trust, mutual cooperation, and the common interests in Russia's regeneration both in the parliament, the authorities, and the Russian party. Therefore, we do not need confrontation, we do not need frontal attacks, we need to seek cooperation for the sake of this very great duty which Russians and our Russia need.

[Makhrin] One last question. You stated that after the 28th congress you intend to suspend your membership of the CPSU. Have you changed your mind?

[Yeltsin] I have been constantly thinking about this and it causes me distress. On the one hand it would be logical: The switch to a multiparty system obliges me, as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to defend the interests of all strata of Russia's population—party members and nonparty people, one party and five parties—equally. Thus while I am chairman, president, my membership of the CPSU should be suspended. Not actually leave the CPSU but suspend membership. But on the other hand I have been in the party for 30 years. And it is very, very difficult to make this decision. Of course, the party is responsible for many sins, for what has happened in our country, but even so not all communists, not all party members are to blame for that—that must be said openly. Not even all party organizations worked in the same way. All this time I have had a great doubt when making this decision. I constantly postponed it. Now the conference is in progress and then there will be the 28th party congress. As the people of Sverdlovsk have expressed their confidence in me by electing me a delegate to the 28th party congress I simply cannot decide before the 28th congress. My eventual decision will probably be determined by people's feelings, by what communists say, and by how the Russian conference and the 28th congress go.

Gidaspov Says Party Influence Should Remain

90UN2117A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Article by B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the CPSU Leningrad Obkom: "On the Road to the Congress"]

[Text] In these final weeks before the 28th CPSU Congress many people cannot throw off a growing feeling of alarm for the fate of the party. This is being openly discussed both among the workers and among the intelligentsia. All those who have any common sense and for whom socialist values are dear are expressing justified concern.

It is impossible not to share this concern. I sense clearly that at times the political pressure to which the CPSU is being subjected borders on moral terror.

Forces that are loudly calling their supporters to the banner of a crusade against communists are no longer reconnoitering the battle but openly throwing down the gauntlet at the CPSU. The party ranks already contain those who waver and the "deserters." Resignation from the CPSU and the theatrical election maneuvering of particular populists are being elevated to the rank of heroic deeds and acts of civic courage.

The massed attack on the party and on party workers is being waged from the pages of the so-called "independent" press that emerged not too long ago.

Undisguised attempts are being made to heat to boiling point the people's dissatisfaction with the serious difficulties in the economy and the social sphere and to bring the masses out onto the streets and squares. A war of slogans is being waged frantically wherever the blind psychology of the crowd takes it, and the inquisitorial fire is being stoked up, ready to convert any creative idea to ashes.

And what of the party? Will it be able to respond adequately to the dramatically developing events, and to defend before the people the path onto which society was led five years ago, and to strengthen the socialist orientation of perestroyka? Both the continuity of the historical choice of principle made by the people in October 1917, and the future of the CPSU itself, will depend on the answers to these questions.

The situation is extraordinarily complex. Particularly if we take into account the fact that the party itself is now in a stage of keen debate, and sometimes even disagreement, on principle. On the one hand this stimulates the process of rebuilding the CPSU on a new democratic basis and the search for new forms and methods in its activity. On the other hand, however, it weakens the unity and cohesion of the communists and their ability to oppose the destructive attacks from the left and the right.

The polemic that has developed in the CPSU between the supporters of the various platforms is a quite natural phenomenon. In this far from simple and contradictory stage in our development, the normal process of searching for the truth is taking place amid the clash of opinions.

But how is it possible to understand the position of those CPSU members who state aloud that their aim is to work actively for the dismantling of party structures and a weaker role for communists in public life? How is it possible to explain the fact that such statements often ignore the primary party organizations and party committees? And finally, why has the feeling of fellowship and party comradeship that V.I. Lenin assessed so highly been gradually disappearing from the atmosphere of party meetings and from the party milieu in general?

It is obvious that the general critical attitude toward the CPSU Rules now in force, which are largely outdated, has allowed some communists to disregard their important provisions, to relieve themselves of the heavy burden of political responsibility, and to weaken party discipline.

With increasing frequency we have occasion to encounter labelling and unconscionable disparagement, unfounded accusations and mutual coarseness, suspicion and distrust. We cannot go any further in this if we wish to consolidate ourselves in the leading positions of perestroyka.

The party is a voluntary association of like-minded people united by common goals and tasks, not some communal apartment house. Within it the ways to achieve what has been planned are determined in candid, respectful dispute. Internal party life should also go on in this constructive channel.

It is essential that we have a clear-cut idea of, and take into account, not only our mistakes and shortcomings but also our potential. The latter should not be disparaged nor underestimated. Again and again at the very complex turning points in history—in the years of industrialization, during the Great Patriotic War, in the postwar restoration of the economy—the CPSU has demonstrated the highest degree of self-organization and the ability to carry the people with it.

Now, despite very ominous prophecies from latter-day oracles, it remains a powerful political force capable of remaining aloof from the commonplace struggle for power for the sake of having power, acting in fact not in order to confront but to consolidate actions, and oriented not toward a democracy consisting merely of meetings but toward serious practical work. Much time will elapse before the new parties and public movements that are now springing up like mushrooms after the rain will have acquired these qualities.

However, the obvious and major advantages must still be used effectively after having sharply outrun our opponents in the main thing—in results from efforts made, specific rather than declarative emphasis on the individual and his concerns. This is the key task and it requires major changes in the party and its structures, and work on and implementation of an up-to-date model based on the new CPSU Program and Rules.

First we need an authoritative party integrated in the radically restructured economic and social organism of the country, capable of generating and implementing a policy to shape and unfetter the individual and his business, creative, and spiritual qualities. Second, it should be a party totally freed from any inferiority complex or wounded pride about its sometime monopoly rights of state control, it should be able to act decisively and be prepared to cooperate with other creative developments and firmly resist destructive trends. And the main thing is that perestroyka in the party should serve to further turn it toward the needs and requirements of the workers by shaping and guaranteeing the implementation of dynamic socioeconomic programs with a socialist thrust.

Work on the blueprints for a new model for the CPSU is under way, but as the course of events shows it is constantly late and fails to keep up with events. This is also confirmed by the broad debate in the party organizations about the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, during the course of which the vagueness and indeterminate nature of many of its provisions and the lack of a whole series of factors of principle have been revealed.

At the same time, the document does reflect quite clearly the position of the Central Committee on questions relating to rethinking the principle of democratic centralism and the retention of party organizations in the labor collectives. It is common knowledge that those who support the "Democratic Platform" have a different viewpoint.

I would like to express my own opinion here. I suggest that a given decision is reached not out of general considerations but from real conditions and situations. V.I. Lenin, whose 120th birth anniversary we recently marked extensively, always followed the principle of the historical method and the specific in assessing events and phenomena which enabled him to avoid many serious political mistakes.

This is the situation here: A course has been set toward transition to regulated market relations. What does this mean? Emphasis has been placed on the premise that untying the hands and increasing the economic independence and entrepreneurial spirit of collectives and citizens, denationalizing property, and creating conditions for competition between the various forms of ownership will sharply improve production efficiency and improve the economic situation.

At the same time the market also has another side. It is associated with inflationary processes, accelerated stratification of the population's incomes, price increases, and exacerbation of the problem of employment of the labor force.

There is no need to frighten people, but they should be told candidly and truthfully that a long period of social discomfort awaits them. The transition to a regulated market is not a short-lived campaign but a difficult road, for years. And under the conditions prevailing in the country we shall manage to traverse it only by creating precise mechanisms to provide social safeguards for the people.

I think that the specifics are understood. Given all the gross errors permitted in the past in the sphere of economic management, within the Soviet Union the level of social guarantees has, thanks to the party, been raised to a considerable height. Entire generations have not had to face the phenomena of unemployment, bankruptcy and ruin, or mass layoffs.

Is it right to weaken the influence of the Communist Party on what is happening precisely now, at this critical time? I suggest that it is not. It is not in the vital interests of broad strata of the population.

Under the conditions of the sharp turnabout in the economy we should thoroughly check the thesis on the unity of the party and the people. The market will become a touchstone that will graphically show who in fact is fighting for rights and improvements in the people's lives, and who, hiding behind fine phrases, is pursuing quite different goals.

Already, particular pieces being published in the press—including the press in Leningrad—are being backed not only by their authors but also by forces which are dissatisfied with the regulatory nature of the market mechanism being devised, and are offering "invaluable" advice and instructions about how to hawk it and totally undermine relations with the "conservative" center. It is clear that what we have here is a desire to sharply raise the plank of social tension, blame the CPSU for the deterioration in the position of the workers, and make a certain amount of political capital. This road is unacceptable for communists because it is fraught with serious social consequences. I am sure that in practice the CPSU will demonstrate its loyalty to the interests of the workers.

We must also assess the divergence between the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the "Democratic Platform" by proceeding from the above. Today, under conditions of defending socialist priorities and social values and during the switch to the market path and the period of sharp political disagreements in society, the approach of the Central Committee appears objectively right. But this does not mean that in the long-term, when political and economic processes are stabilized, the party will not undergo new transformations. In particular, I do not exclude an end to the creation of party organizations in the production sphere. But we should not run ahead of ourselves. I would like to remind you, for example, that not so long ago the unseemly haste in liquidating the sector structures in the party organs exacerbated the destabilizing factors in the economy and the social sphere and led to paralysis of the complex management system at various levels.

Now we find ourselves at a boundary where society needs an integrating, consolidating political nucleus as at no other time. I am deeply convinced that only the CPSU is capable of fulfilling this function, given a clear-cut definition of its role and place in the country's life.

The preparations for the party congress at local level and the keen polemic that has been initiated on fundamental political issues acquire special importance in this sense.

What direction of movement will the majority of communists choose? What is the danger of a split within the CPSU ranks? Will it succeed in forming combat-capable party committees? What will the delegates elected to the congress bring to Moscow?

To some extent the answers to these questions have been provided by the first stage of the Leningrad party conference. The range of assessments carried in the mass media was quite extensive—from the restrained and well-considered to those sharply critical and containing insinuations about party games that would set one's teeth on edge.

My opinion of the conference and its first results is unambiguous: There has been a de facto transition to finding democratic solutions to the problems of internal party life and collective work on political landmarks.

For the first time in many decades a democratic mechanism has been used to elect delegates and members of the oblast party committee. All candidates were nominated without any preliminary approval "from above," usually by the primary party organizations. Those elected to the conference and to the composition of the oblast committee underwent serious competition on a contested basis with secret ballots in the party districts. They represent an extraordinarily broad range of views and opinions on key issues of party life. And this is almost a mirror image of the reality that today determines the situation in the Leningrad party organization.

The opposition of positions and viewpoints, the keen debate and the stubborn search for mutually acceptable solutions, the heat of the political struggle—these were the subjects of the day-to-day work of the conference. But in this situation of total internal tension, the constructive foundation won the day. A number of major issues were considered and resolved, important documents were adopted, and the leading and working organs of the Leningrad party organization were in the main formed.

The first stage of the conference created conditions for the development of activity by the oblast committee and its bureau, which is extremely important because little time remains until the congress. It can be said that it was compressed to the limit.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that forces must be dispersed in at least two main directions. The first is to complete the great amount of pre-congress work. What do we have in mind here? It is necessary not only to hold democratic elections for the party forum but also to collectively consider and prepare proposals for the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, giving due consideration to the opinion of the primary party organizations and communists and also the new party rules. Working groups have been set up to deal with these matters, and they reported on their own activity to the recent CPSU Central Committee Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] plenum.

Renewal of the rules is a key factor. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the CPSU depends on how this is done. We need a Communist Party that would bring powerful democratic mechanisms into play. And at the same time we need a party that has a strong organization and discipline without vagueness and amorphousness, a party with its own alignment, with clear-cut landmarks, respectful of and complying with statutory requirements. Without this pivot we shall be unable to solve the enormous tasks that face us.

The second is to organize the efficient operation of the oblast committee. Life insistently demands major restructuring of party structures so as to enhance the role of the elected organs in work on, and the adoption of, decisions and raising the level of collegiality in the leadership.

These issues were recently considered at a meeting of the bureau and at a plenum of the CPSU Obkom. What did their first joint debate show?

First of all that it is impossible not to notice that considerable intellectual forces have been assembled in the leading party organs, people who think independently and in an unconventional way and are capable of assuming responsibility. The process of mutual study and "fitting in" of views, inevitable during the initial stage, is still under way.

There is an obvious general trend toward shifting the center of gravity in the activity of the obkom from the departments to the commissions. Initially it was deemed necessary to set up six of these structures to deal with matters pertaining to organizational party issues; ideological and mass political work; links with state organs; analysis, prediction, and interaction with sociopolitical organizations and movements; and socioeconomic and agrarian policy. It is proposed to set up under the commissions fully subordinate departments whose staffs will be formed independently. It is planned to set up several structural subdivisions under the bureau and secretariat in order to insure their function and coordinate the operation of the obkom overall.

It is probable that the structure adopted by the plenum, taking the above comments into account, still has defects and will require further refinement during the course of its work. Notwithstanding, it does make it possible to really eliminate the notorious diktat by the apparatus and to affirm the authority of the elected organs.

It must be stated candidly that during the period of activity by the previous obkom the commissions did not realize their full potential. They met and discussed issues prepared beforehand but efficiency was not very great. The times insistently demand that they be transformed from organs that listen into organs that engage primarily in constructive and creative work.

There is a special debate about the apparatus for which the principles by which it is formed must also be seriously altered. I note that the creation of a unified regional party organ based on the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom [City Party Committee] as well as structural perestroyka has enabled their numerical strength to be reduced by more than 30 people.

In all, over the past one-and-a-half years it has been almost halved. In my opinion, further sharp steps in this direction would be harmful.

The question of re-certification of the apparatus, with the active involvement of the obkom commissions, and the promotion of new workers to vacant positions on a competitive basis is also on the agenda. The process is to some extent a painful one that affects the individual's fate and requires a careful and benevolent approach.

As a result of the sometimes undeserved criticism of the apparatus, negative psychological attitudes have been shaped about its supposed incapacity and the need to replace it totally. I think that it is time to introduce clarity into this matter.

For many years the party organs enjoyed unrestricted opportunities to select cadres, and it did this very carefully. Specialists with high qualifications, often scientific degrees, and with good prospects for growth were gathered together. It is another matter that all their work was artificially squeezed into the Procrustean bed of complying with commands and directives, and was often devoid of creativity. The system by which the apparatus functioned was vicious, but not the apparatus itself in which an absolute majority are honest, principled, and profoundly knowledgeable people. We must also approach the re-certification by proceeding from these criteria.

A few words about the composition of the elected organ. It is, of course, a fine thing that fresh forces have emerged in the obkom that are not weighed down with the burden of the past and have proclivity for administrative-command methods. But on the other hand, their lack of experience in political work at the level of a large region, and particularly at this complex time, requires some time for adaptation. And there are no reserves. Something else is also of concern. The members of the present oblast committee include only a few workers which is obviously not on a par with their social representation in the Leningrad party organization.

This issue is acquiring some keenness because it is precisely in the working milieu that attitudes of dissatisfaction with the situation in the party and society are particularly strong, and where the percentage of resignations from the CPSU has especially been on the increase. This problem and ways to resolve it are the focus of attention in the oblast committee.

Now, when our commissions are defining the regulations for their own activity and marking out its main directions, I would like to deal with a number of urgent tasks.

First of all we must draw up a platform for the Leningrad party organization under present conditions into which life has managed to introduce its own amendments. And of course, we must take the lessons of past mistakes and create a mechanism to implement its provisions. In this our main document we should provide for a strategy and tactics for the activity of party organs under the conditions of market relations, and orient them more exactly on consistent defense of the interests of the workers. Here we must firmly take the initiative, yielding it to no one.

Another concern is to establish constructive contacts with the newly elected soviets at all levels. It should once again be emphasized that we recognize and respect the powers of the soviet organs formed democratically. But this means something else at the same time. All responsibility for the state of affairs in the territories and their development, and for supplying the population with everything it needs, is placed on the shoulders of the corps of deputies and the executive committees. It is a question of laborious, rough work that cannot be replaced by slogans or resolutions or widely publicized statements. Failure to understand this could already this year lead to negative social consequences.

We are prepared to offer specific political and practical assistance to the soviets while reserving the right to work on proposals to implement socioeconomic and agrarian policy and submit them to the judgment of the public and the deputies.

In this I do not exclude the possibility that on a number of issues the viewpoints of soviet and party organs will be quite different. For example, the position of the Leningrad City Soviet and some of the deputies is still dominated not so much by cooperation with the CPSU Obkom but rather by acting out the role of accusers and denouncers. In the dust of the political struggle, some of those elected by the people counsel in favor of democracy but disregard the elementary standards and try to use glasnost as a press for applying pressure to public opinion. One example of this is the recent publication in VECHERNYY LENINGRAD of a letter from a group of deputies from the Leningrad City Soviet who are members of the CPSU. While being perfectly well aware of the democratic procedure for the election of delegates to the conference of the Leningrad party organization and for the election of obkom secretaries, they expressed their lack of trust in the highest organ of Leningrad's communists. It is clear that what is behind these kinds of irresponsible statements is nothing but a desire for confrontation and a wish to split the communists and exacerbate the factional opposition in the corps of deputies.

How much longer will the concept of democracy be interpreted here as group and personal predilections? In my opinion, that road leads to impasse and has no prospects.

What should our tactics be in such situations? I think that life itself obliges the party organs to look more frequently and to find support among the broad masses, in the working milieu, and in the various public movements with which we must establish mutual relations and coordinate actions and engage in constructive dialogue. Our support is people, and no communist should forget this come what may.

With the passage of the law on the common foundations of local self-management and local economies, and consolidation of the material and financial base for the soviets, and the creation of committees for self-management in the microrayons, favorable opportunities are being created for accelerating the pace of social transformation in the territories. The political aspects of this work should be very important for party committees and bureaus. We must carefully consider the matter of strengthening the territorial party organizations and reinforcing them with active communists, including workers in the production sphere. Here the CPSU city and rayon committees, proceeding from the prospects for growth in their financial possibilities and independence, could engage more meaningfully the problems of strengthening the material foundations for the activity of party organizations in the territories.

With the approach of the market, the party organs will become involved increasingly with economic issues. The more so since a fundamental review is now being made of the system used to allocate and use party membership dues for the needs of the primary party organizations.

All of this obliges the oblast party committee to work on cost- accounting principles for the functioning of party structures. There must be a careful study of opportunities to improve profitability in the use of the fixed capital of the Leningrad party organization and the prospects for publishing other publications and setting up small enterprises with the emphasis on commerce. Life is simply forcing us to set out on this road. And better to do it sooner rather than once again try to catch up later for what has been lost.

It is, however, important that commercial undertakings do not overshadow the moral and political principles by which communists are guided. This danger does exist, especially when we take into account the sad experience gained on this path by the Komsomol organs.

It is time to start thinking about the search for ways to provide material support for party veterans and to strengthen the social safeguards for party workers. These are all problems that are already looming.

These are some thoughts on our immediate plans. And what is the main thing in the times immediately ahead? Ahead lies the second stage of the Leningrad party conference which will convene on 8 June. It will make it possible to sum up the results of major organizational work, in particular to define attitudes toward a number of issues of principle, including those pertaining to the switch to regulated market relations, and to review the fulfillment of conference assignments. We also advocate that a referendum be held on key problems of internal party life, not only at the rayon level but at the national level.

Conference delegates are perfectly well aware that the months immediately ahead in the life of the CPSU, and this means also in the life of one its largest detachments—the Leningrad party organization—will be decisive. Our actions are now directed toward dealing with the dramatic unfolding of events and consolidating the party ranks.

By early July the Leningrad delegation will be ready to introduce at the all-Union party forum the proposals from the almost 600,000-strong detachment of communists. The congress will resolve everything.

Congress Establishes Economic Councils

PM2606150790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Single Edition p 1

[Report: "Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies Resolution on Republic Supreme Economic Council"]

[Text] The Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies resolves:

1. To form a Republic Supreme Economic Council under the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with the aim of coordinating the activity of all organs of power, economic organizations, and ministries and departments on RSFSR territory in carrying out the economic reform and elaborating programs for the RSFSR economy's transition to market relations.

2. To instruct the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to determine the composition of the Supreme Economic Council and ratify a statute on its activity.

Resolution Abolishing State Acceptance Published

PM2806110390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jun 90 Single Edition p 1

[Report: "Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies Resolution on Abolishing State Acceptance on RSFSR Territory"]

[Text] The Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies resolves:

1. To abolish state acceptance in associations and enterprises on RSFSR territory, regardless of whose authority they come under.

2. In connection with the transition to market relations in the economy, according to contractual obligations and conditions for the fulfillment of state orders, labor collectives, associations, and enterprises have the right to independently establish quality control methods.

3. To instruct the USSR State Committee for Quality Control and Standards and the USSR State Committee for Standards Russian Republic Administration to adopt measures within a period of two months to find jobs for workers from state acceptance organs.

The Kremlin, Moscow, 22 June 1990.

Silayev Outlines RSFSR Government Program

90UN2186A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Single Edition p 2

[Report by I.S. Silayev to RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies on 18 June: "Impending Activity of the RSFSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Dear Comrade People's Deputies!

I would like first of all to express profound gratitude to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, which has appointed me to the high office of chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers. But I understand that the final decision will be made by the congress. For this reason I shall try from this crucial rostrum to tell you about the most important, most fundamental directions of the program of activity of the future government. In addition, I understand that you also have many questions about me personally. I shall not avoid them either.

The new government of the republic is invested with a task of extraordinary complexity—implementing measures which will make it possible to extricate Russia and its economy from the present crisis situation. This must be a competent and balanced policy and at the same time radical and anticipatory. I understand that we are no longer allotted time for warming up, fittings, and experiments.

The "Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR" which you have adopted provides the basis for realization of this policy.

A most important area of the government's activity will be the honing of an economic mechanism providing for Russia's genuine economic independence as a sovereign state within the USSR. The solution of this problem is impossible without a renewal of the Soviet Federation based on a new Union treaty, which it would be exceedingly desirable to have concluded before the end of the current year. The treaty should guarantee the republic's economic independence through the establishment of ownership of the land and its interior and the revenue of its budget and also the republic's exclusive right to regulate internal social and socioeconomic development proportions. The precise redistribution here of legislative and executive authority between the USSR and the Russian Federation ensuring the noninterference of Union authorities in the jurisdiction of the republic will be the basis of the government's effective work for the implementation of an independent economic policy formulated by the legislative authorities.

The extremely deformed interrepublic commodity exchange which exists currently has essentially led to the concealed financing of the other Union republics from Russia's budget. Judge for yourselves: In recent years contributions of the republic's resources to the Union fund of all-state resources has constituted more than R100 billion. Little more than R30 billion only are returned from the Union budget.

Calculations show that an approximation to world prices in economic relations between republics would add to the budget of the national economy of the Russian Federation approximately R25 billion.

In this connection the government will this year even take the necessary steps to level the current imbalance in reciprocal payments.

An important condition of a strengthening of the republic's sovereignty is complete economic freedom for all producers located on its territory.

For this it is essential that all enterprises be accorded in the current year even the legislative right to emerge from beneath administrative-departmental subordination and of independent choice of organizational structures and also of forms of ownership regulated by legislation, including the USSR law "Property in the USSR."

The mutual relations of the economically independent agricultural and industrial enterprises with the local soviets will be built on the basis of their common interest in the socioeconomic development of the villages, rayons, and cities through a system of taxation, the realization of joint social programs, and strict compliance with local laws.

Having thus broken down the current wall of alienation between the local authorities and the commodity producers and, in addition, having given them an economic interest in mutual assistance, we will create practicable prerequisites for the self-government and self-financing of all autonomous formations, krays, and oblasts. It is a question of the independent formation and use of the republic and local budgets, given the lower budgets' complete independence of the superior ones. Only on this condition will we be able to ensure the independence and responsibility of the republic and local authorities in all that concerns satisfaction of people's needs and requirements.

And only in close interaction with the councils of ministers of the autonomous republics, kray, and oblast ispolkoms [soviet executive committees], and the ispolkoms of the autonomous oblasts and okrugs, will the government of the Russian Federation be able to successfully accomplish the tasks that confront it.

A most important question with which the government is beginning its activity is the honing of a mechanism of the incorporation of the national economy in market relations. In the interests of our republic's economy this needs to be done now inasmuch as sovereignty affords us not only economic freedom but also additional financial, currency, and material-technical resources, which we sorely need to start the process.

There are many proposals and concepts pertaining to transition to the market. The program drawn up by a number of economists codenamed "500 days" is of considerable interest also. We have entered into active cooperation with the authors and have reached agreement on the mutual adaptation within one month of our concepts insofar as the main ideas have a common purpose and focus.

This will permit us within two months to have drawn up a republic program of transition to market relations and to have submitted it for examination by Russia's Supreme Soviet.

I appeal to the people's deputies and specialists and anyone who has proposals pertaining to an improvement in the mechanism, however radical they may be, to expound them, and we will discuss them.

It is essential that the program have legislative backing. It is essential for its accelerated realization to prepare and adopt the appropriate legislative enactments in order as of the start of next year to actively start the process of incorporation in market relations.

I would like to emphasize here that this point is by no means connected with an increase in retail prices, for this idea would not lead to a reduction in the shortage of commodities.

At the same time, however, changing the overall price structure will subsequently, under the influence of the market, be inevitable. But none of this should be to the detriment of the interests of the people or at their expense.

A means of protection of the interests of the population, its needy strata particularly, should be the introduction of a tax we are proposing ensuring the continuation in production and for sale of commodities of the inexpensive range such as footwear, clothing, dishware, furniture and so forth.

In addition, prices will be indexed, and the population's income will be brought into line with them. Primarily pensions, grants, benefits, and the wages of low-income categories of workmen.

This was rightly discussed in their speeches by Comrade People's Deputies Mikhaylov, Anikeyev, and many others.

So there will be elements of economic reform: taxation policy, prices, government orders which are profitable and backed by financial and material-technical resources, an independent outlet onto the foreign market, and the opening of the domestic market to foreign companies. No less important a component of the reform is the stimulation of scientific-technological progress by direct government investments and enterprises' interest in investing their resources in innovations. All this is geared to an increase in incentives for economically free enterprises to increase the production of commodities and the sale of them, which will lead to a change in the economic situation in the republic, on the consumer market primarily.

World practice shows that the greatest effect, and quickly, is achieved by the privatization of enterprises in various spheres of the economy. The government intends providing in its program for the transfer to private ownership of small businesses in the sphere of services and consumer goods and home building materials, the processing of agricultural products and such. If supported by the Supreme Soviet, of course.

According to our calculations, people will feel this change in the direction of an improvement within 18 months to two years.

The overall scale of problems which have accumulated in Russia is such that, granted all their seriousness, it is essential to select the most important and tackle them as quickly as possible, concentrating the maximum in the way of forces and efforts.

Among such problems, the people's deputies cite the food, environmental, and social problems, including housing, health care, public education, science and the higher school, and the development of the culture and distinctiveness of all Russians. This is my position also.

But the main one is revival of the countryside. A specific program for this will be submitted to your next congress.

The government will submit to the people's deputies in good time proposals pertaining to a change in the system of taxation of agricultural production and a uniform tax with regard to the prevention of an increase in the price of agricultural equipment for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms].

I will confirm what I said in my report at the Supreme Soviet session on the liquidation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz debt, and as a priority measure, a suspension of the payment of withholdings.

The program for the revival of the countryside will be backed on the requisite scale by government capital investments for the development of the social infrastructure, primarily road-building, communications, and development of the rural construction industry. The preferential extension of credit for the development of the production base of the countryside will be provided for. Particularly preferential support will be rendered those who show a desire to participate in the revival of neglected land and villages of the Russian Federation, including the transfer of this land to private ownership. We will pursue a policy of the broad-based stimulation of the creation of mixed agroindustrial structures. The first of them have been created with the participation of the machine builders in Krasnodar Kray and Kalinin Oblast. It is essential to develop the network of enterprises for the storage and processing of farm produce where it is produced.

We will do everything to ensure the solution within three or four years of the problem of provision of the countryside with the necessary farm equipment, enlisting on a broad scale the capacity of enterprises of both civilian and defense mechanical engineering and economically stimulating its production, and also the development of the network of machinery and equipment servicing in the countryside.

The government envisages purposively transferring all the budget resources channeled within the framework of this program into backing for social needs to the local soviets.

But, without awaiting the decisions of the congress, it is essential right now to elaborate and adopt a number of urgent measures aimed primarily at the preservation and processing of this year's harvest.

According to the villagers' forecasts, a pretty good harvest is expected.

The Council of Ministers will adopt the most decisive measures to provide the agroindustrial complex with fuel, lubricants, rubber, batteries, and other commodities in short supply and also spares.

I consider it of fundamental importance that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin supported my proposal concerning the inclusion in the government of the chairman of the Peasant Union.

We will find an opportunity to provide agriculture as quickly as possible with additional hardware, transport, and equipment.

Another acute problem are the empty shelves of the dry goods stores. In order to alleviate the seriousness of the commodity shortage we will make purchases, overseas included, but the main thing is that we will increase approximately threefold investments in the retooling of more than 800 light and textile industry enterprises.

This, as all the other programs I have cited, will contain the principle of economic stimulation of the interest of all participants in its fulfillment.

I will permit myself to repeat what I said in the report at a sitting of the Supreme Soviet: Granted all the wealth of resources and the scale of development of scientific and production potential, Russia's national economy will be receptive to the achievements of scientific-technological progress only when the economic mechanism interests enterprises not only in investing their resources in innovations but also in making a living from this. Under these conditions government investments could constitute up to 40-50 percent of total research and development. It is such a policy that enabled the industrially developed countries to gain the lead in the competitive struggle on the world market and achieve a high living standard of the population.

It is clear that we will have to solve all Russian problems from our own resources. We will also have to find them for the creation of special goal-oriented funds. This will help in equalizing the socioeconomic development of the regions, primarily the Non-Chernozem Zone, Siberia, the north, and the far east.

The question of the elimination of the lag in the socioeconomic development of the national formations is particularly acute. To this end the government will create the special "National Revival" fund. This fund will be used specifically in conjunction with the people's deputies.

Considerable attention will be paid to problems of arrangements for refugees and the creation of normal housing conditions for Afghanistan veterans and servicemen released into the reserve upon a reduction in the armed forces.

We will do everything to build up the intellectual potential, preserve the historical legacy and national distinctiveness, revive the culture and morality, and strengthen the spiritual and physical health of all peoples of the Russian Federation.

Proposals will be prepared pertaining to an enhancement of the social status of the teacher, doctor, engineer, and also the person working in the law enforcement authorities and the field of culture, and an improvement in their material situation.

All this will be at the center of the government's attention.

There are many problems, and none brook delay. But our possibilities are considerable also, if we work freely and with interest and make efficient use of all that we create.

Dear People's Deputies!

Inasmuch as new economic relations and the achievements of scientific-technological progress are being made the basis of the development of the national economy as the most effective way of increasing society's well-being, the need for the replacement of the old structures of administration arises. They should not be axed but rather superseded by new ones and by the functions that the economically free producer and the market need.

For example, on the basis of the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the State Committee for Prices, and the State Committee for Statistics, we intend to form a republic State Committee for the Economy with new functions: study of the conditions of the market, forecasting the development of the productive forces, and drawing up balance sheets of the social product, national income, and financial resources, a balance sheet of labor resources and so forth.

At the same time, however, we need to create other authorities also: for the development of and government support for small business and tenant and individual farms, the pursuit of an antitrust policy, for foreign economic relations, for realization of the program of the revival of the countryside, transition to the market economy, administration of state property, and others.

The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply and its territorial bodies will be converted from a vehicle of alienating the producer from the consumer to a mechanism of the market—will become financially autonomous commercial middlemen.

As a whole, the conversion of the structural subdivisions of the republic Council of Ministers will lead to the elimination of more than 20 sectoral ministries and state committees, with a simplification of the remaining structures.

A question of principle is the interaction of the republic Council of Ministers with the government of the Union. The Russian Government should be subordinate only to the Russian Parliament. And only as determined by the Russian Parliament will it be guided by ordinances of the USSR Government on the basis of the Union treaty.

Dear People's Deputies!

It is very important that the government program obtain the support of the Russian people and that they participate actively in its realization. This will not be done without the mass media, and Russia needs, consequently, its own television, press, and radio. And, of course, its own newspaper, which should be the organ of the republic Supreme Soviet and the government. In this sense, perhaps, it might be expedient to determine the status of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA also. I am prepared to go to the Supreme Soviet with the corresponding proposals. Its own mass media are an essential condition of Russia's sovereignty. In the government's organizational structure we will provide for the creation of the corresponding body—a ministry of information and communication.

Now about myself. I, like many of you, worked under the conditions of the command-administrative system, but I am not a conservative and never have been, for it is due to innovations that I have received headaches and contracted trouble.

But I have managed to get a considerable amount done also and accumulate knowledge and experience. I now have an opportunity to participate in Russia's revival on the principles of the declaration adopted by the congress. I do not believe you will regard as privileged the position of head of the government in this grim, crisis period, but I made my choice unhesitatingly. It is simple: giving everything for the revival of Russia and working together with you and seeking and finding the best solutions for the good of Russians. I look for close cooperation with the people's deputies and mutual understanding with Boris Nikolayevich. The only place where I will not aspire to compromise with him is on the tennis court.

Thank you for your attention.

Russian Premier Silayev Gives Interview

PM2706182690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 25, 1-8 Jul 90 p 16

[Interview with Chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers Ivan Silayev by Viktor Loshak; place, date not given: "Russian Prime Minister's Credo: Market, Private Property, Demonopolization, Foreign Capital"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Ivan Silayev, 60, has always been a journalist' man. He was known to grant long interviews, but once he was elected, rather unexpectedly, Russia's prime minister, the journalists realized they knew very little about him. For 20 years he had worked at an aviation factory in the city of Gorkiy, and was eventually promoted Deputy Minister and later Minister of the Aviation Industry. He took part in launching MiG-29, Su-27, Il-96, Tu-160 and 204. For the last five years he has been chairing the Machine-Building Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers, and was deputy to Nikolaiy Ryzhkov. The four ministries under his supervision had a workforce numbering nearly 5,000,000.

He is known to play tennis and have old-fashioned tastes. He prefers songs from the 60s, his favourite perfomer is Edita Piekha. His ofice in Mayakovskiy Square is very much like any other executive office. The only evidence of his machine-building speciality are the mock-ups of an aircraft, a tractor, a car, and a harvesting combine "Don-1500". Contrary to the prevailing opinion he spoke of the latter combine with approval and asked me if I had read the good notices "Don-1500" got in the Western press...

A Thunderbolt

[Loshak] What was the procedure for your nomination as prime minister?

[Silayev] I had other problems on my mind. Suddenly, about ten days before the election, I had a telephone call from Yuriy Lebedev, a young deputy whom I once helped organize an independent engineering centre in the Attay region. He told me the ecologists and engineers had put my name on the list of candidates for the post of prime minister. He also invited me to attend a meeting the same night. But a telephone call is just a call, even though I was told Yeltsin had approved of the idea.

[Loshak] Are you well acquainted with Yeltsin?

[Silayev] Yes, we crossed paths a lot when I worked at the ministry and he was stationed in Sverdlovsk where we have a number of aviation works. We had contacts later, too.

So I rang him up and he confirmed that the proposal was serious. He wanted me as a candidate, and not just a figurehead. I went to meet the deputies. There were medical doctors, production managers, and ecologists among them...I got hooked on the idea. Or course, my main motive is patriotism. But also a desire to put into life the ideas I could not realize here, at the USSR Council of Ministers.

I felt slightly awkward because one of the candidates at an early stage was my colleague Voronin, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. You see, competition at this level is considered bad form.

[Loshak] Did you consult anyone before making the decision to run for prime minister?

[Silayev] That day Ryzhkov had a road accident and was taken to the hospital. Although I had by then decided the matter for myself, I asked to convey the information to him. The same night my family—my wife and two sons—Oked my decision.

[Loshak] What do your sons do?

[Silayev] The elder son is a doctor of technical science working at a research institute. My younger son is a mathematician, now writing his candidate thesis.

Premier vs Premier

[Loshak] Do you realize that the principles of the economic reform you have proposed for Russia and the situation in the country set you at odds with the USSR Cabinet and the premier?

[Silayev] This is inevitable, primarily because my position requires that I follow the decisions passed by Russia's Supreme Soviet, specificially the decision on Russia's sovereignty. Much will depend on our flexibility and the readiness to meet each other halfway.

Your see, all nationwide processes are slower and more complicated. Russia is different. For various reasons Russia is always more radical. Take the issue of privatization, for example. While in the All-Union Cabinet, I never thought about it. My problem was how to make the Kama Automobile Works a joint-stock company, or how to lease a plant in Sterlitamak to its own employees.

[Loshak] In short, you thought about introducing innovations without destroying the ministerial structures?

[Silayev] We have reduced the number of ministries, both numerically and structurally. We have removed the intermediate links between the minister and the enterprise. But the other day I looked at the structure of Russian Federation ministries and saw all those unnecessary links still there!

When one looks closely at the situation in Russia, one realizes that the issue of privatization is not even debatable. It is inevitable. Consumer goods and services industries must be privatized immediately, including small factories. Or consider the amount of neglected land and abandoned villages in Russia! To help farmers a fund in the budget is needed...

[Loshak] Incidentally, what about your native village? As far as I can remember, you said something about your peasant origins in parliament...

[Silayev] I was born in the village of Bakhtyzino in the south of the Gorkiy region. It is almost extinct now.

[Loshak] The ideas of privatization and opennness to foreign capital are directly opposite to the ones propounded by Ivan Polozkov, the candidate for Russia's presidency for who almost half the Russian congress voted. Does this mean that almost half of Russia is opposed to you even now?

[Silayev] I count on people's support. Not unanimous support, of course. But those who are closer to everyday life, to empty shops and outrageous market prices, will back me up, I'm sure.

Destroy with Optimism

[Loshak] What helped you beat your rival Mikhail Bocharov, whose programme included a day-by-day schedule for radical reforms in Russia, all planned to take place with the ambitious candidate's first 500 days? What played into your hands: the conservatism and caution of the Russian parliament, Bocharov's conceited manner, or, perhaps, some flaws in his programme?

[Silayev] it is not polite to discuss the subject now. Bocharov's programme is to a great extent in agreement with my own. I have already met with his advisers and invited them to cooperate. Good ideas must not be wasted. As for the timetable... It did not sound serious enough. It would be fine if we managed to put the mechanism of privatization in motion in six to eight months. Our task is to set the scene for individual entrepreneurs. How can we plan private industry's output? His motive was plain: to make Russia see that things have started moving. I think it will take us a couple of months to develop a detailed programme like this.

[Loshak] Who are your economic advisers?

[Silayev] Specialists from the Machine-Building Bureau, most of them young. And two Moscow University scholars: Pavel Medvedev and Igor Nit. I also consult progressive-minded ministers. Some of them are far from hopeless, really.

[Loshak] Don't you feel that Russian Prime Minister Silayev will be busy destroying the structures created by the USSR Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Silayev?

[Silayev] I will destroy all that without regret, even with optimism.

'I Propose a Merger'

[Loshak] You seem to have become a radical economist in the ten days since you were invited to run for prime minister!

[Silayev] I will not dare say I was a born radical. We are all children of our times. After the 27th congress I was convinced that acceleration was the key to our new economic policy. The euphoria lasted for about a year, and then we realized the economy stood still or continued to lag behind as before. The West's 15-year lead has not been reduced one bit. The task to catch up with the most advanced world standards proved too hard for us. At that moment it became clear that the nation's strength depends not so much on the size of the territory, the mineral wealth, the size of the population, or the amount of money in the banks, but on the scientific and technological potential and the intensity of its application. The slogan "Let's do everything on our own, better than others and immediately!" was our own undoing. We began to see the light some three years ago. We realized that our task must be to produce machines up to modern standards. It is utopian to hope to meet the nation's demand for machinery. Not a single nation in the world can do without imports. What we need is a different economic mechanism stimulating every form of initiative, be it a state-run enterprise, a cooperative or an individual one.

At that stage I ran into opposition from the State Planning Committee which rejected all my proposals. There was a stage when I insisted on opening our market to foreign companies—not to imports, mind you, but to foreign concessions operating here. Such a proposal was formulated at the beginning of 1989.

[Loshak] How did you propose to pay? Where was the hard currency to come from?

[Silayev] We are in for another depression, so foreign concessions could come in handy. This country's industries have about 2 billion convertible roubles in their accounts. Add to that some 200 million owned by the population. Why should the government be afraid of Western competition when it has such levers as customs duties and licencing? If we cannot make up our mind to open our market up on a nationwide scale, let's do it in Russia. We have not proclaimed Russia's sovereignty for nothing. This is the project I'm going to propose.

Secondly I am sure we must bring together the two machine-building complexes, the civil and the military ones. Despite conversion, powerful barriers still exist between them. The Defence Ministry vetoes every attempt at cooperation between them. Incidentally, the old structures have remained intact in the defence industry. When I first proposed a merger I said I was not after greater power for myself. As an aviation engineer I would be happy to work in my speciality. I'm not quite sure yet, but I feel my new post will push me towards a merger.

[Loshak] While speaking in the Russian parliament you quite unambiguously delineated the future for the State Planning Committee. You said it would become a centre for scientific and economic coordination. I am afraid the political weight of the Planning Committee (where your predecessor, the ex-prime minister of Russian now works) will not allow you to put this idea of yours into practice soon.

[Silayev] Let's be frank: it's either a planning committee or a market economy.

[Loshak] What was Brezhev's attitude towards you?

[Silayev] There were no contacts between us. Only once in 1981, when my appointment as minister was being confirmed, he looked at me as if I were an inanimate object and said: "There's a motion to confirm." The whole procedure took not more than two or three minutes.

[Loshak] Does your credo as Russia's prime minister conflict with your membership in the CPSU Central Committee, whose line, by all accounts, is far less radical than yours?

[Silayev] We are all rejecting our views of ten or 15 years back. We are revising many things now. What sort of a party are we if we loudly proclaim that we work to make the people's life better while in fact it's getting worse? In the long run, one comes to the conclusion that if socialism is ever built, it will be built in Japan, or in Sweden, but not in Russia. Remember, the main thing is for Russia to live on a flourish.

'Democratic Russia' Voters' Conference Held

PM2706155590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[INTERFAX report: "Voters' Conference"]

[Text] On 24 June a two-day conference of voters from the "Democratic Russia" bloc organized at the initiative of the Moscow Voters' Association ended in Moscow.

In addition to Moscow delegates, 65 delegates from 37 Russian cities took part in it. The conference elected an organizational committee and supported "Democratic Russia's" statement of intentions, which says that this movement will be able to link democratic factions in soviets of various levels vertically and horizontally. Also approved was "Democratic Russia's" proposal to convene an all-Russian constituent congress in late November 1990. Sergey Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, spoke on the last day of the conference. He noted that in his opinion the sharp, personal, and crude attacks against Mikhail Gorbachev at some demonstrations are inappropriate and intolerable. "That is my opinion," Stankevich said. "I continue to adhere to it firmly."

'Democratic Platform' Issues Tactics Resolution

90UN2096D Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 90 p 3

[Resolution on Tactics of Proponents of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU"]

[Text] We, communists of Babushkinskiy Rayon, proponents of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" who understand the choice of our comrades who have decided to withdraw from the CPSU, consider it necessary to continue and develop the movement for democratization of our party.

We consider inexpedient both an immediate withdrawal from the CPSU and the establishment of any fixed deadlines for this step. We see as our task to continue dialogue within the party, to establish democratic principles in our local party organizations, to promote progressive ideas, to provide constructive criticism to erroneous decisions and actions of party organs and individual Communists, and to enlist new proponents from among communists and nonparty members with the goal of transforming the CPSU into a democratic party of the parliamentary type.

Proceedings of Moscow Party Conference Reported

PM1506151290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Report by S. Bogatko, A. Ilin, and Yu. Kazmin under the rubric "At the 28th Conference of Moscow Communists": "The Way Up Will Be Difficult"]

[Text] Moscow—The 28th conference of Moscow City CPSU organization, the country's biggest, opened yesterday at the Moscow CPSU gorkom [city committee] and obkom [oblast committee] sociopolitical center. M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.A. Kryuchkov, and D.T. Yazov were elected delegates to the conference. L.N. Zaykov, V.A. Medvedev, A.N. Yakovlev, G.P. Razumovskiy, Ye.M. Primakov, and CPSU Central Committee secretaries took part.

The capital's communists are summing up the results of the Moscow-wide debate on the party's role and place in the political system as it undergoes renewal and on the paths of development of intraparty democracy and are discussing the draft "Position of the Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress." This document has been published, in PRAVDA and elsewhere, and it reflects the wide diversity of views expressed during the debate, in the course of discussions at the deputies' club, commissions, and the gorkom plenum and bureau, and in the press.

The report delivered at the conference by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, and the delegates' speeches expounded the fundamental tenets of the "Position" and expressed attitudes toward key questions of party renewal and the most acute and pressing problems of society's life. It was noted that collective work on the draft precongress documents helped to take into account the communists' diverse views and opinions and to enlist the supporters of various platforms within the CPSU in a creative process of forming a common position in the interests of party consolidation.

A fundamental question that the communists are raising in the course of the precongress debate is the political evaluation of the present situation in the country. No one denies that in its first 5 years perestroyka has brought about many positive changes in our life. It was the source, it was said at the conference, of democratic transformations in society and provided the impetus for a truthful, if painful, interpretation of the path traveled and the real problems of today. New organs of power have been democratically elected and have begun to operate, and a start has been made on creating a rule-of-law state. But we can no longer remain in the state of euphoria prompted by perestroyka's slogans, we must set clear goals and offer people scientifically substantiated ways of leading the country out of the crisis. Otherwise perestroyka increasingly becomes just another campaign. The support of Soviet people, the trust they invested at the beginning of the transformations began to melt away when the party's policy started to run aground on inconsistency, half-heartedness, and sluggishness in decision-making. As a result the outlines of perestroyka appeared vague, and vacillations to left and right only created the semblance of active movement, which was in fact illusory; the key questions—what kind of future society we want to see, what its economic basis and political structure should be, and so forth—have yet to be properly answered. A totally unjustified haste and a desire to set about everything at once are not infrequently seen in practical affairs. Much of what is begun is not taken to its conclusion.

The conference participants gave a searching analysis of the specific mistakes made in the course of perestroyka. In particular, the proclamation of perestroyka and acceleration simultaneously did not prove justified. This was spoken of, in particular, by conference delegate V.L. Pashchenko, general director of the "Frezer" Science and Production Association. The profound structural changes that were embarked upon were unable to produce rapid results; on the contrary, as a rule they temporarily retard growth in economic results. Yet people were given hopes of speedy changes for the better. When these did not materialize, the first major disappointment came. We also set about the conversion of military production without thinking through all the details. As a result the danger arose that our country's scientific and technological potential, which is very high by world standards, would be squandered on producing foldaway beds. The hangover from the so-called "struggle against drunkenness" proved serious. One-sided economic measures, including the transfer of enterprises to "defective" economic accountability models, failed to produce the desired results. Errors in the approach to the development of the cooperative system not only failed to help fill the market with goods and services, but actually exacerbated the situation in the sphere of monetary circulation. Attempts are still being made to paper over the cracks in the economy with the same old administrative edict measures.

There was sharp criticism of the party leadership at the conference. It was noted that at meetings and rayon conferences and in the course of the elections of delegates, communists spoke of the need for the congress to give an assessment of the activity of Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries and speak frankly both of the contribution by each of them to the cause of perestroyka and of his shortcomings and mistakes. At the same time the capital's communists stressed that we must not be like those politicians who do nothing but throw stones at the upper echelons of power. The gorkom report and the speeches of a number of delegates noted that the Moscow party organization has not always shown independence or formulated its own line, and has thereby failed to give the best possible assistance to the Central Committee. Basically the gorkom gave its uncritical, conformist agreement to the decisions adopted in recent years. The efficiency of the gorkom's actions is low because it lacks political will and organizational efforts to implement its own programs. New forms of collaboration with the soviets to resolve concrete problems of the city people's life have not been found. Links between party organizations and various social groups of Muscovites have grown weaker and the separation from the working class that has occurred is very worrying. The coordinating activity of Moscow Gorkom and the raykoms [rayon committees] is patently inadequate. This was manifested particularly clearly in the course of the election campaigns. The departure of more than 15,000 people from the CPSU's ranks in the first five months of this year, 50 percent more than in the whole of last year, is a direct reproach to the party committees.

Shortcomings in the work of the capital's party organizations were spoken of in the conference speeches by N.Ye. Kislova, first secretary of Sverdlovskiy CPSU Raykom; N.M. Pyatchits, worker at the ZIL plant; I.I. Melnikov, secretary of Moscow State University party committee; L.I. Gracheva, plasterers' team leader at the "Mosotdelstroy" Trust; B.N. Lebedev, chairman of the No. 1 Clocks and Watches Plant People's Control Committee; and other delegates. They lamented the weakening of communists' positions in the labor collectives and spoke of how the party is insufficiently consistent in upholding and defending the interests of both the working class and the intelligentsia, particularly in connection with the proclaimed transition to a market economy.

How can the labor collectives' economic initiative be released and how can the maximum possible be done to stimulate honest, highly efficient work by people and activeness and enterprise on their part, in the new conditions? These questions were discussed with profound interest at the conference.

Various strategies for economic and social development exist today. Some are oriented toward the creation of a sociopolitical system similar in its basic parameters to the developed capitalist countries. This is the path of denationalization of ownership of the means of production, utilization of hired labor, and full freedom of the market, including the labor and capital market. It is the path of reforms aimed at creating a classical parliamentary system, with its characteristic alienation of the majority of people from politics. In general, it is proposed to cancel out more than 70 years of the country's development and "tag along behind history." Not only the right to labor and other social gains, but even the state's independence are called into question. And there is no guarantee that after making its way painfully through all these new tests, society will achieve even something like the Swedish model of society.

The report expressed support for the concept associated with the radical renewal of socialism, which is capable of realizing the main panhuman values and ideals appropriate to our times, to the peculiarities of the country's historical development, and to human needs. The attraction of this path of development lies in the orientation toward social justice and protection of the working people and the social paramountcy of conscientious, highly skilled labor. We can also explain this choice in terms of the fact that the socialist idea has penetrated deep into the people's soul. And this must be reckoned with, since the wrecking of the established way of life will inevitably entail turbulent social explosions and upheavals. Reforms only lead to success when they are based on the people's traditions, when the unique characteristics of a society's development and culture are preserved, and when the reforms form part of a new historical spiral.

Indisputably, the problems of drastically increasing the efficiency of the national economy cannot be resolved today without introducing market relations. But something else is also quite clear—the proposed price increase has nothing at all to do with either the "plan" or the "market." Such measures, the delegates said, inevitably lead to an increase in speculation and the emergence of additional incentives for the black economy. In these conditions the switch to market relations could result in the establishment of a "black market" system. "Shock therapy" is unacceptable, it is necessary to ensure that the planned economy gradually "grows into" a market system.

We cannot but be concerned, it was stressed at the conference, that the country once again faces a choice without an alternative. Other possible versions of economic reform are for some reason simply being ignored. Critics of the government program are also not revealing their cards, proposing their own, supposedly painless, ways of making the transition to the market system, but without substantiating them. Yet we are talking about a radical restructuring of political and economic life in the country.

It is obvious that the transition to a regulated market will inevitably entail tough consequences for society, such as price increases, inflation, and partial unemployment. Naturally, this cannot be regarded with approval. In these conditions, public consent to unpopular measures is more necessary than ever before. The people must understand the nature of these measures and be convinced of the extreme necessity for them. Here public opinion should be prepared and people should be consulted prior to the announcement of measures. This was not done. As a result panic-buying hit the stores. The question of the transition to the market system, in the opinion of the conference participants, is so serious that it requires special consideration at the CPSU congress.

In the course of precongress debates the capital's communists put forward much of value for improving the party's organizational structure and statutory composition. On the basis of these proposals, the delegates stressed, the CPSU's nature could be changed, making it more democratic. But all these transformations in the party itself will be worth precisely nothing unless communists put forward a viable, up-to-date, attractive program for social development. The party can count on the masses' support only in the event that it comes to the defense of the working people's vital interests in the period of complex social clashes that the country is going through. In other words, the CPSU should become a party of social progress and reforms, with the goal of advancing toward democratic socialism, justice, and the protection of working people's interests. The ideological legacy of Marx and Lenin is the basic, but not the only, theoretical source of contemporary CPSU ideology, which faces a complex task—that of formulating a new concept of humane, democratic socialism and the communist future.

What is the CPSU's social base in modern conditions? This question was considered by keynote speaker Yu.A. Prokofyev and the speakers in the debates. It is clear that the CPSU is not a party of the whole people, because it cannot express the interests of those who are opposed to the country's socialist choice and preach national exclusivity and racial hostility and exploit other people's labor. These strata and groups are the social base of fundamentally different parties. The Communist Party was born as the party of the working class, and it is this class's interests that the CPSU upholds and will continue to uphold. But in present-day conditions the potential base of the renewed party is the broadest strata of society, strata that associate their fate with socialism in one way or another and are in favor of social justice, fundamental human rights, and the growth of the role of moral and spiritual values. In its policy the party should devote particular attention to the needs and concerns of the least well protected strata of the population—pensioners, students, and large families. It was noted at the conference that the working class, the peasantry, and the labor intelligentsia need protection.

The report and the delegates' speeches devoted particular attention to the formation of the party's ranks. The delegates came out in favor of simplifying the admission procedure: abandoning the probationary stage as candidate member and the institution of sponsors, and giving the primary organizations the right to take the final decision on questions of admissions. As meetings at the delegates' club on the eve of the conference showed, the majority of communists support these proposals, which are stipulated in the draft new CPSU Statutes.

The party should be open to all who share its program goals and are prepared to fulfill the requirements of the Statutes. The question of leaving the party should also be resolved freely and without hindrance. Delegates believe that a reregistration of CPSU members and an exchange of party cards could and should be carried out on the basis of these principles immediately after the 28th CPSU Congress.

As a party of progress, social justice, and protection of working people's interests, the CPSU cannot confine its activity to within the narrow framework of parliamentarianism. Its functions are far wider, and include program, political, ideological, and organizational activity.

Heated disputes are currently under way about the expediency and validity of the existence of party organizations in production. In order to weaken the party, the idea of abolishing party cells in the labor collectives is being pushed. Events in Eastern Europe allow us to judge how tragically this could turn out for the party. Therefore the production principle of party building must be defended, and that includes legislative support. What is another matter is that the party organization must not be "built into" the production system and should not be a mere appendage to the administration, but should engage in political work. More active work must be done in neighborhoods, as is also indicated by the perceptible losses in the elections.

On the first day of the conference problems of the party's collaboration with trade unions and youth organizations and the work of communists in the army and organs of law and order held an important place. The task was set of devoting more attention to the development of women's and youth organizations, aid to pensioners, war and labor veterans, and disabled people, and collaboration with other political parties and movements.

People spoke with particular concern about the situation that has developed in Moscow City Soviet. The conference delegates are worried about the mood that has become apparent among some of the Moscow deputies, where attention is focused not on improving the lives of the city people, but on a kind of contest with the CPSU gorkom. Yet the subject of the conflicts often turns out to be a problem that can easily be resolved in accordance with legislation, through direct, first-hand contacts. Delegates consider it expedient particularly to discuss the question of the parliamentary activity of the Moscow City Party Organization.

Polemics have arisen over the permissibility of factional activity in the party. The majority of speakers put it like this: In the conditions of a multiparty system and constitutional freedom of political convictions, parties within a party are hardly necessary. And the formation of factions should be regarded as an attempt to split the party, as a serious crisis within it. But there were also other views; in particular V.N. Shostakovskiy came out in favor of the validity of forming factions in the conditions of the diversity of views on the processes of party reform. At the same time he called for civil consensus.

Many participants in the debate at the conference touched on questions of CPSU finances and property. This question, as is well known, is prompting heated debates in society. And there is much political speculation over it and anticommunist sentiments are fanned on this basis. The CPSU, like other social organizations, had and still has property of its own, which was created by generations of communists. The party does not lay claim to what does not belong to it, but in accordance with the norms of a rule-of-law state, it is also entitled to the protection of its property. That applies to the buildings, premises, publishing houses, newspapers and journals, and other property belonging to the party.

The majority of Moscow's communists advocate the formation of a Russian Communist Party. One argument in favor of creating it is the multiparty system that is developing in the republic in practice. An RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party, Moscow's communists are convinced, will make it possible to pool efforts in the struggle for Russia's sovereignty and the development of the economy and culture of its peoples. The party's political task and program of activity should be the struggle to eliminate historical injustice with regard to the biggest republic.

The proclamation of the Communist Party of Russia should take place at the conference in Moscow, which, many delegates believe, must be given the status of a constituent congress. It was stressed that the formation of a republic Communist Party does not represent opposition to the CPSU, on the contrary, it arises from the desire to preserve its healthy nucleus, which adheres to the platform of perestroyka.

What do Moscow's communists expect from the 28th CPSU Congress? First and foremost an honest, uncompromising analysis of the causes of the crisis in society and a principled, objective political evaluation of the existing situation and the actions of the party leadership both in the period of stagnation and in the years of perestroyka. The conference delegates came out in favor of the radical renewal of the party's leading organs. The formulation of a realistic program for emerging from the crisis is also expected from the congress. This should be a prop for communists in their difficult struggle to revive the party's prestige.

Moscow's communists believe in the possibility of self-renewal by the CPSU and its ability to become a party of progress and reforms, a party of social justice and protection of the working people.

Today the conference will continue its work.

More on Conference

PM1106092790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Roundup of PRAVDA correspondent and TASS reports: "Party Conferences Held"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—The 28th Moscow Oblast CPSU Organization Conference opened yesterday. The agenda included a discussion of the organization's work in the precongress period, a summing up of the debate on the draft CPSU Platform and Statutes, and the elaboration of the position of the Moscow Oblast Communists' delegation to the upcoming CPSU congress. It was decided to postpone the report of the obkom [oblast party committee] and the election of the new composition of Moscow Obkom's leading organs until the second stage of the conference—after the congress. V.K. Mesyats, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Obkom, delivered the report.

The discussion of the report developed into a sharp and principled discussion of communists' responsibility for the destinies of the party, the people, and the state. Ways to overcome the crisis in society were at the center of attention. Communists are alarmed at the leniency toward liquidationist, splittist trends, at the "trench" tactics of committees, and at the timidity in countering slanderous attacks on the party.

Many delegates assess the present situation in the CPSU not as a general crisis of the party but, above all, as a crisis of the party leadership, and they are opposed to attempts to "extend" responsibility for the mistakes of specific individuals to the entire party and to communist ideology. Proposals were advanced to nominate candidacies for members of the new CPSU Central Committee before the start of the congress—from party districts.

Ye.S. Stroyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is participating in the work of the conference of Moscow Oblast Communists. [passage omitted]

New Moscow Patriarch Gives News Conference

LD1206160290 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 12 TASS—Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksiy the Second met Soviet and foreign journalists today. This was his first meeting with the press and took place in the St. Daniel monastery, the official residence of the Moscow patriarch and the holy synod.

Also present were Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuriev, chairman of the Publishing Department of the Moscow patriarchate, and Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, chairman of the Church External Relations Department of the Moscow patriarchate.

Patriarch Aleksiy the Second summed up the results of the recent meeting of the church council of the Russian Orthodox Church and its documents. He said that the Russian Orthodox Church would base its activities on the council principle at all levels, including the life of diocesis and parishes.

The church will also engage in educational activities. It will train the staff for newly-opened churches and educate believers in the spirit of mercy and charity, teach them to do good and help and console ill people and those who are in trouble.

Patriarch Aleksiy the Second said that the Russian Orthodox Church would continue cooperating with local orthodox churches and also other religions. It will participate in the work of world and regional religious organisations and in the solution of international problems facing Christians and representatives of other religions.

Aleksiy stressed that the Russian Orthodox Church had great experience in external peace activities and added that it is necessary to pay attention to its peaceful activities at home.

The patriarch expressed concern about the attempts of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad to split the church by spreading its jurisdiction to the parishes of the Moscow patriarchate in the Soviet Union. He expressed regret over these attempts and said that the Russian Orthodox Church regarded these attempts as a sad fact.

Commenting on the recently-published bill on the freedom of conscience and religious organisations, Aleksiy said that the church council would like to introduce several amendments to it. For instance, he stressed the need to grant the right of a juridical person to the whole church and not its separate structures.

After the news conference, Patriarch Aleksiy visited the Assumption Cathedral in the Moscow Kremlin to worship sacred things.

Leningrad Oblast To Hold Extraordinary Conference

LD2606204390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] The results of the first stage of the founding congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] were discussed at a plenum of Leningrad Oblast CPSU committee today. Communists stressed the need to define the role and place of the Leningrad party organization in the RSFSR Communist Party. It was decided to examine these matters and the progress of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress at an extraordinary party conference of the communists of the city and oblast, which is to be held on 28 June. Candidates for the central bodies of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party will be elected at the conference.

Leningrad's Popov Interviewed on Market Reform

LD1006193190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1908 GMT 8 Jun 90

[Interview with Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, to Volodya Molchanov; from the "View" program]

[Excerpts] [Molchanov] Our guest on the program is Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov, USSR People's Deputy and the present Moscow mayor—chairman of the Moscow City Soviet. [passage omitted] How long have you been mayor now?

[Popov] Over a month now.

[Molchanov] Yes, over a month. Can you draw any conclusions yet?

[Popov] Yes, of course—you can reach certain conclusions in any period. [passage omitted]

I am profoundly convinced that your Supreme Soviet [Molchanov is an RSFSR deputy] and the country's Supreme Soviet should discuss the issue of fully nationalizing CPSU property. It is not a question of how the CPSU should carry on. What is at issue is property in the possession of a party that has not met its obligations to the people and the country. If that is the case, a perfectly basic question arises. I am an economist. What does a man do who cannot honor his debts or his promises? His property is taken away and confiscated. If we confiscate all this property, it will provide the assets, on the basis of which we shall be able to create a multiparty system. But if, as now, we're going to have to battle over every newspaper with every oblast and rayon CPSU committee, then...

[Molchanov] We means who exactly, Gavriil Kharitonovich?

[Popov] I refer to the soviets which want to have something now. How will you deal with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in the days to come? I can tell you what will happen. They'll tell you the paper belongs to the CPSU, and they'll cross out the names of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers.

[Molchanov] I see what you mean. We must set up our own new paper then.

[Popov] Why must you automatically have to set up your own paper?

[Molchanov] There's one simple reason...

[Popov; interrupting] You have the newsprint, the building, and everything else. Or are our people so well-off at the moment that they can leave all the existing assets to the party apparatus and allocate additional resources from their paltry remaining funds for new parties and new papers? No, I think we must take what exists at the moment.

[Molchanov] I see, I see. Gavriil Kharitonovich, we invited you here and we were pleased you agreed to come because the way the Moscow City Soviet has begun to act—I have in mind the introduction of a passport system [in shops]— has had a very serious impact not only in Moscow, Moscow Oblast and the environs of Moscow, but also in the country as a whole. I must tell you—I don't know if you were watching or not—that your deputy, Sergey Stankevich, was literally driven off the rostrum when he came to our Congress of People's Deputies to talk about the idea, and so on and so forth. [passage omitted] What I want to ask is, what was being proposed by the people who were dead set against you daring to introduce a passport system or other restrictions?

[Popov] You know, Volodya, you have started the discussion in the same way as these people. They begin the discussion with the introduction of a passport system in Moscow. But the discussion has to be started not with the introduction of the passport system in Moscow, but from the government report. Until we find the right point of departure in this discussion, we won't understand the subsequent measures. If the Moscow City Soviet convened and suddenly got the idea of imposing a passport system, it would be acting undemocratically. It all happened differently, as you will well remember.

Moscow was the last city which held out by inertia, with harassed Muscovites standing in endless lines, unable to buy a thing, staring at empty shelves. They put up with it despite the fact that other towns had had coupons and allocations and so on, for years. These were the same oblasts that protested, as you will recall. What finally pushed us over the edge was the government report on its program of proposed measures. I think that people in Moscow are reasonably responsible. The mere fact that they would have to forgo something and that prices would go up was not the final blow for them. They realize that the present situation in the country is difficult and everyone has to make some sacrifices.

I believe the decisive factor was not the actual announcement about price rises, but all the accompanying elements—the complete hopelessness on other matters. When, on the one hand, you tell someone that he has to do without something, and, on the other, you don't give him any explanation of what he can do, how he is to live, how he can extricate himself from the situation. Well, the program, after all, lacked the essential point—would property be placed in people's hands or not, would the peasants get land, would the labor collectives get the factories and shops? If this issue had been resolved, you could have said: The situation in the country is very difficult, the going will get tough, but I'm going to put in your hands the tools and the machines—take them, get down to work and achieve something. I think we would have coped then. We would have endured and coped. That's what was missing.

The second thing that was lacking was what we've already mentioned. How can you expect a market economy and the free competition of enterprises to be organized by enterprises at which party organizations remain as the controlling administrative bodies, so to speak? What sort of competition and market would it be? I could go on and on. But you will know what I mean.

Now for the passport system itself. It seemed to me, and I was profoundly convinced of this, that if we had not adopted this decision on that day and on that evening, the following day we would not have managed to get to our council chamber. That was the situation in Moscow. Those who are currently talking about the situation from a theoretical point of view have a poor understanding of what was happening in Moscow factories, in labor collectives, and so on, at the time. We realized what we are letting ourselves in for. It was a complete counsel of despair—quite definitely so. It ran counter to our beliefs. It ran counter to moral considerations. But we adopted this option. As you wil recall, we adopted it for a two-week period. We have now got a fairly good idea of...

[Machanov] Until the 10th?

[Popov] Yes, the period ends the 10th. But I think we've got on top of the situation. Why? Because we won time, and we halted the panic buying which was taking place. If it had continued for another couple of days, Moscow would have been stripped of its reserves for months to come. We came out on top. The people believed in us, you understand. And now, comrades—this is the most important point. You asked what are we proposing. There was a conference held by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Dozens of oblasts surrounding Moscow were represented. What did I say there? I said that what was involved was a system that had evolved over decades. What have we turned our city into? We have turned our city into a vast distribution center. Goods are semiforcibly collected from the whole country and brought here, and then everyone travels here for their goods, they take something and go back to their homes again. This humiliates us. We are told that we consume 160 kg of meat per year. Do you consume 160 kg of meat a year?

[Molchanov] More like 16!

[Popov] We are told that of these 160, 70 are allegedly dispersed around the country, and so we consume 90 kg. So it just isn't like that.

It is humiliating to live in a country where an artificial system has been foisted on us in which we have become symbols of this mechanism. So it needed to be ended. It would have had to be ended sooner or later. I'll return to the conference at which this issue was discussed. Look—almost 30 surrounding oblasts attended. They all said the same thing—that they had to buy certain things in Moscow.

A second question then arose. We can't carry on as we are—we have to change things. What changes were proposed? That is the most interesting thing. We proposed the following option, and we are now pursuing it. Following the end of the 10-day [as heard] period we shall preserve the right for all visitors to Moscow to buy food without producing their passports, so long as it falls within the personal daily consumption ration. There's no secret about it—it is the minimum, normal level for a person to live on. We are making every Sunday available for unrestricted shopping for all visitors, and last Sunday we even asked Muscovites not to do any major shopping then, and we are increasing the amounts that can be sold to a single person. We understand what the lives of people who live in surrounding oblasts are like. Finally, the third point is that after the 10th we shall be compelled to continue sales to Muscovites—but in place of passports we shall introduce special ID passes [vizitki]. We have no other option.

[Molchanov] You were talking about the ministries, that two capitals are concentrated here. There is a basic question, whether to transfer the capital of the union somewhere else, let's say, Nizhniy Novgorod, or Leningrad, where the revolution began—it's a revolutionary city.

[Popov] You have asked a very interesting question. I think that if we do create a normal confederation and there is a union treaty, then one of the points in this union treaty will be the question of the capital. If I were in the place of the union republic, I would categorically object to the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being in one of the major republics. By the logic of things, so to speak, it should be something like the federal District of Columbia, as in the United States, not under anybody's administration, so to speak, or at any rate, not in the biggest republic. As far as Moscow is concerned, for me it is, has been, and will be the capital of Russia itself, and on that issue I would not make any concessions under any conditions.

[Molchanov] What about the people who drive around Moscow in the black cars—when the passport system was brought in, did they drive to the shops with their passports?

[Popov] Now you have asked a different question!

[Molchanov] RSFSR People's Deputy Aleksandr (?Britkovskiy) is asking: Were privileges preserved following the introduction of the passport system in Moscow?

[Popov] I can say this. You have asked a perfectly justified question, and I can say that they did not go to the shops before, either. Neither before the passport system, nor afterwards. Why? Because several other systems of distribution have formed apart from the shops. An interesting merging process has occured here. On the one hand, food orders are distributed to enterprises, labor collectives, and so on, and that, as it were, gives the right to distribute orders to ministries, to rayon party committees, in the Central Committee apparatus, and so on and so forth. But as you can understand, these are quite different compartments, if you can put it that way, concerning their contents. For that reason, when adopting our decisions on what to do in future, we are making several interesting decisions. They will be difficult for us to implement, but we will try. The first decision is that we will implement supplies of food products to cafeteries of ministries and other establishments according to standardized norms and norms of individual consumption depending on how many people work there. that is the first thing. The second thing we want to do is to stop supply to them of prepacked meat, for example. What is it for? A cafeteria gets meat.

[Molchanov] It is convenient to take away (?for your meal).

[Popov] Well, Volodya, for whom is it convenient? So, to be brief, all this is not simple. But on the other hand, there exists this system of orders for resale at enterprises. We have spent a long time analyzing, and we came to an unexpected conclusion—unexpected, but in general we will also have to [words indistinct] Who benefits from it at the moment? According to the form of it, it would seem to be the workers, who can buy things at the workplace. But in practice, I have here two bundles of telegrams. What do they say? All of them are the same, they are from trade union organizations. The trade unions protest against our still unimplemented intention—we have not yet cancelled one food order- -the trade unions protest that we want to cancel these orders.

So I sit and think, things are much worse. You understand, the Moscow Soviet deals with organization of trade, and there is also the trade administration. We calculate all these stocks and reserves, we regulate things, and so on. But the orders are distributed by the director, the trade union committee, the labor collective's council and the party buro. And these orders which today go to the Moscow labor collectives are the last lever with which all these organizations hold on to power. I am absolutely convinced that if tomorrow these orders were no longer in their hands, I don't know who would stay in this trade union. So I have formed a firm impression, and I think the Moscow Soviet deputies will back me up on this, that the orders have to exist, because people need help, but they should be distributed according to place of residence. Let there be a deputies' commission, or rayon deputies, and so on, and let them deal with this.

But the main question you raised, Volodya, is nevertheless what to do in future, and this is still not the solution. I consider that the solution is not contained in the government's program, and I do not consider that the solution is in the system which we will be sticking to temporarily. So we have set ourselves the date of September to try and put to a vote of Muscovites a referendum on the question of several possible options for solving the problem. Of these options, two are traditional, it is not difficult for you to guess that they are rationing and the cards that we have, but there is also an option which seems very important to us for the future and for reflection. We propose that we might adopt the following system. The first thing to do is to carry out a total removal of trading from state hands. The shops should come into the hands of families, collectives, and so on. The second thing that must be done is that trade in shops must be allowed according to market, commercial prices, because we will not move toward a market otherwise. These two parts, removal of trade from state hands and trade according to market prices are purely classical. But we know that a classical market will not work here, we have to give people protection, our life is too complicated.

I consider protecting people through monetary compensation, as the government currently proposes, an unrealistic step. Why? Because what I think they are about to do, if I may make some suppositions, is that they will try to raise prices for bread and flour products from 1 July, and give 100 percent compensation for those goods. Comrade Yanayev, a very subtle person, has even suggested raising compensation in July above 100 percent, maybe it will be 105 percent. Why is that necessary? So as after a certain time to raise everything without any compensation, with a loss, so that people will have reconciled themselves to the fact of rising prices. So a two-stage step will be made. People will swallow the first price increase with 100 percent compensation, or 105 percent according to Yanayev, but later the process will be quite different. So monetary compensation is not the step.

The second option ensures guaranteed provision through cards or rationing.

Finally, there is the third option, as I have already said, and which I find most attractive. Look here, if we start paying part of a person's wages in what we might call hard rubles—for example, each of us receives for each member of our family 30 hard rubles, and we keep the old, hard prices for these rubles. Then there will be both commercial prices and hard ones, and these rubles guarantee us the minimum basket which will allow us to survive for a certain period.

[Molchanov] So we would have wooden rubles and hard ones, too?

[Popov] These hard ones could later be extended, because there will be some prospects, they will begin to gain in proportion as things improve.

[Molchanov] May heaven let these nevertheless more theoretical suppositions be turned into real products and real improvement of life!

[Popov] All that depends on us!

[Molchanov] I invite you to join us then, when we get there.

Gidaspov Views Leningrad Party Reorganization

LD2505110290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 May 90

[Text] At the press center of the Leningrad Communist Party Oblast Committee today, the new obkom secretaries have met journalists. What are now the concerns of the leaders of the oblast party committee, and what is the main thing in the work of the secretariat and the bureau? This is the question, that our correspondent Matvey Frolov addressed to Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee.

[Begin Gidaspov recording] Now the oblast party committee is, of course, going through a complex period in its activity. We are now reorganizing ourselves to get ready to work in conditions of a multiparty system and to get ready for new work with the Leningrad City Soviet, for new work and for a new system of interaction with the center. These are quite complex matters. Therefore, we are now engaged in thoroughly thinking through the structure and in selecting people. It is important to stress that unlike previous years, this work has been carried not in the office of first secretary or in the office of the second secretary, as it used to be the case. All this has been carried out by public commissions selected from among the communists who were conference participants, and members of the oblast party committee.

Compared with 1988, the oblast party committee staff has been halved. The most fundamental difference is that the party apparatus is now an executive body in relation to the oblast party committee. It is headed by the commissions staffed from people who are not staff members of the oblast party committee. These are the most diverse people from the most diverse backgrounds—engineers, scientists, workers and peasants. All sorts can be found there. Every commission draws up its work plan and it sets tasks for the administrative apparatus. To a greater extent, we are now paying attention to ideological provision, to the working out of forecasts, and to our policy on the basis of the forecasts.

We will have to change our work both with local soviet organizations and with public political movements which are gathering strength. We must think over the ways in which we will cooperate with them; we are ready for cooperation. The oblast committee has undergone a great renewal; 80 percent of the oblast party committee membership has no doubt been renewed. I have not counted, of course, 80 percent or more.

The bureau has changed very substantially. As a matter of fact, our bureau staff are now completely new. Absolutely new people, a considerable proportion of whom have little knowledge of party work have joined. However, they are intelligent people who will enable us to work out very correct decisions.

The secretariat has also undergone very great changes. Those left from the old secretaries are in fact just me with my nine months experience and Anatoliy Vasilyevich Pavlov. All the other secretaries are new. We still have two secretaries who have not been elected. We think that in the process of our discussion of the oblast party committee structure, we will perhaps be able to reduce the number of the secretaries even more. So, you see the processes are underway here, and they are proceeding forcefully.

Admittedly, a large group of young capable people have been involved in the work in the oblast party committee. For example, at the latest bureau meeting, we have confirmed in the post of a departmental instructor someone who completed a post graduate course in the GDR, and defended his thesis there. We are expecting another similar comrade to join our ranks. Many people from science and production are joining, that is people who really know life from the inside. That is very important, I believe, for the oblast party committee. That is what constitutes the point of our short-term activity.

Leningrad Foreseen as 'World Cultural Center'

LD2606131990 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kondratenko]

[Text] Leningrad June 26 TASS—Chairman of the Leningrad Municipal Council Anatoliy Sobchak wants his city to become a world cultural centre, with a flourishing economy, where free enterprise thrives, and attract tourists from all over the world.

In a TASS interview, Sobchak said the time has come to restore the grandeur and beauty of the former northern capital of Russia and make them serve people's benefit.

"Peter the Great, who founded St. Petersburg, opened an outlet to Europe. We intend to open a door to the world," he said.

Sobchak believes that the city should earn funds needed to resolve its problems. One way to achieve this is to turn Leningrad into a free economic zone.

"When we are given the right to create the zone, all the enterprises in the city will be municipally controlled (most industrial firms are now under control of Union or republican ministries)," the chairman of the City Council said.

"Independent producers of goods will thus emerge. We shall be given free hands and will be able to use our resources more efficiently."

"Even if there is no such permission from the centre, we can settle the problem at a republican level. In the framework of existing laws we can take certain steps already. The law on land comes into effect in July 1. The City Council will be the only lawful land-user. Striking an agreement with it on the use of land, enterprises and organisations will have to accept its terms as regards environmental protection, transportation, housing construction and social development."

Sobchak also favours Leningrad's participation in the Baltic market and in direct contacts with other regions. Asked if this step can be regarded as a political demarche in connection with the situation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, he said: "no demarches at all. The governments of these republics addressed us with a proposal to establish business relations, and we do not see any reason to reject it. These relations suit the purposes of a free economic zone. The Baltic market will enable us to try out a model of new relations within the union in conditions of a market economy."

The chairman of the Leningrad City Council is against state monopolism and favours the simultaneous existance of various kinds of property, including private property. The privatisation of trade enterprises has already begun in Leningrad. They are either leased or sold to private owners, he said. In future this process might apply to industry.

The new city council inherited a multitude of unsolved problems—deteriorating ecological conditions, a housing shortage, bad roads, a collapsing infrastructure, a lag in culture and tourism. Vast funds are needed to resolve these problems. Sobchak stressed that the City Council does not intend to plead with the centre for these funds. They can be provided by business cooperation with foreign partners, through the institution of a Leningrad shipping company, conversion of military enterprises to civilian uses and creating conditions to attract foreign investments.

Kalinin Oblast First Secretary Elected

PM1106103990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Jun 90 Single Edition p 8

[TASS report under general heading: "Party Conferences Held"]

[Text] Kalinin—An oblast party conference has discussed the drafts of the CPSU Central Commitee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and the CPSU Statutes and the oblast party organization's stance toward the congress. The conference examined an organizational question. As a result of a vote A.I. Ilenkov—deputy chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee—was elected first secretary of the CPSU oblast committee.

Kalinin City, Oblast To Be Renamed Tver

LD2706124590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1118 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Kalinin, 27 Jun (TASS)—A session of the Kalinin City Soviet has adopted a decision to return to the city of Kalinin the historical name of Tver. A session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies agreed with this decision today. It decided also to rename the Kalinin Oblast as the Tverskaya Oblast.

The oblast soviet presidium has been instructed to present to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet documents for renaming the city and the oblast in the prescribed manner.

Dagestan Experiencing Increase in Mosques

PM2806095590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Ali Kazikhanov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Shortage of Cadres"]

[Text] Makhachkala—A madrasah has opened in Makhachkala under the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Dagestan.

"The republic is experiencing a religious boom," M. Suleymanov, representative of the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Council for Religious Affairs, said. "Until last year there were 17 active mosques here, now there are 137. We have received the documents for the registration of a further 50 mosques. Of course, this sharp increase in their number has created a new problem—cadres: There is a shortage of professional, qualified clergy. The newly opened madrasah, with room for 100 students, will help to resolve that question."

New Smolensk Oblast Party Chief Elected

LD2706102890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Summary] At the recent Smolensk Oblast party conference Victor Sergeyevich Samorodskiy was elected first secretary. He is a native of Smolensk, 50 years old, candidate of economic sciences, and a party official since 1974.

Karachay Urges Restoration of Autonomous Republic

PM1306134590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Correspondent Valeriy Oliyanchuk report under the rubric "Direct Link": "Karachay People's Appeal"]

[Text] Cherkessk—The second congress of Karachay peoples has adopted a resolution on the restoration of autonomy.

The first such congress was held last October, when the "Dzhamagat" society for the promotion of perestroyka was entrusted with taking vigorous actions to restore the Karachay people's right to autonomy. In 1943 they were subjected to repression and moved from their homes to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. The Karachay Autonomous Republic ceased to exist at that time. The return of the people, who had lost many fellow countrymen on the way into exile and in exile itself, was legitimated after Stalin's death by the creation of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast.

The congress of Karachay peoples has now asked the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet to resolve the question of restoring the Karachay Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR.

Norilsk Uses Computers To Monitor Services

PM1406134190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Newscaster] We've kind of gotten used to our municipal services coming up with all sorts of stories to excuse their inefficiency. Most often it's either too early a fall or too severe a winter that's to blame. Our correspondent in Norilsk believes that this city has thought seriously about how to organize its work in this area.

[Reporter] Here on the 69th parallel, the thaw is only just starting. But even at this time of the year frosts can hit and snowstorms set in. Until mid-June, when diagnostic, major, current, and other overhauls of heat and water supply systems are fully under way in Murmansk and Magadan, the boilers are in continual operation in Norilsk. And the municipal service workers have just two months left before the next winter season starts. It is exceptionally important for them to know the state of affairs in the heat and electric networks in all sectors of this large and complex urban economy. This year they are being helped by computers.

[S.P. Rokhimov, chief engineer at the "Norilskbyt" Association] Using the display stations we monitor the parameters of heat and water supplies every day and the way in which sanitary and technical requirements are being met on behalf of the residents of the towns of the Norilsk industrial area. But it must be said that this stage is already over. Currently we're installing personal computers in our subunits. This will allow us to monitor the technical condition of every apartment in the Norilsk industrial area, to implement clearly planned current and major overhauls and—as a result—to sharply reduce the number of complaints from the residents of our towns.

[Reporter] But the computers not only provide exhaustive information on the state of heat and water supplies and the housing stock. They can also tell you the waiting lists for kindergartens and creches, how many available places they have, and the state of affairs regarding repairs to the network of sociocultural and consumer facilities. They can monitor and control the progress of the work.

Antinuclear Demonstration in Saratov Oblast

LD2406141490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] A protest against the construction of phase two of the atomic power station is continuing in the town of Balakovo in Saratov Oblast. This protest began on 1 June on the initiative of the Greens' Movement. A city of tents has appeared along the road leading to the AES [nuclear electric power station], and pickets have been stationed there. Another ecological rally is to be held on the town's central square. The demands include a halt to the construction of the fifth and sixth power sets, and that a thorough ecological and technical expert examination be carried out at the operational station.

Data on Drug-Related Crime in RSFSR Noted

LD2706181490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] According to a report from the INTERFAX agency, approximately 13,000-14,000 crimes connected with the sale, distribution, and use of narcotics are registered in Russia annually. However, in the opinion of (Vatko), head of the chief directorate of criminal investigation of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialsit Republic, only one in three or four crimes connected with drug abuse is brought to light. He also reported that there are 50,000 drug addicts registered in the Russian Federation.

Health Workers Join Independent Trade Union Body

PM0706143590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Jun 90 Single Edition p 8

[TASS correspondent report: "The Federation Extends its Ranks"]

[Text] The Russian Health Workers Union Central Committee, which was formed 6 June, adopted a decision on behalf of the 4 million members of this association on joining the Federation of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Independent Trade Unions [FRITU]. The workers in this sector see the new trade union center as an ally in the resolution of their difficult problems.

The federation was established at the end of March at its congress and soon after, in April, regional trade union organizations from Yakutsk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Kalinin and Smolensk Oblasts, and the RSFSR Detective Services Workers Independent

Trade Union Central Committee, became its first members. So far another 24 kray and oblast trade union councils, four republic sectorial committees, and a whole series of mid-level trade union associations have also announced their decision to join the FRITU.

"Of course, the constituent congress had a right to declare all the Russian trade union organizations members of the FRITU. This would not have contradicted the Statute of USSR Trade Unions that currently in force," A. Dolgorybin, chief of the federation's organizational department, said. "However, if the congress had taken such a decision, it would have been meaningless to seriously talk about perestroyka in the trade unions. After all, the principle of democratic centralism—and this has been confirmed in practice—contradicts the very nature of professional unions. If we do not dismantle the unwieldy hierarchical structure, we will not take a single step forward. Therefore, the founders did not agree with an automatic approach in forming the FRITU, but advocated that unions should join and leave the federation on a strictly voluntary basis.

As is known, the constituent congress has suspended its work for six months. An discussion of the fundamental documents of this forum is now going on in labor collectives and at primary organization level.

Far East People, Navy Confrontation Reported

OW1706020990 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Text] For the first time in the Soviet Union, a confrontation has developed in the Soviet Far East between the local populace and the Navy. This is a protest by the local populace, which began after the local newspaper (?VOTKHOD) reported that a military-related [word indistinct] plans to designate a bay in the vicinity of Sovetskaya Gavin City and Vanino Village as a site for dismantling a nuclear-powered submarine. It has been decided to scrap the submarine.

The local residents who took part in the antibase protest pressed the commander of the local Coast Guard unit into stopping the execution of the order of the Pacific Fleet command concerning the dismantling of the submarine.

Comparison on Ligachev at 20 Jun Russian Congress

PM2706131590

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian on 22 June 1990 carries in its Single Edition on page 3, as part of the stenographic account of proceedings at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Congress; the speech by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered at the 20 June evening sitting of the congress. Comparison of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA item, carried under the general heading "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Whole Country,'" with the translation of the Moscow TV version published in the 21 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT beginning on page 88, reveals the following variations:

Page 89, column one, third full paragraph, second sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...and its principal directions, are correct. And... (replacing "delegations" with "directions");

Page 89, column one, fourth full paragraph, penultimate sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...Marxist-Leninist positions and the platform of scientific socialism. (rewording);

Page 89, column two, first full paragraph, sentence seven, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...demanded that the "progressive part" of the Politburo, as they put... (omitting phrase and adding quotation marks);

Page 89, column two, fourth full paragraph, second sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...often, not without satisfaction, have said... (omitting "deep");

Page 90, column one, first full paragraph, fifth sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...imperialism have grown stronger. The question... (omitting "incredibly");

Page 90, column one, second full paragraph, sixth sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...retreated from it. One cannot lead... (omitting sentence, picking up eighth sentence);

Page 90, column one, fourth full paragraph, last sentence , SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...nothing other than "curtailed democracy." [new graf]

Extremist groups are... (adding quotation marks);

Page 90, column two, first full paragraph, sixth sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...began to receive fewer resources and machinery... (rewording);

Page 90, column two, second full paragraph, fifth sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...for the countryside. There must be major—if not to say greater—capital investment. I have spoken... (rewording);

Page 90, column two, third full paragraph, last sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...my firm position. (Applause) (adding "(Applause)" and omitting last three paragraphs).

Western Republics

Reportage on Ukrainian Oblasts Party Conferences

29 May Report

90UN2151A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
29 May 90 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "Oblast Party Conferences"]

[Text] Khmelnitskiy—Delegates to the oblast party conference that took place here discussed the reports of the obkom [oblast party committee] and auditing commission, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and CPSU Rules, and program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

At the conference V.I. Kupratyy, who had worked previously as the second secretary, was elected party obkom first secretary on a contested basis.

I.G. Grintsov, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, took part in the work of the conference and made a speech.

Vinnitsa—A conference of the oblast party organization has been held here. Reports on the work of the party obkom and the draft program documents for 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were heard and discussed, and leading organs were elected for the oblast party organization.

A.P. Nekhayevskiy was elected party obkom first secretary.

Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were elected at the conference. Candidates from the oblast party organization were nominated for posts in the leading organs of the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party.

V.M. Gayevoy, chairman of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Commission, and V.F. Gudnev, official organizer in the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadres Work Department, took part in the work of the conference.

Zhitomir—At the recent oblast party conference here the delegates discussed the reports on the work of the party obkom and the auditing commission. Elections were held for the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

The conference elected a new party obkom. V.G. Fedorov was reelected to the post of obkom first secretary.

A.S. Statinov, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, took part in the work and spoke at the conference.

Poltava—The party obkom report, the main directions in the activity of the oblast party organization at the present stage, and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and CPSU Rules were discussed here at an oblast party conference. Those present confirmed the results of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and they elected the leading organs for the oblast party organization. A.S. Myakot won a majority of the votes in a contested ballot and was reelected to the post of party obkom first secretary.

The conference delegates sent a telegram to the session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet in which they condemned the provocative and unlawful actions of extremist and nationalist elements that have provoked the public to unauthorized meetings in connection with the anniversary of the birthday of S. Petlora.

V.D. Kryuchkov, candidate member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Defense Industry Department, took part in the work of the conference.

Lugansk—An oblast accountability-and-election party conference has taken place here, at which reports were heard from the party obkom and the auditing commission, together with the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for 28th CPSU Congress and CPSU Rules, and the program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

New leading organs were elected for the oblast party organization. A.I. Onishchenko, who worked previously as first secretary of the Krasnoluch party city committee [gorkom] was elected to the post of party obkom first secretary on a contested basis.

B.V. Kachura, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, took part in the work of and spoke at the conference.

Nikolayev—An organizational matter was reviewed at the recent accountability-and-election conference that took place here. I.T. Gritsay, who worked previously as chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, was elected to the post of first secretary of the Nikolayev Party Obkom on a contested basis.

Yu.N. Yelchenko, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, took part in the work of the conference.

Lutsk—The report of the party obkom and the program documents for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were discussed at an oblast party conference held here. Those present elected delegates for the party congresses and named candidates for the top elected party organs, and also elected new leading organs for the oblast party organization. V.I. Blazhenchuk, who worked previously as second secretary and is the chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, was elected first secretary of the party obkom.

L.M. Kravchuk, candidate member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, and official organizers from the CPSU Central Committee and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee party building and cadres work departments, took part in the work of the conference.

Donetsk—The 25th Conference of the Donetsk Oblast party organization continued its work here. Those present took under advisement information from the oblast election commission on the results of elections that took place in the party okrugs to choose delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. Delegates were elected to the vacant positions.

A decision was adopted to agree with proposals from the primary party organizations concerning the recommendations of communists from the oblast party organization for posts in the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee Central Auditing Commission, and also for the leading organs of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Conference delegates heard and discussed a report "On the Precongress Debate in the Oblast Party Organizations and the Main Provisions in the Position of the Donetsk Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress," presented by Donetsk Party Obkom First Secretary Ye.V. Mironov.

In accordance with a decision adopted in April during the first stage of the conference, the powers of its delegates were extended until the end of the 28th CPSU Congress. In this connection the conference again interrupted its work; the concluding meeting will be held after the 28th CPSU Congress.

A.P. Savchenko, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Socioeconomic Department, took part in the work of the conference.

Ivano-Frankovsk—The course of the debate by communists in the oblast on the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, the CPSU Rules, and the program principles for activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed by delegates to the oblast party conference. Those present also heard information about the results of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, made nominations for the vacant positions, and discussed candidates for the top elected organs of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party.

A.S. Popovich, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department, took part in the work and spoke at the conference.

30 May Report

90UN2151B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 May 90 p 1

[UKRINFORM report]

[Text] Kirovograd—The results of the debate in the oblast party organizations of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, the party rules, and the program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party were reviewed by those attending the oblast party conference here. Party obkom First Secretary Ye.V. Marmazov presented the report.

Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were elected at the conference, and nominations for the elected organs of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed.

A.V. Metlitskiy, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadres Work Department, took part in the work of the conference.

Chernigov—The political situation in the oblast and the tasks for Communists in the oblast party organization were considered at the first session of the oblast party conference here. Party Obkom First Secretary V.T. Lisovenko presented the report. Delegates discussed the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, the party Rules, and the program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Those attending the conference confirmed the list of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress and elected delegates for the vacant positions, recommended candidates for the elected organs of the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party, and adopted an appeal to the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session.

Ye.P. Chulakov, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Agrarian Department, spoke at the conference.

V.G. Kremen, sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, took part in the work of the conference.

The second session of the conference will be held after the 28th CPSU Congress.

Kiev—The drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and party Rules, and the program documents of the Ukrainian Communist Party were reviewed at the oblast party conference that took place here. Party obkom First Secretary A.I. Kikot presented the report.

Those attending the conference confirmed the delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, nominated candidates for leading organs in the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party, and adopted an appeal to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet session on matters pertaining to the cleanup following the Chernobyl accident.

A.I. Korniyenko, Politburo member and first secretary of the Kiev Party Gorkom; V.G. Ryabov, sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Department; V.V. Slavikov, instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee; and N.F. Strela, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee

Organizational Party Work and Cadre Work Department, took part in the work of the conference.

5 June Report

90UN2199B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 5 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Ukrainian Information Agency report: "Oblast Party Conferences"]

[Text] Chernovtsy—An oblast party conference took place here in which participants discussed reports of the party obkom [oblast committee] and auditing commission, and program documents for the upcoming congresses of the CPSU and republic Communist Party. Candidates to higher echelon party elective organs were nominated and new membership of the party obkom and auditing commission elected. Ye.I. Dmitriyev was again elected first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom.

I.G. Grintsov, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee secretary and member of the Politburo, spoke at the conference.

Simferopol—Oblast party conference delegates discussed policy matters of party organizations of the Crimea and issues related to preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. N.V. Bagrov, first secretary of the party obkom and candidate member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the conference.

Conference participants ratified the lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, conducted additional elections of delegates for vacant seats, and recommended candidates to elective CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party organs.

At this point during the conference a recess was declared. Delegates will assemble again following conclusion of the reporting and election campaign in the oblast party organizations in order to consider the reports of the party obkom and auditing commission, discuss the tasks proceeding from decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and form elective organs of the oblast party organization.

Taking part in the work of the conference were A.S. Kapto, head of the Ideology Section of the CPSU Central Committee, and Yu.N. Yelchenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee secretary and member of the Politburo.

Cherkassy—A conference of the oblast party organization took place here in which the party obkom report was rendered, the main orientation of party organization activity in our modern stage was discussed, and leading organs were elected. A.A. Ruzhitskiy was again elected obkom first secretary.

Taking part in the work of the conference were A.S. Popovich, head of the Ideology Section of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and V.O. Myakishev, instructor in the Agrarian Section of the CPSU Central Committee.

Dnepropetrovsk—Participants at the oblast party conference discussed program documents for the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. N.K. Zadoya, party obkom first secretary, addressed the conference. A report was rendered on the results of delegate election to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress and candidates were nominated for membership in central CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party organs. The conference declared a recess and will continue its work following the completion of reports and elections in the oblast party organizations.

Taking part in the work of the conference were V.L. Katayev, deputy head of the Defense Section of the CPSU Central Committee; V.D. Kryuchkov, head of the Defense Industry Section of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and candidate member of the Politburo; and A.S. Statinov, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

Kherson—Drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, CPSU Statutes, and Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed at the oblast party conference which was convened here. M.M. Kushnerenko, party obkom first secretary, addressed the conference.

A report was rendered on the results of delegate elections to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. Additional elections of delegates were conducted to vacant seats and candidates nominated from the oblast party organization for the membership of CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party leading organs.

Ternopol—Drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, CPSU Statutes, and program documents of the Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed at the oblast party conference which convened here. V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, party obkom first secretary, addressed the conference.

Conference participants also received information on the results of delegate elections to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. Candidacies to the highest elective organs of the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed.

In accordance with an adopted resolution, the conference extended the delegates' term of office and suspended its work at this point. The second phase will be conducted after the 28th CPSU Congress.

Zaporozhye—The oblast party conference presented the results of discussion of drafts of the CPSU Central

Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, CPSU Statutes, and Program Principles of the Ukrainian Communist Party. G.P. Kharchenko, party obkom first secretary, chairman of the Zaporozhye Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, and member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the conference.

Reports were also rendered on the results of delegate elections to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. Candidacies to the highest CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party elective organs were discussed.

I.G. Sidorov, department chief in the Socioeconomics Section of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the conference.

Lvov—An oblast party conference convened here in which participants discussed drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, CPSU Statutes, and Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party. V.V. Sekretaryuk, party obkom first secretary, addressed the conference. Conference participants also heard information on the results of delegate elections to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. Additional elections of delegates were held for vacant seats.

A commission was formed for conducting the reporting and election campaign in the oblast party organization, preparing for the oblast reporting and election conference, and improving the structure of party committees and their apparatus.

Ivashko's Chairmanship Protested

90UN2199A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Workers' Opinion—Over the Telegraph Line"]

[Text] Last Saturday in Kiev, in October Revolution Square, a group of activists of some kind were appealing to passers-by to sign pieces of paper glued together into a long strip. This is the manner in which "voices of the people" were collected who are opposed to the election of V.A. Ivashko to the post of chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. Many people paid no attention whatsoever to this occurrence, but there were those who stopped all the same. And then, to encourage those who might be vacillating, the agitators freely related stories from the life history of the candidate to the idle crowd. "Facts" not flattering to him, to put it mildly, were cited. Of course it would be impossible to ascertain on the spot whether the "exposers" who had come from God knows where were telling the truth or lies. But there were trusting people here, excited by the "circumstances come to light," who affixed their signatures to the long paper panel which would then, as has happened before, probably be used as a flag to be waved by ideological opponents of the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

One agitator held a poster calling for people to assemble at nine o'clock Monday morning at the republic Supreme Soviet building in order to express "their will."

Most of the multiethnic working people of the Ukraine cannot spend entire days at mass rallies in squares of the capital, however. Yet this does not mean they have no opinion—they react to what is going on in the republic parliament without breaking away from production, as the saying goes. And the more passions heat up at a session, the greater is the operating load of the telegraph. Hundreds of telegrams arrive at republic newspaper offices from the farthest corners of the Ukraine.

"We are attentively following the work of the session. We demand that our deputies find constructive solutions to problems existing in the republic," state voters from the city of Severodonetsk.

"It is time to get away from trifling verbal skirmishes and move on to the major policy of creating a law-governed Ukrainian SSR," the collective of the working people of the Lugansk Motor Vehicle Transport Enterprise echoed in support.

"We are indignant at the tactless behavior of certain deputies... We request that order be restored to the work of the session... We protest the separation of the Ukraine from the USSR," stated a telegram from Stakhanov.

The proposal of a few deputies to take down the bust of V.I. Lenin from the hall of sessions caused a virtual explosion of indignation and resolute protest in many cities of the Ukraine.

Practically all miners' telegrams actively supported the promotion of V.A. Ivashko to the post of chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. "We are confident that under his leadership the Ukraine will become sovereign and economically independent," was the view expressed by Kommunarsk workers. Calling for the parliamentarians to exercise good judgment, the collective of the Rubezhnoye Motor Depot expressed its conviction that the most important thing was "not to permit a split in the body of deputies." It must be remembered that the success of perestroyka lies in the consolidation of all sound forces. And today in our republic only V.A. Ivashko is up to such a task—this is the considered opinion of the lessee council of the Kiev Motor Vehicle Transport Enterprise.

Telegrams supporting the candidacy of V.A. Ivashko to the post of chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and of V.A. Masol to that of chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, have arrived from Lugansk, Pervomaysk, Chernigov, Severodonetsk, Markovka, and other cities and villages of the Ukraine.

12 June Report

90UN2199C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Information Agency report: "Oblast Party Conferences"]

[Text] Odessa—Delegates to the oblast party reports and election conference conducted here over a two-day period determined their strategy and tactics in today's political environment. The communists discussed obkom [oblast party committee] and auditing commission reports, and drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, party statutes, and the Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Conference participants ratified the lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, conducted additional elections for vacant seats, nominated candidates to the highest party elective organs, and also elected new leading organs of the oblast party organization. R.B. Bodelan was again elected party obkom first secretary.

I.G. Grintsov, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee secretary and member of the Politburo, addressed the conference. Taking part in the work of the conference were I.F. Feklistov, executive organizer of the Party Structuring and Personnel Section of the CPSU Central Committee, and A.Ye. Pasov, instructor in the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee.

Uzhgorod—Participants in the first phase of the oblast party reports-and-election conference which convened here examined the basic orientation of activity of the oblast party organization under today's conditions. Reports of the oblast committee and auditing commission were heard. Drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, party statutes, and the Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party were discussed.

The lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were ratified, additional elections of delegates were conducted for vacant seats, and contenders were named for membership in the highest organs of the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party. New leading organs of the oblast party organization were elected. M.Yu. Voloshchuk was again elected party obkom first secretary.

The conference extended the delegates' term of office and decided to continue its work following the 28th CPSU Congress.

Yu.N. Yelchenko, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and member of the Politburo, addressed the conference. Participating in the work of the conference were B.A. Malkov, executive organizer of the Party Structuring and Personnel Section of the CPSU Central Committee, and B.N. Bilunov, instructor in the Ideology Section of the CPSU Central Committee.

Rovno—Delegates to the first phase of the oblast party conference which convened here discussed program documents of the CPSU Central Committee and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, as well as the tasks of oblast party organizations in our present stage. Communists ratified the lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and conducted additional elections of candidates to vacant seats. Candidates were nominated from the oblast party organization for membership in the central elective party organs.

V.Ya. Lopatkin, executive organizer of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the conference.

Kharkov—The results of discussion of precongress documents and results of elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress were examined at the first phase of the oblast party conference which was convened here. A.K. Myalitsa, party obkom first secretary, addressed the conference. Additional elections of delegates were held for vacant seats. The question of improved food provision for the workers of the oblast was also examined.

The second phase of the conference will take place after the 28th CPSU Congress.

P.F. Pavlyuk, consultant in the Socioeconomics Section of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in the work of the conference.

Kiev—Participants in the first phase of the city party conference conducted here focused their attention on drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, party statutes, and Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, on regulations of the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the CPSU Central Committee, and on the political situation in the city. A.I. Korniyenko, first secretary of the Kiev party gorkom [city committee] and member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the conference.

The communists ratified lists of delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and examined the procedure for nominating candidates to CPSU central organs and leading organs of the Ukrainian Communist Party, as well as the agenda for the second phase of the conference.

The conference extended the term of office of the party gorkom and its bureau to the beginning of the second phase of its work, which will continue following the 28th CPSU Congress.

Conference participants adopted an appeal to communists of the city and all residents of Kiev.

S.I. Gurenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and Politburo member, addressed the conference. A.V. Metlitskiy, deputy department head in the Party Structuring and Personnel Section of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the conference.

Israel Offers Help to Chernobyl Victims

LD2706192490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Kiev, 27 Jun (TASS)—Representatives of the General Federation of Labor in Israel (Histadrut) will take part in creating in the Ukrainian capital a rehabilitation center in which children from the areas affected by the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station will undergo observation and treatment. The center is being created on the basis of a comfortable sanatorium that the Ukrainian trade unions are handing over free of charge to the children.

Agreement on the joint creation of the rehabilitation center was reached during a meeting between the Histadrut delegation and the leadership of the Ukrainian trade unions. They also signed an agreement on exchanging information, arranging tourist and cultural exchanges, and jointly implementing other treatment programs. The leader of the delegation, Geysar, the Histadrut secretary general, said that the agreement opens up broad opportunities for developing all-round ties both through public organizations in Israel and the Ukraine and at government level. He voiced the hope that the accord that had been reached would help to arrange cooperation between the trade union centers on a long-term basis.

The members of the delegation were received in the Ukraine's Council of Ministers. Viktor Urchukin, deputy chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers, expressed, on behalf of the government, his gratitude to them for taking part in the charitable humane mission to treat the children who suffered from the Chernobyl accident. The fact that Israel has accepted a group of such children for treatment evokes a grateful response, he said. Not only in the hearts of their parents, but also from the whole Ukrainian people.

Viktor Urchukin told the visitors about the work that is being done by the government of the Ukraine to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. All parents and their children will be moved out of the contaminated areas already this year, and the whole population will be evacuated from there in 1991. However, there many problems still remain, he stressed. It is hard to solve them successfully through the efforts of just one republic, international assistance is required. We are very grateful to Histardrut for taking part in this noble mission.

The guests found a visit to the republic society of Jewish culture interesting and useful.

Free Enterprise Zone Set Up in Brest

LD2806082990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT on 28 June reports that a free enterprise zone is being created in the western border town of Brest. The local oblast soviet of people's deputies initiated the move. Correspondent Aleksey Guretskiy talks to Deputy Chairman Gurenchuk of the Brest city executive committee about the aims and problems of the project.

*Belorussian Strike Committee Official Interviewed

90UN1991A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with A. I. Bukhvostov, by A. Gulyayev, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent, Belorussian SSR; date not specified: "We Need an Answer!"]

[Text] **A one-day warning strike was held at the Gomselmash Production Association. The strike committee, which united representatives of more than 50 enterprises in the oblast center and the rayons in the oblast, made 26 specific demands. They are addressed to the local, republic, and central agencies of authority and are linked with the problems of eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. Today our correspondent had a conversation with A.I. Bukhvostov, chairman of the enterprise's trade-union committee and co-chairman of the city's strike committee.**

[Gulyayev] The warning strike cost Gomselmash alone R2.5 million. For what?

[Bukhvostov] We feel that none of the decisions that were made after Chernobyl took into consideration the interests of the people living on the territories where the contamination constitutes more than one curie for cesium. That is 76 percent of the oblast and the city of Gomel—including our association.

[Gulyayev] How do you want your interests to be taken into consideration?

[Bukhvostov] We are talking primarily of benefits—including a [number illegible]-hour work week, the lowering of the retirement age and the increasing of the size of the pension, the increasing of vacations to four calendar weeks, and the giving of the status of refugees to those who move to clean zones.

[Gulyayev] But there has been such decisions by the republic and country government. The benefits in them are based on scientific data and are granted when the levels of contamination are higher than normal. Don't your demands appear to be an attempt to use this commotion to grab additional blessings for yourselves?

[Bukhvostov] We are sometimes accused of that. But let's analyze the situation. Right now, in the association's ventilation systems, the contamination level exceeds the norm by tens and hundreds of times. The workers in that service have had to be transferred to Category A: employees of nuclear electric-power stations.

Let us also take into consideration the contaminated products, the migration of radio nuclides with the air streams and ground water. If one is to believe certain scientists, as well as the items published in the press that no one has yet refuted, there are absolutely no clean territories in the republic. Therefore we are attempting, for example, to have Gomel and the oblast declared to be an ecological disaster area. We want the banning of all kinds of agricultural activity in places where it is impossible to grow pure products containing the levels that existed prior to the accident. We want to have the contaminated land taken out of the crop-rotation system.

[Gulyayev] Contaminated to what levels? What criterion do you have?

[Bukhvostov] It must be said that we are not completely clear about this. But we want to achieve that clarity, because the most contradictory opinions are being published in the press today, and we hear scientists making the most contradictory statements. The republic leadership, which a year ago attempted to convince us that we were safe, is now saying completely opposite things. There have been four years of constant tension, of constant fear for ourselves and for our children. We must know what's going on!

Thus, we have seen the accumulation of more than enough material to ignite a conflict. There have already been rallies in shops, and a two-hour sitdown strike. One of the plants in the association held a conference for the labor collective, where the collective set forth its demands. And now we have the anniversary of the accident. Once again we have the most contradictory items in the newspapers, more appeals by public organizations, more television marathons....

So we people at the trade-union committee concluded that the situation was getting out of control. We decided that we would support the demand and assume the functions of the strike committee. The trade-union committee voted unanimously.

[Gulyayev] That is, you headed that movement because you were afraid of finding yourself overboard? Was there no other way out?

[Bukhvostov] No. Everything occurred in a completely deliberate manner. Each of us shared those demands. Obviously, other than the extremist demands. And they were: "Down with the Communist Party!" "Get the party committee out of production!" etc. We saw our task in having the movement travel along the path of the law governing labor disputes. We held a conference of the association's labor collective. We prepared our demands and transmitted them to the administration. Incidentally, whatever we could do ourselves, we did. We paid a monthly grant in aid for each family member. We ourselves found the opportunity to provide medical assistance for children and adults. But most of the problems were beyond our control, and therefore the administration forwarded the collective's demands to the authorities. Once again, all this was done in accordance with the law governing labor disputes.

[Gulyayev] What happened then?

[Bukhvostov] Then, according to the law, there was supposed to be created a conciliation commission which, jointly with the representatives of the labor collectives, would settle everything. But no one took that action. Oblast administrators arrived, telling us what had been done and what was being done. But we had already heard more than enough educational lectures. We wanted a specific discussion dealing with each of our demands. That did not occur. Moreover, we were told: strikes do not constitute any threat, now that everyone is striking. So, on 26 April, the anniversary of the accident, Gomselmash [Gomel Agricultural Machinery Plant] stopped working.

Then a city strike committee was elected, and I became one of its co-chairmen. At the same conference, the demands of the city's labor collectives were formulated. We have already mentioned some of them.

Of course, you cannot resolve everything in just one month. Therefore we are insisting only on obtaining by 15 June an answer that will indicate the deadlines for the execution of our demands. Otherwise (and I quote), "the city strike committee will retain the right to appeal to the labor collectives to engage in an extreme measure, up to and including a strike." I must say at the outset that we do not want this to happen. We would like the authorities to execute the law governing labor disputes. That will resolve all the problems.

[Gulyayev] Are you convinced that the city collectives will support you?

[Bukhvostov] Judge for yourself. At the moment when the city conference was held, we were supported by approximately 50 enterprises. Currently strike committees have been created at practically all of them. Incidentally, out of the 25 members of the city strike committee, five are chairmen of trade-union committees.

[Gulyayev] That is, the position of the trade unions has been expressed rather clearly. But what about the party committees? Yours, in particular....

[Bukhvostov] Our party committee did not take part in the development of events, but it also made no attempt to stop them. The party's obkom published a message in which it accused us of inciting an uncontrollable strike situation. I repeat that we specifically do not want this kind of uncontrollable situation. What we need is a precise and clear answer to our demands.

Moldavia Reorganizes Media Staff, Organs

LD2806015190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2057 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Report from Kishinev by correspondent I. Petkov; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Many people are in despair. That is the title given by our Moldavian correspondent to his reportage on the cadres policy of the republic's new government.

[Petkov] Seventeen ministers have begun work, replacing the 40 that there used to be, including the state committees. And now in their departments, the new people are looking to see what and who is superfluous. Today when the staff of the rayon departments of public education in Kishinev came to work, they unexpectedly found out that their jobs were being abolished. Only the town directorate of public education remains.

There is despondency among many journalists, too. The republican parliament abolished the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and also the (?ATEM) News Agency which is a branch of TASS, having created a National Center for Television and Radio and a similar news center, Moldovapress. In order to keep their jobs, the staff who are being let go are undergoing competitive selection, the main criteria for which are professional mastery of the state language—Moldavian—and, of course, professional qualities. This also applies to city and rayon newspapers which, by decision of parliament, have become exclusively the organs of the local soviets and are issued in Moldavian and also in translation into Russian.

Many newspapermen have hastened in search of work to those towns and rayons of Moldova beyond the Dnestr where the local soviets refuse to recognize the validity on their territories of some decisions of parliament.

Also seeking work are thousands of staff, mainly specialists, fired by the republican state planning committee and other departments.

Caucasus

Armenian General Opposes Conscription Suspension

NC2105100690 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 19 May 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] As you already know, dear compatriots, the Armenian Supreme Soviet passed a decision on 3 May on the temporary suspension of the 1990 spring conscription in Armenia.

A correspondent of URBAT [weekly suplement of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN] requested that Major General Arutyunyan, the military commissar of the republic, express his views on this decision. The major general said: It is devoid of substantial arguments. I say this as professional soldier and after considering the present situation prevailing in our republic. The demand for the creation of a separate army is naive, to say the least. The fact is that 2,000 Armenian soldiers will be demobilized in the spring of this year in Armenia, and 8,000 will be called up. Where do we keep and house them? Do we have available barracks and modern military equipment? These are problems which require practical solutions. Instead, we have a bitter experience from last year when we allowed the Armenian army deserters to continue their service in Armenia. The result was the continued evasion of army service. A group of deputies was able to pressure the parliament—I would say a dying parliament—to pass this decision during its last days.

URBAT and the majority of the Armenian people do not share the major-general's opinion.

Ministry Official Describes 27 May Yerevan Events

PM0106152590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 May 90 Single Edition p 6

[Report on interview with Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, commander of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops by unidentified TASS correspondent, place and date not stated: "What Happened in Yerevan?"—first paragraph is an introduction]

[Excerpt] A tense explosive situation has developed in Armenia. What happened in Yerevan? This is the question a TASS correspondent asked Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, commander of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops. He said:

"Many tears have been shed by Armenian families during these sorrowful days. But quite frankly, many bitter tears have also been shed by Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian families, who were unexpectedly struck by misfortune, whose children were killed or wounded as a result of instigated—I stress this, and I firmly believe it—instigated actions by certain forces that could never be called representative of the industrious Armenian people. I think you will agree that these forces have nothing in common with the people and their interests although they masquerade in all kinds of costumes.

"However, let us return to the tragic events that have taken place, setting them out in chronological order, so to speak. So, 27 May, 0850 hours. The railway station in Yerevan. The soldiers' waiting room. A guard detail from a local unit, assigned to accompany the Kafan-Yerevan passenger train (which is done, incidentally, at the request of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] government to protect citizens and prevent sundry provocations), was in the waiting room.

"The 12-15 armed bandits (for some unknown reason modestly described as 'unidentified persons' by certain mass media) who entered the hall, surrounded the group of servicemen and positioned themselves behind the columns. Two of them approached Lieutenant Pavel

Tereshchenko, chief of the guard detail and the company's deputy commander for political matters, and demanded that the guard detail personnel surrender their weapons. One of the criminals confirmed the seriousness of his intentions with a burst of submachine gun fire in the air. But neither the officer nor his soldiers, who were subjected to the armed attack, were frightened by this. Tereshchenko sacrificed himself in the literal sense of the word. Without breaching his military obligation or his oath, he gave the servicemen the order to repulse the attack. And he straight away received two bullets in the back. The other gangsters opened fire at point-blank range on the guard detail. The servicemen returned fire. As a result, five of the gangsters were killed and one died of his wounds later.. One passenger was slightly hurt in the crossfire. Lt. Tereshchenko is in hospital in a very serious condition, with a bullet wound in the spinal cord. Private Aleksandr Yakovlev was also seriously wounded. The other servicemen in the guard detail also received several bullet wounds each, apart from Junior Sergeant Vladimir Mikula, who was unharmed. Incidentally, guys of six different nationalities served in this tiny collective, comprising 11 persons altogether: three Russians, three Ukrainians, two Lithuanians, a Kazakh, an Uzbek, and a Moldavian.

"Military subunits were urgently called out to the railway station area. Those wounded received medical assistance. A Kalashnikov assault rifle, five revolvers, and ammunition were confiscated from the gangsters. Representatives of the USSR MVD, and the Armenian MVD and Prosecutor's Office arrived at the scene of the incident. An investigation is being carried out.

"When the Internal Troops subdivisions' personnel were returning from the station to the unit's base, they were ambushed near the service station on Sovetoshenskoye Highway. The highway was blocked off by buses and heavy dump trucks loaded with stones. Armed terrorists, positioned at a commanding height, opened heavy fire on the column. The servicemen took up a defensive position.

"A duty subunit headed by Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Chekmarev, deputy commander of the unit, was sent to their assistance.

"The subunit came under heavy automatic fire. Lt. Col. Chekmarev decided to execute a maneuver. The servicemen suppressed the resistance and seized a Degtyarev machine gun, a grenade launcher, and other weapons and ammunition. Lt.Col. Chekmarev was seriously wounded in this skirmish. He led his subordinates' actions right until the last moment, and sought to save their lives and evacuate the wounded. The brave officer was taken to hospital, but, as they say in such cases, medicine proved powerless. He died on the operating table.

"Lt. Col. Chekmarev was not even 40. He had fought in Afghanistan and been awarded combat decorations. Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich left a 10-year old daughter and a wife who is expecting another child. This child will never see the father who died on Soviet soil. We have petitioned for V.M. Chekmarev to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner (posthumously). Two other servicemen were wounded in the same skirmish.

"Between 1840 and 1845 hours, the terrorists, who numbered 300-350 people, fired on the local unit's base camp—the barracks, the mess room, the vehicle fleet, and the encampment. The personnel were forced to return fire. Between 1840 and 2200 hours, the servicemen ceased fire on three occasions in order to set an example and prevent further bloodshed. However, the opposing side unfortunately did not respond to this. The terrorists' losses amounted to 16 killed and 49 wounded. The exchange of fire stopped as night fell.

"This is the essence of the events. I am deliberately not going to name the possible organizers of these events—an investigation is going on and I believe that specific names will be revealed. But it is probably necessary to try and formulate conclusions and single out the important points.

"And so, did all this happen by chance? Were there preconditions for such a bloody tragedy? Yes, undoubtedly there were!

"Recently there has been no end to thefts by terrorists of weapons and ammunition, and on 22 May terrorists attacked an infantry combat vehicle belonging to one of the Internal Troops subunits which had become separated from a convoy near Abovyan. With threats of violence, they demanded the surrender of weapons (the handwriting was the same as in the railway station at Yerevan). Unfortunately, on that occasion they did achieve their aim," Col.Gen. Yu.V. Shatalin said in conclusion. [passage omitted]

Ministry Account Disputed

NC0206131090 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] What was the reason behind the reports which appeared two days before the tragic 27 May incidents to the effect that there would be a takeover of the government institutions and a removal of Lenin's statue? Artashes Gegamyan, acting chairman of Yerevan city soviet executive committee, posed this question in his article published in the press. Based on what information did the MAYAK radio station inform the whole Soviet Union that there would be a coup d'etat on 28 May 1990? If this was really so, then why didn't the relevant legal organizations take the necessary preventive measures and provide explanations to the public? What sort of weapons and bullets were used by the Army units during the deterrence action at the railway station when the so-called terrorists were all killed except the one who disappeared under strange circumstances? Why was the term Armenian terrorists introduced into usage just before USSR President Gorbachev's visit to the U.S.; a term which before the May incidents was used by [the

Azerbaijani historian] Ziya Bunyatov? Was it advantageous to call the Armenian civil guards terrorists just to play on international opinion on terrorism? And what sort of terrorists are they considering that, as a result of their own terrorism, they lost 24 people?

AZERINFORM's report about the servicemen's appeal to Gorbachev also raises questions. This appeal was made from that city where a few months ago terrorism was in fact employed against the servicemen and their families. Why did the servicemen appeal so hastily to the president and the Soviet people when they had failed to make such an appeal after the Baku, Sumgait, and Kirovabad incidents, or after the destruction of the 830 km of Soviet borders?

It is necessary to think soberly about the danger threatening the Armenian people.

Armenian 'Extremists' Detained After Skirmish

PM2706134590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Captain S. Borisov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Clash in the Hills"]

[Text] Stepanakert, 26 Jun—A group of Internal Troops soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. Voronov have carried out aerial reconnaissance of the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Two vehicles carrying armed extremists were discovered in one section. Seeing the helicopter, they opened fire with automatic weapons. The officer decided to repulse the attack and then to try and detain the guerrillas. This was not straightforward—they were well armed and numerically stronger than the troops.

A group comprising Privates V. Zagonov, V. Tsarenko, and S. Dementyev was the first to disembark from the helicopter and go on the offensive. A hail of bullets greeted the soldiers. They were obliged to return fire. The extremists, unable to withstand the onslaught by the fighters in speckled berets, began to retreat into a hillside ravine. At that moment a second group of servicemen, successfully making their way from the helicopter, rushed to cut them off. This group comprised Lt. Col. A. Voronov, Senior Lieutenant S. Gorshkov, Sergeant O. Ustinov, and Privates I. Shcherbinin and S. Komendanskiy.

All the servicemen acquitted themselves ably and decisively. Even the wounded, of whom there were three—Sgt. Ustinov and Privates V. Zagonov and I. Shcherbinin—continued to support their comrades with fire. The last named moreover managed to carry the wounded squad commander out from under fire, receiving a wound himself in the process. The skirmish, which was essentially a real combat engagement, lasted for about an hour. The bandits suffered losses: three killed, several wounded. Some extremists were successfully detained. They turned out to be inhabitants of Armenia. Weapons and ammunition, four radio transmitters, and military and militia uniforms were confiscated from the detainees.

More on Clash

NC2806093990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers today published reports on incidents in the Azerbaijani towns bordering the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. It has been reported that the sound of gunfire is heard in the farming settlements of Kelbadzharskiy and Lachinskiy Rayons every day and that armed Armenian groups attack innocent people driving their herds to the grazing grounds. Their intention is to steal and remove the property of other people. In view of all this, the border regions are being fully patrolled by the military units.

Military units carrying out helicopter reconnaissance of the farming settlements on the evening of 24 June observed an extraordinary situation when they reached the farming settlement known as Sariyer. Armed and bearded individuals had gathered together on a large stretch of land down below. There were many vehicles. The criminals fired continuously at the helicopter in order to prevent it from landing. However, experienced pilots landed the helicopter with the help of the troops. The actual clash occurred after this. As a result, the troops pushed the bearded individuals back toward the Armenian SSR's border. They captured two of them. Three of the troops were wounded. About 900 cartridges fired from automatic weapons and a large quantity of explosives, incendiary devices, and military and militia uniforms were found at the place where the clash occurred.

'Vremya' Report on Border Tension Criticized

NC2706141090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The "Vremya" newscast has again let its correspondent in Azerbaijan, Mayis Mamedov, broadcast his regular report which this time was about the military outposts defending the Azerbaijani borders against the so-called well-armed Armenian guerrillas. It was immediately (?indicated) that the arms were being stolen from the military [word indistinct]. We are no longer (?amazed) at such (?concocted) "Vremya" reports. However, looking back we can see whether arms seizures have taken place in Azerbaijan over the years. It is known to many that in Agdamskiy Rayon there are constant arms sales going on [words indistinct].

The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers passed a decision on 24 April 1990—yes, on 24 April—on temporary suspension of all anti-hail operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], Shaumyanovskiy, Khanlarskiy, and Fizulinskiy Rayons. At the orders of the state of emergency commandant, all anti-hail guns were taken out of the Armenian regions on the pretext that they posed a serious threat to the Azerbaijani-inhabited villages. The military fulfilled this important martial duty and took the guns to a secure place: to Agdam. Anti-hail operations in the NKAO were set up in 1966, the first in Transcaucasia. Specialists were working in 16 anti-hail centers and watchfully defending agricultural produce from hail. One can read Levon Mkrtichyan's article, [title indistinct], to realize the extent of damage caused by natural disasters in the NKAO after the confiscation of these guns.

Armenian Appeal on Nagorno-Karabakh to Gorbachev

LD2706110290 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the republican Council of Ministers have sent to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev a demand to restore the activities of the soviets of people's deputies in Nagorno-Karabakh, and recognize immediately the authority of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, and to abolish the state of emergency, introduced on 15 April, on the territory of the oblast. The appeal states that the antipopular policy of Azerbaijan's leadership pursues in fact the aim of abolishing autonomy and stripping Armenians of all rights.

Situation in Kazakhskiy, Kedabekskiy Rayons Viewed

NC2706123090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 25 Jun 90 90

[Excerpts] A report from Kazakhskiy Rayon says that tension still prevails in the towns which border the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], because of the activities of groups of bandits affiliated to the inauspicious Armenian national army. Armed Armenians opened fire on the (?Sirtly) and Barkhudarly towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon from (?Seynavan) town in Idzhevanskiy Rayon on the night of 19-20 June. Soviet Army units in the region returned the fire and repulsed the bandits. Fortunately, no one was killed or injured. The bandits fired on the rayon once again on 24 June. The troops were again compelled to open fire. Bayramov, deputy chief of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, has stated that the armed Armenian bandits are engaged in acts of robbery. [passage omitted]

A complex situation also continues to prevail in the Kedabekskiy Rayon. Mamedov, secretary of the Kedabekskiy Rayon Party Committee, told an AZERINFORM correspondent that armed Armenians drove off 31 cattle from Gadzhiagalilar town on 23 June. A flock of sheep was stolen from the Narimanov collective farm and [words indistinct] on 24 June.

Authorities Work for NKAO Normalization

LD2806081690 Moscow TASS in English 0651 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By AZERINFORM correspondent Viktor Shulman]

[Text] Stepanakert June 28 TASS—A republican organisational committee on Nagorno-Karabakh, set up by the Azerbaijani leadership in line with a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, continues efforts to normalise the situation in the predominantly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region.

In the five months since its founding, the committee has succeeded in removing the blockade from all roads and railways and resuming vital supplies to Stepanakert and other cities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Viktor Polyanichko, second secretary at the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, told AZERINFORM.

Practically all enterprises, farms and construction teams are working the area, he said.

Interior Ministry troops sent to the area in accordance with a decree by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the introduction of a state of emergency in the area are helping authorities to restore order.

A total of 350 kilograms of explosives, more than 1,200 guns and tens of thousands of ammunition have been confiscated in 43 settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh, military authorities said.

However, militants continue staging terrorist acts in Nagorno-Karabakh and in neighbouring areas in Azerbaijan. Increasing numbers of militants are penetrating the area from Armenia.

Military authorities are hopeful that common sense will prevail. Armenian representatives are increasing their contacts with the organisational committee. However, their efforts are at times thwarted by bans imposed by Yerevan and Moscow-based Soviet people's deputies from Nagorno-Karabakh, Polyanichko said.

These orders prevent Armenian representatives from working on the committee and local governments from resuming their work, he said.

Report on Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Proceedings

LD2806020590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2057 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Video report from Azerbaijan by correspndent E. Mamedov; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Parliamentary news: Here is reportage from the session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet:

[Mamedov] The People's Front of Azerbaijan and other public organizations, of which there are quite a few in the republic today will now be able to put forward their candidates for people's deputy of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and for local soviets. The deputies are examining a whole package of bills, the adoption of which will undoubtedly have an effect on the further development of the republic's sovereignty. It has been decided to submit a bill on economic independence for discussion by the working people of the republic. The session will continue its work tomorrow. [video shows Supreme Soviet in session]

More on Session

NC2806101390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The 13th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet was held yesterday. The republic's newspapers published reports on the session on their front pages. The session was chaired by El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The deputies approved the session's agenda and work schedules. Twenty-six issues were debated and relevant laws and decisions were adopted during the session. El'mira Karafova read a report on the first, second, third, and fourth items on the agenda. A law was passed on these matters after a debate was held on the report.

The deputies debated and approved the remaining items on the session's agenda after they returned from a recess. They also approved the draft laws. Later, the session approved a number of decrees of the president of the Azerbaijan SSR. With this, the work of the 13th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet was concluded.

President Ayaz Mutalibov participated in the work of the session. The newspapers published El'mira Kafarova's report to the session today.

Azerbaijani Parliament Attacks Armenian Actions

90US1019B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 25 May 90 p 1

[Decree of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Unconstitutionality of Rulings of the Armenian SSR and its Presidium Concerning the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] expresses profound concern about the ongoing, unprecedented, crude interference of the Armenian SSR in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. The basic norms of relations between the union republics are being defied and the USSR Constitution is being ignored.

Armed Armenian fighters organized into large paramilitary units, using automatic weapons, artillery, and armored vehicles, have been committing bandit attacks and firing upon border settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR as well as servicemen of the Soviet Army and internal forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] stationed there. The goal of these actions is to create conditions for the practical implementation of illegal and anticonstitutional acts which are directed at severing the Autonomous Republic from the Azerbaijan SSR and which have been consistently and purposefully adopted over the course of more than two years by the Armenian SSR and other organs of state power and administration of this republic in connection with the artificial so-called problem of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. Adding a new twist to the escalation of tension between the two republics, on 3 May 1990 the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the latest anticonstitutional ruling "On the Situation Arising in the NKAO and the Goals for Regulating it," as well as "On the Results of Studying the Circumstances of the Tragic Incident Which Took Place on 10 October 1989 in the City of Stepanakert." In these documents, which do not have any legal force, annexationist claims are made on the territory of the sovereign Azerbaijan SSR just as before.

Z. Balayan, B. Dadamyan, V. Grigoryan, G. Pogosyan, and V. Gabrielyan, USSR people's deputies from the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR, also make consistent efforts to implement the illegal rulings of the Armenian SSR on the territory of Nagornyy Karabakh. It is these deputies who, taking advantage of their immunity, are appealing to the population of the oblast to resort to violence and acts of civil disobedience, organizing and controlling the implementation of anticonstitutional decrees which are being passed in the Armenian SSR, inspiring an illegal electoral campaign for elections to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and committing other illegal actions under emergency conditions.

An undisguised desire to further inflame interethnic enmity and to misinterpret the events taking place in NKAO is appearing in the various decrees and speeches of officials of the Armenian SSR as well as of the aforementioned USSR deputies from the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR and in the materials of the newspapers and other mass media.

Provocative declarations are being addressed to the leadership of the republic and of the country, and attempts are being made to drive a wedge between the people of various nationalities living in Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet lodges a strong protest in connection with the continuing provocative actions of the Armenian SSR to destabilize the situation in the NKAO and makes an urgent demand that the president of the USSR guarantee rigorous implementation of the decrees he has signed with regard to the lack of authority of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the unconstitutional acts adopted by it.

The entire course of events demands, finally, that real political, legal, and other sanctions be undertaken with regard to the Armenian SSR within the bounds of the power of the president of the USSR and the government of the country as happens when the USSR Constitution is violated and the territorial integrity of the Soviet federation is threatened.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. Guided by paragraph 3 of Article 124 of the USSR Constitution, to propose that the USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight:

Present the USSR Supreme Soviet its conclusions concerning the compliance of the following with the USSR Constitution: The 15 June 1988 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the 20 February 1988 Ruling of a Special Session of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies of the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR Entitled 'On the Petition before the Supreme Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR and Armenian SSR Concerning the Transfer of the NKAO from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR'"; the 12 November 1988 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On the Ruling of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Entitled 'On Draft Laws Concerning Changes and Supplements to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and Concerning Elections of USSR People's Deputies'"; the 17 September 1989 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Proposals Introduced Into the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Solution of the Problem of the NKAO"; the 17 September 1989 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Tasks of Guaranteeing the Security of the Armenian Population in the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Border Regions of the Armenian SSR, and Servicemen of Armenian Nationality in the Soviet Army"; the 15 October 1989 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Tragic Event That Took Place in the City of Stepanakert"; the 1 December 1989 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the 28 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Decree 'On Measures to Normalize the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast'"; the 13 February 1990 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "Acknowledging the Illegality of the 5 July 1921 Ruling of the Caucasus Bureau of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks])"; and the 3 May 1990 Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees "On the Situation Which Has Arisen in the NKAO and the Tasks of Regulating It" and "On the Results of Studying the Circumstances of the Tragic Incident Which Took Place on 10 October 1989 in the City of Stepanakert"; and that it prepare conclusions on the constitutionality of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees "On Reuniting the Armenian SSR and Nagornyy Karabakh" of 1 December 1989 and "On the Inclusion of a Plan for the Social and Economic Development of the NKAO for 1990 in the State Plan of Economic and Social Development of the Armenian SSR for 1990" of 9 January 1990, and of the ruling of the Armenian SSR Central Electoral Commission on the election of Armenian SSR people's deputies of 23 February 1990 with regard to the formation on the territory of the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR of 12 electoral districts for elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies, and that it bring them to the attention of the USSR Supreme Soviet inasmuch as the 10 January and 3 March 1990 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees on the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned rulings are being ignored by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia and the leadership of the republic.

2. To propose that the USSR Supreme Soviet examine the issue and agree to the institution of criminal proceedings against the USSR people's deputies from the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR Z. Balayan, B. Dadamyan, V. Grigoryan, V. Gabriyelyan, and G. Pogosyan, who are trying to implement illegal acts of the Armenian SSR and are appealing for actions directed at the forcible violation of the territorial unity of the Azerbaijan SSR and the kindling of interethnic enmity and hatred, according to Articles 63 and 67 of the Azerbaijan SSR Criminal Code.

[Signed] E. Kafarova, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.
Baku, 18 May 1990.

Mutalibov Meets Candidate Pilgrims to Mecca

NC2506142390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1730 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] On 21 June, President Ayaz Mutalibov received a group of religious Muslims who are preparing to make the hajj to Mecca. It was noted during the meeting that the workers of Azerbaijan, including the religious Muslims, who are an inseparable part of the society, greatly support and approve the ideals of reconstruction, democratization, and openness. As in the case of the strengthening of activities in the other domains of life, contributing toward this noble activity has become a demand of the [word indistinct] classes of the republic's people. It is necessary to [words indistinct] and contribute toward the realization of intentions which comply with the important tasks of the Soviet people.

While explaining the incidents in the republic, President Mutalibov pointed to the importance of the measures that have been taken in the economic, social, and moral fields. For example, an agreement has been reached for [word indistinct] with a view to supply metal parts to foreign firms. This will provide up to $50 million for the republic and help resolve the problems of the refugees. Meanwhile, the question of using the (?water resources) in Apsheronskiy Rayon is being resolved with the help of foreign firms. This will provide additional (?funds), which can be used for the settlement of social problems in Baku, the protection of the environment, and other matters.

The problems of our people are not few in number. One of them concerns peace and security in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The multinational peoples of our country have only one choice, which is to live and work within the united Soviet family on the basis of mutual confidence and brotherhood.

Speaking at the meeting, Sheykh-ul-Islam Allakhshukyur Pasha-zade, chairman of the board of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Transcaucasus, said that the Muslims are trying to contribute actively toward reconstruction work. He said: The religious people have vested significant hopes in the new leaders of the republic. The work of the leaders is appreciated. The democratization, openness, and reconstruction policy has created new opportunities for the fulfilment of the religious needs of the believers.

The participants in the meeting also discussed a number of issues related to the practical realization of the constitutional principle on the question of freedom of faith, in line with the strengthening of democratic principles in the life of the society.

Muradaliyev, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and Abdullayev, representative of the USSR Council of Ministers Religious Affairs Council in the Azerbaijan SSR, participated in the meeting.

Central Asia

Uzbek Party Considers Tashkent Food Situation

LD2706122490 Tashkent Domestic Service in Russian 0115 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Excerpt] In the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee Karimov, president of the republic and first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, on 25 June 1990 held a sitting, at which questions associated with supplying the inhabitants of the city of Tashkent with meat and agricultural products were examined. It was noted that leaders of party, soviet organs of the city of Tashkent and the Tashkent Oblast, Gosplan [State Planning Committee], irrespective of the repeated warnings, did not make the corresponding conclusions, and as a result the situation concerning provision of cities with fruit and vegetable products and meat.

Comrade Karimov emphasized in his speech the necessity of mobilizing all forces for improving work in providing the city of Tashkent with the necessry food products and to complete by the first half of July the conclusion of direct contracts between industrial enterprises of the city, state farms and collective farms of Tashkent Oblast. [passage omitted]

Dismissal of Uzgen Rayon Leaders Reported

LD2406180390 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1200 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Excerpts] A plenum of the Uzgen Rayon Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia has been held. It examined the matter of the public disturbance in the rayon. The plenum released (Asanov) from his duties as first secretary of the Uzgen Rayon Party Committee and member of the bureau, in connection with his shortcomings in work, which had led to disorder among the nationalities, killings, and disturbances. At the plenum (Yergeshev), chairman of the Soviet Executive Committee and (Boranbayeva), first deputy chairman, who previously worked as secretary for ideological matters, were relieved of their duties as members of the bureau of the rayon party committees.

The participants discussed and examined the unpleasant situation which occurred in the rayon. They concluded that in present circumstances it would be more suitable if representatives of the Russian nationality lead the rayon party organization. The plenum elected (Sarpatov) first secretary of the Uzgen Rayon Party Committee. He previously worked as first secretary of the Karakol Town Party Committee. [passage omitted]

Masaliyev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee and chairman of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic spoke at the plenum. [passage omitted]

Central Asian Republics Sign Regional Pacts

PM2606123590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent E. Matskevich report under "Events, Facts, Opinions" rubric: "Important Documents Signed"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The leaders of the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics have signed an Appeal to the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan To Strengthen Interethnic Relations;an Agreement on Economic, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation;and other documents.

It was stressed in the talks preceding the signing that a region inhabited by almost 50 million people possesses enough powerful resources to solve expediently and economically not only local social and economic problems but also important union tasks.

Participants in the meeting stressed that none of the republics can develop normally without the right to own, use, and dispose of its national riches.

The sides agreed to lift existing restrictions on the export of consumer goods, while retaining mutually beneficial deliveries of raw materials and products.

The agreement was concluded for the period through 1 January 1996 and is subject to confirmation by the republics' supreme soviets, and it is open to any union or autonomous republic to join. It was decided to set up an interrepublic commission to coordinate efforts to restore the ecological balance in the Aral area and to establish a fund for aid to the population of this disaster zone, and to form the "Sredazekoprom" interrepublic science-and-production association.

It was decided to hold regular meetings of working groups from the five republics to implement the plans outlined.

Central Asian Muslims on First-Ever Pilgrimage

LD2306180390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today 500 Muslim pilgrims from Central Asia and Kazakhstan left Tashkent by air for Jeddah. Our correspondent Mukhtar Ganiyev reports:

[Ganiyev] In the Soviet history of the region this is the first organized pilgrimage or hajj to Mecca, to the holy place, the burial place of the prophet Muhammad, the Ka'bah. The hajj is the most cherished dream, and according to the Koran it is the duty of every Muslim in the world, who prepares himself for this all his life.

[Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad Sadyk, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan—identified by caption—in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation] We realize what an important historic event this is in the lives of Muslims and all believers, says the mufti. We have begun to experience in reality the democratic changes for the better in the country, and the fact that we are opening new mosques and are preparing to publish the Koran in the Uzbek language, and now this long-awaited hajj to mecca—these are vivid confirmation of that.

[Ganiyev] But we should not fail to mention today how difficult has been the believers' path to Jeddah. As far back as the spring, important documents were signed by President Gorbachev and Uzbek President Karimov concerning the organization of the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Many ministries and departments were involved in this, but because of bureaucratic red tape and lack of coordination among these the pilgrims had to spend almost a week hanging about in Tashkent, waiting for foreign currency and departure documents. And only today, the very day of the beginning of the holy services in Mecca, have the believers been able to take off for Jeddah aboard two aircraft belonging to the civil aviation administration of Uzbekistan.